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temic analogue: eudaimonistic virtue epistemology.
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the right sort of community being indispensable for
the cultivation of the intellectual virtues necessary to
each project. This paper proposes a unification of the
two projects by arguing that the intellectual good life
sought by eudaimonistic virtue epistemologists is best
realized through the articulation of an account of argu-
mentation that contributes to human flourishing.
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Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) emphasize the
roles arguers play in the conduct and evaluation of
arguments, and lay particular stress on arguers’ ac-
quired dispositions of character, that is, virtues and
vices. The inspiration for VTA lies in virtue epistemol-
ogy and virtue ethics, the latter being a modern revival
of Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle is also, of course, the fa-
ther of Western logic and argumentation. This paper
asks to what degree Aristotle may thereby be claimed
as a forefather by VTA.
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It has been a decade since the phrase virtue argumen-
tation was introduced, and while it would be an exag-
geration to say that it burst onto the scene, it would be
just as much of an understatement to say that it has
gone unnoticed. Trying to strike the virtuous mean be-
tween the extremes of hyperbole and litotes, then, we
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There are at least two reasons why contemporary moral
and political philosophers should be attentive to Aristo-
tle’s account of practical reason. First, in contradistinc-
tion with views that characterize the emotions primar-
ily as a hindrance to practical reasoning, moral philoso-
phers have become increasingly impressed with the re-
vived Aristotelian insight that good practical reasoning
systematically relies on the emotions. Second, accounts
of practical reason have become increasingly important
for political philosophers seeking to theorize the regu-
lative principles governing democratic deliberation. My
intention in this paper is to demonstrate that Aristotle
shows how an account of practical reason and delib-
eration that constructively incorporates the emotions
can illuminate key issues about deliberation at the po-
litical level. First, I argue that, according to Aristotle,
character (êthos) and emotion (pathos) are constitutive
features of the process of phronetic practical delibera-
tion: in order to render a determinate action-specific
judgment, practical deliberation cannot be simply re-
duced to logical demonstration (apodeixis). This can
be seen, I argue, by uncovering an important struc-
tural parallel between the virtue of phronêsis and the
art of rhetoric. Second, this structural parallel helps to
tease out the insights of Aristotle’s account of practi-
cal deliberation for contemporary democratic theory—
in particular, the ethical consequences that follow from
the fact that passionate political deliberation and judg-
ment are unavoidable in democracy and are always sus-
ceptible to straying from issuing forth properly ethical
outcomes.
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Educators concerned with critical thinking have two
distinguishable objectives: to teach a set of skills and
to offer an ideal for a liberally educated citizen. Ei-
ther objective requires focus on the development of the
person, not simply the teaching of methods. Positive
attitudes and dispositions toward critical inquiry must
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tention must be devoted to the prospects for success.
[24] Jonathan E. Adler. Reconciling open-mindedness and belief.
Theory and Research in Education, 2(2):127–142, 2004.
Can one be open-minded about a strongly held belief?
I defend a reconciliation of the suggested conflict that
turns on open-mindedness as an educational aim sub-
ordinate to the aim of knowledge, and as an attitude
about one’s beliefs (a second-order or meta-belief), not
a weakened attitude toward a proposition believed. The
reconciliation is applied to a number of related issues
such as the tension between teaching for autonomy and
rightful claims to authority.
[25] Jonathan E. Adler. Commentary on Daniel H. Cohen: “Virtue
epistemology and argumentation theory”. In Hans V. Hansen,
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ed., Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground, pp. 1–5.
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The best way to nail your opponent – to succeed at the
base motivation of winning or embarrassing or destroy-
ing him – within legal bounds – is to genuinely refute
him, and because the refutation is likely to be a surprise
to the ill-motivated and to have to meet high standards,
the base motives will likely lead to no different a result
than if the motives were pure. If an Aristotelian VE is
to work, it will do so only for domains with intellectu-
ally weak standards and either where the inquirer works
in isolation or he is a member of a inquiring community
that is already varied.
[26] Jonathan E. Adler. Sticks and stones: A reply to Warren. Jour-
nal of Social Philosophy, 39(4):639–655, 2008.
Mark Warren argues that good manners facilitate
democratic deliberation. Their absence or violation im-
pedes it. Consequently, efforts should be taken to en-
sure that one’s speech displays good manners, extend-
ing to insincerity and hypocrisy. Those whose speech is
ill-mannered should be ignored or condemned, expres-
sive, I infer, of our disgust or contempt. They are not
deserving of challenge or dispute. My main critical com-
ment is that great effort must go into realizing Warren’s
recommendations. Implementing them courts dangers
of their own for democratic deliberation. Warren does
not produce evidence either that the problems motivat-
ing his recommendation are severe enough to justify his
recommendations or that the consequences of his rec-
ommendations are likely to work out as he envisages.
Finally, testable, alternative proposals extend reason-
able hope to manage those problems in less intrusive
ways.
[27] Lois Agnew. Intellectual humility: Rhetoric’s defining virtue.
Rhetoric Review, 37(4):334–341, 2018.
Western rhetorical history reveals conflicting claims
about where the strength of our discipline lies. Plato’s
suspicion that sophistic rhetoric offers nothing more
than political advancement and the ability to win au-
diences over to a predetermined position is challenged
by alternative strains that perceive rhetorical skill as
an ethical enterprise grounded in the pursuit of a just
society. While these opposing perspectives have been
highly visible in historical accounts of our field’s devel-
opment, perhaps our most significant contribution to
public discourse resides not in the promise that rhetoric
can achieve particular material outcomes, but in our
longstanding commitment to the virtue of intellectual
humility. The focus on language and symbols in rhetor-
ical studies, alongside our field’s historic relationship
to preparing students for civic deliberation, provides
rhetoric scholars and teachers with a unique role in ex-
ploring the potential of pedagogical methods that pro-
mote this virtue, particularly as a resource for revitaliz-
ing academic and public discourse. To embrace this role
entails acknowledging the challenge of promoting intel-
lectual humility as a virtue, coming to terms with forces
that have historically undermined this virtue’s central-
ity to our discipline, and exploring ways in which we
can ensure that intellectual humility flourishes within
our academic community and beyond.
[28] Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij. The social virtue of blind deference.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(3):545–582, 2015.
Recently, it has become popular to account for knowl-
edge and other epistemic states in terms of epistemic
virtues. The present paper focuses on an epistemic
virtue relevant when deferring to others in testimonial
contexts. It is argued that, while many virtue episte-
mologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be ex-
hibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hear-
ers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources for signs
of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who ac-
cepts that also has to accept that an agent may exhibit
epistemic virtue in certain cases of blind deference, in-
volving someone soaking up everything he or she is told
without any hesitation. Moreover, in order to account
for the kind of virtue involved in the relevant cases of
blind deference, virtue epistemologists need to aban-
don a widespread commitment to personalism, i.e., the
idea that virtue is possessed primarily on account of
features internal to the psychology of the person, and
accept that some virtues are social virtues, possessed
in whole or in large part on account of the person being
embedded in a reliable social environment.
[29] Scott F. Aikin. Holding one’s own. Argumentation, 22:571–584,
2008.
There is a tension with regard to regulative norms
of inquiry. One’s commitments must survive critical
scrutiny, and if they do not survive, they should be
revised. Alternately, for views to be adequately articu-
lated and defended, their proponents must maintain a
strong commitment to the views in question. A solution
is proposed with the notion of holding one’s own as the
virtue of being reason-responsive with the prospects of
improving the view in question.
[30] Scott F. Aikin. A defense of war and sport metaphors in argu-
ment. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 44(3):250–272, 2011.
The bottom line is that war and sport metaphors reflect
the intrinsic adversariality of argument.That does not
mean that arguments thereby must be hypercombative.
Rather, once we recognize this intrinsic adversariality
of argument, we must develop techniques to moderate
the heat of argumentative exchanges. My argument is
that the alternative models of arguments can achieve
these ends. In this respect, I fully endorse the devel-
opment of nonadversarial metaphors for argument but
precisely for the reason that argument is adversarial
and they help its management.
[31] Scott F. Aikin. Fallacy theory, the negativity problem, and min-
imal dialectical adversariality. Cogency, 9(1):7–19, 2017.
Fallacy theory has been criticized for its contributing
to unnecessary adversariality in argument. The view of
minimal adversariality by Trudy Govier has received
similar criticism. A dialectical modification of Govier’s
minimal view is offered that makes progress in replying
to these challenges.
[32] Scott F. Aikin. Argumentative adversariality, contrastive rea-
sons, and the winners-and-losers problem. Topoi, 2021. Forthcom-
ing.
This essay has two connected theses. First, that given
the contrastivity of reasons, a form of dialectical adver-
sariality of argument follows. This dialectical adversari-
ality accounts for a broad variety of both argumentative
virtues and vices. Second, in light of this contrastivist
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view of reasons, the primary objection to argumen-
tative adversarialism, the winners-and-losers problem,
can be answered.
[33] Scott F. Aikin & Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht. Argumentative
ethics. In Hugh LaFollette, ed., International Encyclopedia of
Ethics. John Wiley & Sons, 2020.
Argument is widely taken to be the resolution of dis-
agreements by way of the exchange of reasons. This is
a good start, but it seems that sometimes we argue
when there is no disagreement, and sometimes there
is no actual exchange of reasons when arguments are
given in monologue. Regardless, argument requires rea-
sons, and those reasons when marshaled are supposed
to yield some change in what is accepted or the degree
to which it is accepted. Additionally, arguments are
products of our rational sociability, for with argument
we share evidence, address questions, resolve our differ-
ences, and create solidarity. Given that argument is a
social activity, it stands to reason that there are ethical
norms that bear on the practice. This entry will survey
three debates regarding the ethics of argument. The
first bears on whether argument is intrinsically adver-
sarial and what norms obtain regarding how arguments
must be managed in light of the adversariality question.
Call this the adversariality debate. Second, given that,
structurally, arguments are composed of premises and
conclusions, there is a question of what ethical norms
bear on the management and presentation of those core
structural elements. Call this the dialecticality debate.
Third, and finally, there is the question of what is worth
arguing over and who is welcome in those arguments.
The question is how open should inquiry and public
argument be. Call this the argument liberalism debate.
This entry will provide overviews of these three sites of
controversy.
[34] Scott F. Aikin & Mark Anderson. Argumentative norms in
Republic I. Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 13(2):18–23,
2006.
We argue that there are three norms of critical discus-
sion in stark relief in Republic I. The first we see in the
exchange with Cephalus—that we interpret each other
and contribute to discussions in a maximally argumen-
tative fashion. The second we see in the exchange with
Polemarchus—that in order to cooperate in dialectic,
interlocutors must maintain a distance between them-
selves and the theses they espouse. This way they can
subject the views to serious scrutiny without the risk
of personal loss. Third, and finally, from Socrates’ ex-
change with Thrasymachus, it is clear that uncooper-
ative discussants must be handled in a fashion that
reinforces the goals of dialectic. So Thrasymachus is
refuted and silenced not just for the sake of correcting
his definition of justice, but also for the sake of those
listening.
[35] Scott F. Aikin & John P. Casey. Straw men, iron men, and
argumentative virtue. Topoi, 35(2):431–440, 2016.
The straw man fallacy consists in inappropriately con-
structing or selecting weak (or comparatively weaker)
versions of the opposition’s arguments. We will sur-
vey the three forms of straw men recognized in the
literature, the straw, weak, and hollow man. We will
then make the case that there are examples of inap-
propriately reconstructing stronger versions of the op-
position’s arguments. Such cases we will call iron man
fallacies. The difference between appropriate and inap-
propriate iron manning clarifies the limits of the virtue
of open-mindedness.
[36] Scott F. Aikin & J. Caleb Clanton. Developing group-
deliberative virtues. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27(4):409–
424, 2010.
In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims:
first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation
can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and,
second, that successful deliberative groups depend on
individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The devel-
opment of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors
argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but
political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous
deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues con-
tribute to the deliberative synergy of the group, not
only in terms of improving the quality of the group’s
present decisions, but also improving the background
conditions for continued group deliberation. The au-
thors sketch a preliminary schedule of these group-
deliberative virtues modelled on Aristotle’s conception
of virtue as the mean between two extreme vices. The
virtues discussed in this article include deliberative wit,
friendliness, empathy, charity, temperance, courage,
sincerity, and humility.
[37] Scott F. Aikin & Robert B. Talisse. Modus tonens. Argumen-
tation, 22:521–529, 2008.
Restating an interlocutor’s position in an incredulous
tone of voice can sometimes serve legitimate dialecti-
cal ends. However, there are cases in which incredulous
restatement is out of bounds. This article provides an
analysis of one common instance of the inappropriate
use of incredulous restatement, which the authors call
“modus tonens.” The authors argue that modus tonens
is vicious because it pragmatically implicates the view
that one’s interlocutor is one’s cognitive subordinate
and provides a cue to like-minded onlookers that di-
alectical opponents are not to be treated as epistemic
peers.
[38] Khameiel Al Tamimi. Evaluating narrative arguments. In
Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation,
Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Con-
ference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
This paper will discuss how narrative arguments should
be evaluated, i.e I will offer a means of differentiating
between acceptable and unacceptable narrative argu-
ments. I will argue that narrative arguments should
not be evaluated as products; hence narrative argument
evaluation will be a rhetorical evaluation focused on the
process. In line with the rhetorical model of argument
evaluation, I develop an account of the virtuous audi-
ence, which will be the standard for assessing narrative
arguments.
[39] Khameiel Al Tamimi. A Narrative Account of Argumentation.
Ph.D. thesis, York University, Toronto, 2017.
In this dissertation I attempt to accomplish three goals.
The first goal is to develop a narrative account of ar-
gumentation. I show that storytelling serves as a le-
gitimate mode of argumentation. Further, I develop an
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account of narrative argument based on generalized fea-
tures of narrative and a conception of argument that is
rhetorical and in line with Charles Willard’s notion of
argument as an interaction (1989). I identify features
of narrative argument that enable narrative to function
as an argument and thus to provide reasons for a claim
in the context of disagreement. As a result, I synthesize
literatures on narrative and argumentation to provide a
definition of narrative argument. The second goal of the
dissertation is to argue for maintaining the narrative
as a process without reconstructing the narrative into
the dominant model of argument, the Critical-Logical
Model. In this part of the dissertation, I further elabo-
rate on the definition of narrative argument and argue
that narrative argument must be understood as a pro-
cess, and not as a product of argument. While the prod-
uct view focuses on the form and structure of an argu-
ment as being linear, explicit, and containing premises
and a conclusion, and thus treats arguments as things,
the process view focuses on the whole act of arguing,
thus highlighting the importance of the context of ar-
gumentation and the people involved. In support of this
thesis, I show that reducing the narrative into premises
and a conclusion is problematic because it deprives it
of some of its persuasive force. As such, I argue against
the reductionist approach to narrative argument that
seeks to extract premises and a conclusion from a nar-
rative, because I contend that the whole act of story-
telling is an argument. Reducing the narrative into a
product removes the real argument—part of which is
implicit—from its context, its unique situation, and its
complex social setting. The third goal of this disserta-
tion is to develop an account of argument evaluation
that is suitable for narrative argument understood as
a process. I offer an account of how to evaluate narra-
tives using ‘the virtuous audience,’ a novel evaluative
method that combines theories of virtue argumenta-
tion and rhetorical audiences. In sum, this dissertation
provides a definition of narrative argument, stipulates
the conditions of narrative arguments that make them
successful, and offers ways of evaluating the narrative
while maintaining its form as a process.
[40] Susan K. Allard-Nelson. Virtue in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A
metaphysical and ethical capacity. Philosophy and Rhetoric,
34(3):245–259, 2001.
I intend to argue here that Aristotle’s identification
of aretê with dynamis in Rhetoric can be understood
within the highly specific context of rhetoric as an art
as more appropriate, both metaphysically and ethically,
than would have been an identification of aretê with
hexis. I also intend to argue that, while certain ten-
sions and difficulties are created by the classification
of aretê as a dynamis in the Rhetoric and as a hexis
in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle can be defended
against the charge of inconsistency.
[41] Derek Allen. Commentary on Daniel H. Cohen’s “Sincerity,
Santa Claus arguments and dissensus in coalitions”. In Juho Ri-
tola, ed., Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, pp. 1–5.
OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2009.
I consider three questions arising from Cohen’s inter-
esting paper: Is sincerity in premise assertion a premise
virtue? Are arguers who are insincere in the assertion
of one or more of their premises necessarily indifferent
to the truth? Does their insincerity necessarily prevent
their argumentation from producing cognitive benefits?
[42] Amalia Amaya. Virtue and reason in law. In Maksymilian
Del Mar, ed., New Waves in Philosophy of Law, pp. 123–143.
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011.
The concept of virtue figures prominently in current ap-
proaches to moral and epistemic reasoning. This chap-
ter aims to apply virtue theory to the domain of le-
gal reasoning. My claim is that a virtue approach to
legal reasoning illuminates some key aspects of legal
reasoning which have, at best, been peripheral in the
standard theory of legal reasoning. From a virtue per-
spective, I shall argue, emerges a picture of legal rea-
soning that differs in some essential features from the
prevalent rule-based approach to legal reasoning.
[43] Amalia Amaya. The role of virtue in legal justification. In Amalia
Amaya & Hock Lai Ho, eds., Law, Virtue and Justice. Hart Pub-
lishing, Oxford, 2012.
There are many potential applications of virtue theory
to law. One could hold an aretaic theory of law, ac-
cording to which the aim of the law is to make citizens
virtuous. One could develop a theory of legal ethics
on a model of virtues, as some scholars have started
to do. Virtue theory could also be applied to examine
problems in diverse areas of the law, beyond criminal
law, such as torts, evidence law, or constitutional law.
Virtue approaches to justice, which is arguably, a piv-
otal virtue in law and the more legal of the virtues,
could be developed as well. Finally, one could also de-
velop an aretaic approach to adjudication, that is, an
account that explains in aretaic terms the conditions
under which legal decisions are justified. In what fol-
lows, I shall focus on the possibilities of developing a
virtue-based account of adjudication. First, I shall pro-
vide some reasons why one might find an aretaic ap-
proach to legal justification appealing. Secondly, I shall
distinguish different versions of virtue jurisprudence,
depending on the role that they assign to virtue in a
theory of justification. Last, I shall explore some of the
implications of an aretaic approach to legal justification
to the theory of legal reasoning.
[44] Amalia Amaya. Virtud y razón en el derecho: Hacia una teoría
neo-aristotélica de argumentación jurídica. In Guillermo Lar-
iguet & René de la Vega, eds., Cuestiones Contemporáneas de
Filosofía del Derecho, pp. 1–13. Temis, Bogotá, 2013. In Spanish.
The concept of virtue occupies a prominent place in
contemporary approaches to moral reasoning and epis-
temic reasoning. The objective of this work is to apply
the theory of neo-Aristotelian virtue to the field of legal
reasoning. The neo-Aristotelian conception of practical
reason, as I will try to show in this paper, brings to
light some central aspects of legal reasoning that are
buried in the standard theories of legal argumentation.
In addition, an aretaic approach to legal argumentation
allows us to appreciate that there are important con-
nections between the theory of legal argumentation and
judicial ethics. Therefore, and this is the central thesis
of this work, the neo-Aristotelian conception of practi-
cal reason has important implications for the theory of
legal argumentation.
[45] Amalia Amaya. The virtue of judicial humility. Jurisprudence,
9(1):97–107, 2018.
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This paper articulates an egalitarian conception of judi-
cial humility and justifies its value on the grounds that
it importantly advances the legal and political ideal
of fraternity. This account of the content and value of
the virtue of humility stands in sharp contrast with the
dominant view of judicial humility as deference or judi-
cial restraint. The paper concludes by discussing some
ways in which the account of humility and of its value
provided in the paper furthers our understanding of
the judicial virtues and of the political implications of
giving virtue a role in adjudication.
[46] Amalia Amaya. Group-deliberative virtues and legal epistemol-
ogy. In Jordi Ferrer Beltran & Carmen Vazquez, eds., Evi-
dential Legal Reasoning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2021. Forthcoming.
Collective agents play a critical role in the legal deter-
mination of facts. The jury remains the primary fact-
finding institution in many legal cultures and multi-
member courts are also entrusted, in some legal sys-
tems, with the task of determining the facts at trial.
Notwithstanding the relevance of group-decision mak-
ing in evidential reasoning in law, legal epistemology,
for the most part, embraces a highly individualistic per-
spective. A focus on the individual processes of legal
decision-making is also a characteristic of attempts to
address problems of legal epistemology by using the
framework of virtue theory. In this paper, my aim is
to contribute to the study of the social dimensions of
deliberation about factual issues in law. More specifi-
cally, I will examine the relevance of group deliberative
virtues, i.e., the traits of character that enable sound
group-deliberation, to the epistemology of legal proof.
[47] Ruth Amossy. Ethos at the crossroads of disciplines: Rhetoric,
pragmatics, sociology. Poetics Today, 22(1):1–23, 2001.
Examining the rhetorical notion of ethos at the cross-
roads of disciplines, this article builds up an integrated
model attempting to reconcile Bourdieu’s theory of lan-
guage and power with pragmatic views of illocution-
ary force. For the sociologist, the authority of the or-
ator depends on his institutional position; for Ducrot
or Maingueneau, drawing on Aristotle, the image of
the orator is built by the discourse itself. Analyzing
political as well as literary texts, this essay takes into
account the institutional position of the speaker; his
“prior ethos” (the image his audience has of him before
he takes the floor); the distribution of roles inherent
in the selected genre and the stereotypes attached to
these roles; and the verbal strategies through which the
speaker builds an image of self in his discourse. “Argu-
mentative analysis” thus explores a dynamic process in
which social, institutional, and linguistic elements are
closely connected.
[48] Anne-Maren Andersen. Pistis—the common Ethos? In Dima
Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumenta-
tion: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
The classical Greek term pistis (trust) is presented as a
relevant norm in the analysis of parliamentary debate.
Through exploration of pistis apparent similarities to
the term ethos have appeared. It is proposed that pistis
can be viewed as the equivalent to ethos, concerning the
common space or connection between the speaker and
the audience. Tentatively “truth”, “faith” and “respect”
are proposed as the elements equivalent to phronesis,
areté and eunoia.
[49] Anne-Maren Andersen. Response to my commentator. In Dima
Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumenta-
tion: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
Paul van den Hoven questions the way I use the term
pistis. To some extent the critique is understandable, as
I only very briefly examine the classic rhetorical origins
of pistis.
[50] Marcela Andoková & Silvia Vertanova. Is rhetoric ethical?
The relationship between rhetoric and ethics across history and
today. Graecolatina et Orientalia, 37–38:133–145, 2016.
The theme of the relationship between rhetoric and
ethics brings us back to old Greece, which has become
a cradle of European civilization. The need to develop
speech abilities was conditioned by the need for indi-
vidual defense during court trials, and gradually be-
came important in political discourse within Athenian
democracy. Sometimes, the voices of such philosophers
as Plato began to echo very quickly, accusing rhetoric
of being unethical. Over the course of history, many sci-
entists and thinkers have overlooked rhetoric and even
rejected it, considering it to be an effective means of
manipulation. For this reason, communicators some-
times deny the fact that they are using rhetoric in their
speech. Definitely the most effective forms of rhetoric
are those that hide their own strategies and intentions.
The complete denial of freedom of public expression
during the political totalitarian regimes of the 20th cen-
tury can be considered the culmination of the decline of
rhetoric. With the spread of mass media and ongoing
globalization, however, the need for rhetorical educa-
tion within education systems appears more urgent in
today’s world than ever before. Current society is under
heavy pressure from mass media, which often does not
even count on real or fictitious dialogue with its recip-
ients as it used to be in antiquity. Therefore, we strive
to emphasize that ethics is in no way contradictory to
rhetoric, but it can become an effective weapon in the
hands of both the speakers and their listeners. What
rhetoric makes good or bad is the ethical/unethical at-
titude of the person who uses it.
[51] Satoru Aonuma. Dialectic of/or agitation? Rethinking argumen-
tative virtues in Proletarian Elocution. In Dima Mohammed &
Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
This paper explores the possible rapprochement be-
tween Marxism and argumentation attempted in Prole-
tarian Elocution, a 1930 Japanese publication. Against
a Western Marxist commonplace that “[a]s far as
rhetoric is concerned,. . . a Marxist must be in a cer-
tain sense a Platonist” (Eagleton, 1981), the paper dis-
cusses how this work seeks to takes advantage of the
inquiry and advocacy dimensions of argumentation for
the Marxian strategy of “agitprop” and rearticulate it
as part of civic virtues.
[52] David Archard. Political disagreement, legitimacy, and civility.
Philosophical Explorations, 4(3):207–222, 2001.
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For many contemporary liberal political philosophers
the appropriate response to the facts of pluralism is the
requirement of public reasonableness, namely that in-
dividuals should be able to offer to their fellow citizens
reasons for their political actions that can generally be
accepted.This article finds wanting two possible argu-
ments for such a requirement: one from a liberal prin-
ciple of legitimacy and the other from a natural duty
of political civility. A respect in which conversational
restraint in the face of political agreement involves in-
civility is sketched.The proceduralist view which com-
mends substantive disagreement within agreement on
procedures is briefly outlined, as is the possible role for
civic virtue on this view.
[53] Michael J. Ardoline. Impassioning reason: On the role of habit
in argumentation. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński,
eds., Argumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the
First European Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June
2015, vol. 2, pp. 205–213. College Publications, London, 2016.
Reason and argument must be understood in their re-
lation to habit for a full account of decision-making.
While reason attempts disinterestedness, argument is
bound up in interest and passions. Argument, there-
fore, cannot be separated from habit. As all decision-
making requires interest, an understanding of “reason-
ing well” as an ongoing process in which an agent must
continually work to turn reasoned thought into habit
through activity of argumentation is required.
[54] Adam E. O. Auch. Virtuous argumentation and the challenges of
hype. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of
Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA),
May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
In this paper, I consider the virtue of proportionality
in relation to reasoning in what I call ‘hype contexts’
(contexts in which otherwise perfectly temperate claims
take on an outsized or inappropriate importance, sim-
ply due to their ubiquity). I conclude that a virtuous
reasoner is one that neither accepts nor rejects a claim
based on its ubiquity alone, but who evaluates its im-
portance with reference to the social context in which
it is made.
[55] Jason Baehr. The structure of open-mindedness. Canadian Jour-
nal of Philosophy, 41(2):191–213, 2011.
I take as my immediate focus that which is distinctive
of open-mindedness as compared with other intellectual
virtues—not the qualities that make open-mindedness
an intellectual virtue per se or the qualities it has in
common with other intellectual virtues. In addition to
sketching an account of the basic nature and structure
of open-mindedness, I shall also give brief consideration
to two further issues: first, the characteristic function
of open-mindedness vis-à-vis other intellectual virtues;
and second, the issue of when (or to whom or how
much) an exercise of open-mindedness is intellectually
appropriate or virtuous.
[56] Jason Baehr. Educating for intellectual virtues: From theory to
practice. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47(2):248–262, 2013.
After a brief overview of what intellectual virtues are,
I offer three arguments for the claim that education
should aim at fostering ‘intellectual character virtues’
like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual courage,
and intellectual honesty. I then go on to discuss sev-
eral pedagogical and related strategies for achieving
this aim.
[57] Jason Baehr. Intellectual virtues, critical thinking, and the aims
of education. In Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David
Henderson, & Nikolaj J.L.L. Pedersen, eds., The Routledge
Handbook of Social Epistemology, pp. 447–456. Routledge, Lon-
don, 2019.
The so-called “value turn” in epistemology has led to in-
creased attention to the upper normative dimensions of
the cognitive life—to states like understanding and wis-
dom and to the sorts of character traits or “intellectual
virtues” that facilitate the acquisition of these epistemic
goods. This richer, more normative focus has brought
with it a renewed interest in the intersection of episte-
mology and the philosophy of education. The present
chapter explores this intersection by examining the re-
lationship between critical thinking conceived of as an
educational ideal and intellectual virtues like curiosity,
open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and intellectual
perseverance. How exactly are intellectual virtues re-
lated to critical thinking? Can a person be intellectu-
ally virtuous while failing to be a critical thinker? Or
do intellectual virtues secure a certain level of compe-
tence at critical thinking? In light of these issues, which
of these two ideals is a more suitable educational aim?
[58] Sharon Bailin. The virtue of critical thinking. Philosophy of Ed-
ucation Society Yearbook, 15:327–329, 2003.
In his title, Emery Hyslop-Margison boldly proclaims
the failure of critical thinking. He decries its vices and
concludes that critical thinking is beyond rehabilita-
tion. As an alternative, he extols the virtues of virtue
epistemology. I shall argue that critical thinking is in
no need of rehabilitation as Hyslop-Margison’s case
against it is misdirected. I shall also examine to what
extent the notion of epistemic virtue provides a viable
conceptual or pedagogical alternative to critical think-
ing.
[59] Sharon Bailin. Commentary on: Moira Howes’s “Does happi-
ness increase the objectivity of arguers?”. In Dima Mohammed &
Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
I find myself in agreement with some specific claims, for
example, that a certain type of community is important
for objectivity (critical thinking), that there is a con-
nection between emotion or affect and objectivity (crit-
ical thinking), and, more broadly, that psychological
research can be relevant to discussions of critical think-
ing (for example, the cognitive bias research). Where I
shall focus my commentary is on her conception of the
two main concepts which underpin the central claim,
objectivity and happiness, and on her account of the
relationship between them.
[60] Sharon Bailin. Commentary on Tracy Bowell and Justine Kings-
bury, “Open-mindedness”. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benac-
quista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings
of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2016.
[61] Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby. Reason appreciation. In
H. V. Hansen & R. C. Pinto, eds., Reason Reclaimed: Essays
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in Honor of J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnston, pp. 107–120.
Vale, Newport News, VA, 2007.
The pioneering work of Blair and Johnson has made an
extremely significant contribution to both research and
pedagogy by making reasoning and argumentation a
central concern.Their ideas have generated and inspired
a great deal of research focusing on both the concpet-
ualization of argument and the teaching of argumenta-
tion. In thic chapter we would like to extend that work
by developing a dimension of reasoning which is seldom
made explicit—that of the appreciation of reason. Rea-
son appreciation involves a respect for reasoning based
on an understanding of its nature, role and significance,
and a recognition of its subtleties and aesthetic aspects.
A full appreciation of reason has both cognitive and af-
fective dimensions. Reason appreciation should be one
of the goals of critical thinking instruction.
[62] Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby. DAMed if you do; DAMed
if you don’t: Cohen’s “missed opportunities”. In Patrick Bondy
& Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and
Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21,
2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
This paper addresses Cohen’s criticism of the Domi-
nant Adversarial Model (DAM) of argumentation in his
paper “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation”.
We argue that, while Cohen criticizes the DAM account
for conceptualizing arguments as essentially agonistic,
he accepts its basic framing and does not follow its cri-
tique where it leads. In so doing, he misses the opportu-
nity to develop an alternative, non-adversarial account
of argumentation which would avoid his criticism of
how we evaluate arguments.
[63] Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby. Fostering the virtues of in-
quiry. Topoi, 35(2):367–374, 2016.
This paper examines what constitute the virtues of ar-
gumentation or critical thinking and how these virtues
might be developed. We argue first that the notion of
virtue is more appropriate for characterizing this aspect
than the notion of dispositions commonly employed by
critical thinking theorists and, further, that that it is
more illuminating to speak of the virtues of inquiry
rather than of argumentation. Our central argument is
that learning to think critically it is a matter of learning
to participate knowledgeably and competently in the
practice of inquiry in its various forms and contexts.
Acquiring the virtues of inquiry arise through getting
on the inside of the practice and coming to appreciate
the goods inherent in the practice.
[64] Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby. Is there a role for adversar-
iality in teaching critical thinking? In OSSA 12. 2020.
Although there has been considerable recent debate
on the topic of adversariality in argumentation, this
debate has rarely found its way into work on critical
thinking theory and instruction. This paper focuses on
the implications of the adversariality debate for teach-
ing critical thinking. Is there a role for adversarial ar-
gumentation in critical thinking instruction? Is there
a way to incorporate the benefits of adversarial argu-
mentation while mitigating the problems?
[65] Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby. Is there a role for adversar-
iality in teaching critical thinking? Topoi, 2021. Forthcoming.
There has been considerable recent debate regarding
the possible epistemic benefits versus the potential risks
of adversariality in argumentation. Nonetheless, this
debate has rarely found its way into work on critical
thinking theory and instruction. This paper focuses on
the implications of the adversariality debate for teach-
ing critical thinking. Is there a way to incorporate the
benefits of adversarial argumentation while mitigating
the problems? Our response is an approach based on
dialectical inquiry which focuses on a confrontation of
opposing views within a collaborative framework.
[66] Sherry Baker. The model of the principled advocate and the
pathological partisan: A virtue ethics construct of opposing
archetypes of public relations and advertising practitioners. Jour-
nal of Mass Media Ethics, 23(3):235–253, 2008.
Drawing upon contemporary virtue ethics theory, The
Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathologi-
cal Partisan is introduced. Profiles are developed of di-
ametrically opposed archetypes of public relations and
advertising practitioners. The Principled Advocate rep-
resents the advocacy virtues of humility, truth, trans-
parency, respect, care, authenticity, equity, and social
responsibility. The Pathological Partisan represents the
opposing vices of arrogance, deceit, secrecy, manipula-
tion, disregard, artifice, injustice, and raw self-interest.
One becomes either a Principled Advocate or a Patho-
logical Partisan by habitually enacting or embodying
the virtues or vices in the context of professional prac-
tices.
[67] Sherry Baker & David L Martinson. The TARES test: Five
principles for ethical persuasion. Journal of Mass Media Ethics,
16(2-3):148–175, 2001.
Whereas professional persuasion is a means to an im-
mediate and instrumental end (such as increased sales
or enhanced corporate image), ethical persuasion must
rest on or serve a deeper, morally based final (or relative
last) end. Among the moral final ends of journalism, for
example, are truth and freedom. There is a very real
danger that advertisers and public relations practition-
ers will play an increasingly dysfunctional role in the
communications process if means continue to be con-
fused with ends in professional persuasive communica-
tions. Means and ends will continue to be confused un-
less advertisers and public relations practitioners reach
some level of agreement as to the moral end toward
which their efforts should be directed. In this article
we advance a five-part test (the TARES test) that de-
fines this moral end, establishes ethical boundaries that
should guide persuasive practices, and serves as a set of
action-guiding principles directed toward a moral con-
sequence in professional persuasion. The TARES Test
consists of five principles: Truthfulness (of the mes-
sage), Authenticity (of the persuader), Respect (for the
persuadee), Equity (of the persuasive appeal) and So-
cial Responsibility (for the common good). We provide
checklists to guide the practitioner in moral reflection
and application of TARES Test principles.
[68] Andrew Ball. Are fallacies vices? Topoi, 35(2):423–429, 2016.
Why are some arguments fallacious? Since argumen-
tation is an intellectual activity that can be performed
better or worse, do we evaluate arguments simply in
terms of their content, or does it also make sense to
evaluate the arguer in light of the content put forward?
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From a ‘virtue’ approach, I propose understanding fal-
lacies as having some link with intellectual vice(s).
Drawing from recent work by Paul Grice, Linda Za-
gzebski, Andrew Aberdein, and Douglas Walton, this
essay argues that if there is some sense of argumenta-
tion where an argument is (1) truth-propagating and
not (2) put forward in order to ‘win’, fallacies may be
the vicious element in arguments that undermines (1),
most often because the arguer’s goal is only (2). From
this perspective, fallacies may not only be improper
‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something
lacking in the arguer’s intellectual character.
[69] Nathan Ballantyne. Debunking biased thinkers (including
ourselves). Journal of the American Philosophical Association,
1(1):141–162, 2015.
Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of
others, but we do not always believe what we are told.
We often reject thinkers’ reports by attributing biases
to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I
consider how debunking might work and then examine
whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational
belief in the face of disagreement.
[70] Jonathan E. Barbur & Trischa Goodnow. The arete of
amusement: An Aristotelian perspective on the ethos of The Daily
Show. In Trischa Goodnow, ed., The Daily Show and Rhetoric:
Arguments, Issues, and Strategies, pp. 3–18. Lexington Books,
Lanham, MD, 2011.
Presumably, The Daily Show has not achieved [its] sta-
tus simply because of a vacuum in credible news media,
but rather because the show exhibits qualities that lead
its viewers to see it as trustworthy in its own right—in
rhetorical terminology, qualities that lead its audience
to judge it as possessing ethos, a trait that “brings to
mind a person’s moral character, [and] communal ex-
istence,” exhibited through their skillful use of rhetoric
(Hyde, 2004, p. xvii). Over the rest of this chapter we
briefly review the concept of ethos, then turn to con-
sider how The Daily Show exhibits its ethos.
[71] Y. Michael Barilan & Moshe Weintraub. Persuasion as re-
spect for persons: An alternative view of autonomy and of the
limits of discourse. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,
26(1):13–34, 2001.
The article calls for a departure from the common con-
cept of autonomy in two significant ways: it argues
for the supremacy of semantic understanding over pro-
cedure, and claims that clinicians are morally obliged
to make a strong effort to persuade patients to accept
medical advice. We interpret the value of autonomy
as derived from the right persons have to respect, as
agents who can argue, persuade and be persuaded in
matters of utmost personal significance such as deci-
sions about medical care. Hence, autonomy should and
could be respected only after such an attempt has been
made. Understanding suffering to a significant degree
is a prerequisite to sincere efforts of persuasion. It is
claimed that a modified and pragmatic form of dis-
course is the necessary framework for understanding
suffering and for compassionately interacting with the
frail.
[72] Jeremy Barris. Deep disagreement and the virtues of argumenta-
tive and epistemic incapacity. Informal Logic, 38(3):369–408, 2018.
Fogelin’s (1985) Wittgensteinian view of deep disagree-
ment as allowing no rational resolution has been criti-
cized from both argumentation theoretic and epistemo-
logical perspectives. These criticisms typically do not
recognize how his point applies to the very argumen-
tative resources on which they rely. Additionally, more
extremely than Fogelin himself argues, the conditions
of deep disagreement make each position literally unin-
telligible to the other, again disallowing rational resolu-
tion. In turn, however, this failure of sense is so extreme
that it partly cancels its own meaning as a failure of
sense. Consequently, it paradoxically opens new pos-
sibilities for sense and therefore rationally unexpected
resolutions.
[73] Heather Battaly. Attacking character: Ad hominem argument
and virtue epistemology. Informal Logic, 30(4):361–390, 2010.
The recent literature on ad hominem argument con-
tends that the speaker’s character is sometimes rele-
vant to evaluating what she says. This effort to redeem
ad hominems requires an analysis of character that ex-
plains why and how character is relevant. I argue that
virtue epistemology supplies this analysis. Three sorts
of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s intellectual
character are legitimate. They attack a speaker’s: (1)
possession of reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of re-
sponsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform intellectu-
ally virtuous acts. Legitimate ad hominems conclude
that we should not believe what a speaker says solely
on her say-so.
[74] Heather Battaly. Intellectual perseverance. Journal of Moral
Philosophy, 14(6):669–697, 2017.
I offer a working analysis of the trait of intellectual per-
severance. I argue that it is a disposition to overcome
obstacles, so as to continue to perform intellectual ac-
tions, in pursuit of one’s intellectual goals. Accordingly,
I contend that the trait of intellectual perseverance is
not always an intellectual virtue. I provide a pluralist
analysis of what makes it an intellectual virtue, when
it is one. Along the way, I argue that the virtue of intel-
lectual perseverance can be contrasted with both a vice
of deficiency (capitulation) and a vice of excess (recal-
citrance). I also suggest that the virtues of intellectual
courage and intellectual self-control are types of intel-
lectual perseverance. The essay ends with several open
questions about the virtue of intellectual perseverance.
My hope is that this essay will stimulate further inter-
est in, and analysis of, this important intellectual trait.
[75] Heather Battaly. Closed-mindedness and arrogance. In
Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch, eds., Polarisation,
Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 53–
70. Routledge, London, 2020.
I intend this project to be a contribution to the de-
veloping field of ‘vice epistemology,’ which focuses on
dispositions, attitudes, and character traits that make
us bad thinkers. The industry-term for these qualities
is intellectual vices. The foundational goals of vice epis-
temology include determining which qualities are intel-
lectual vices, and providing analyses of those qualities.
Here, I propose analyses of closed-mindedness and arro-
gance that allow us to distinguish between them, while
also explaining why they are so often found together.
If this is on the right track, closed-mindedness and ar-
rogance are correlated, but they are not the same. By
VIRTUES AND ARGUMENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 11
way of preview, section I identifies closed-mindedness
with being unwilling to engage seriously with intellec-
tual options or unwilling to revise one’s beliefs. Sec-
tion II identifies arrogance with under-owning one’s
cognitive shortcomings and over-owning one’s cognitive
strengths. These analyses of closed-mindedness and ar-
rogance allow for cases where they come apart. Section
III focuses on a sub-set of such cases in which agents
are closed-minded but not arrogant. Real world illustra-
tions include academics, who engage with flat-earthers,
and activists, who engage with white supremacists,
while being unwilling to revise their own beliefs that
the earth is round and that people are people. The fi-
nal section explains why we should nevertheless expect
closed-mindedness and arrogance to be found together.
[76] Michael D. Baumtrog. Considering the role of values in prac-
tical reasoning argumentation evaluation. In Dima Mohammed &
Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
Building upon the role values take in Walton’s theory
of practical reasoning, this paper will frame the ques-
tion of how values should be evaluated into the broader
question of what reasonable practical argumentation is.
The thesis argued for is that if a positive evaluation of
practical reasoning argumentation requires that the ar-
gument avoid a morally negative conclusion, then the
role of values should be given a central, rather than
supportive, position in practical argument evaluation.
[77] Michael D. Baumtrog. The willingness to be rationally per-
suaded. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Ar-
gumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th In-
ternational Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON,
2016.
In this paper I argue that underlying phronêsis is the
more foundational virtue of a willingness to be ratio-
nally persuaded (WTBRP). A WTBRP is a virtue in
the sense that it fulfills the doctrine of the mean by
falling between two vices—never sticking to your posi-
tion and never giving it up. Articulating a WTBRP in
this way also helps address problems phronêsis faces in
light of implicit bias research.
[78] Gregory R. Beabout. What contemporary virtue ethics might
learn from Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, 87:155–166, 2013.
In this paper, I extend contemporary virtue ethics by
pointing to a philosophical insight that emerges from
Aristotle’s Rhetoric: technical mastery of a discipline
or practice involves cultivating the virtue of practical
wisdom. After reviewing features of Alasdair MacIn-
tyre’s virtue ethics, I draw attention to specific virtues
identified by MacIntyre while noting the relative ab-
sence of the virtue of practical wisdom in his discussion
of social practices. I compare and contrast MacIntyre’s
virtue ethics with that of Aristotle. Focusing on Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric, I show how Aristotle suggests that the
virtue of practical wisdom is integral to technical mas-
tery in the art of persuasive public speaking. I argue
that Aristotle’s insight about the tight connection be-
tween practical wisdom and technical mastery is not
limited to the art of rhetoric. Retrieving insights from
Aristotle’s Rhetoric brings into focus ways in which
the virtue of practical wisdom is requisite to technical
mastery more generally.
[79] Marcel Becker. Aristotelian ethics and Aristotelian rhetoric. In
Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.M.S. Coelho, eds.,
Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Jus-
tice, pp. 109–122. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013.
In our search for an appropriate assessment of the place
of rhetoric in courts, we see that the history of philoso-
phy offers a variety of descriptions of what rhetoric is as
well as a variety of notions of what rhetoric should be.
The paper shows that in the work of Aristotle rhetoric
and ethics are inextricably connected. Aristotle’s lim-
itation of rhetorical activity to three domains, his de-
scription of rhetoric as an offshoot from politics, his
view on emotions and his elaboration of rhetoric as
‘technê’ all imply that the art of rhetoric is directly
related to the orientation towards the good life. Subse-
quently the paper shows that Nicomachean Ethics has
a rhetorical calibre. The contingent character of prac-
tical truth implies that discovering and communicating
practical truth inevitably has a rhetoric dimension.
[80] Carl Bereiter. A dispositional view of transfer. In Anne Mc-
Keough, Judy Lee Lupart, & Anthony Marini, eds., Teach-
ing for Transfer: Fostering Generalization in Learning, pp. 21–34.
Routledge, New York, NY, 1995.
There seems to be a trend toward reinterpreting what
are usually thought of as mental abilities or cognitive
skills and treating them instead as dispositions. Schrag
(1988) and Brell (1990) both argued for reinterpreting
critical thinking in this way—treating it as a virtue,
like honesty and kindness, rather than as a mental skill
like deductive reasoning and problem solving. Perkins
(1991) made a similar proposal regarding creativity, of-
fering what he called a dispositional view—in which
creative accomplishment is seen as depending on a com-
bination of personal characteristics, such as persistence
and willingness to take risks, which thus dispose a per-
son to do creative work. I offer a dispositional view of
transfer. This is a somwhat different matter from the
previous ones, because transfer is not usually thought
of as an ability but rather as an event, and the poten-
tial for transfer is not usually thought of as residing in
the learner but rather in whatever has been learned.
[81] Ryan Bevan. Expanding rationality: The relation between epis-
temic virtue and critical thinking. Educational Theory, 59(2):167–
179, 2009.
In this essay, Ryan Bevan explores the pedagogical im-
plications of taking virtue epistemology as the philo-
sophical foundation of educational theory rather than
following the instrumentalist approach that is currently
dominant. According to Bevan, the critical thinking
strategies characteristic of instrumentalism generally
work to further the vocationalization of educational dis-
course as well as the cultivation of unreflective moral
agents. He contends that critical thinking should be
expanded beyond its rationalist criteria to focus on
the process of inquiry. Such a virtue epistemology ap-
proach, according to Bevan, has the potential to un-
cover and change fundamental misconceptions that per-
vade current theoretical assumptions by encouraging
learners to engage in a more inclusive inquiry that
draws out alternative perspectives. Bevan concludes
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that citizenship education in particular can benefit
greatly from this more expansive theory with concrete
pedagogical implications.
[82] Noell Birondo. Virtue and prejudice: Giving and taking reasons.
The Monist, 99(2):212–223, 2016.
The most long-standing criticism of virtue ethics in its
traditional, eudaimonistic variety centers on its appar-
ently foundational appeal to nature in order to provide
a source of normativity. This paper argues that a fail-
ure to appreciate both the giving and taking of reasons
in sustaining an ethical outlook can distort a proper
understanding of the available options for this tradi-
tional version of virtue ethics. To insist only on giving
reasons, without also taking (maybe even considering)
the reasons provided by others, displays a sadly illiberal
form of prejudice. The paper finds and criticizes such a
distortion in Jesse Prinz’s recent discussion of the “Nor-
mativity Challenge” to Aristotelian virtue ethics, thus
highlighting a common tendency that we can helpfully
move beyond.
[83] J. Anthony Blair. The moral normativity of argumentation. Co-
gency, 3(1):13–32, 2011.
This essay seeks to answer the question whether there
can be an ethics of argumentation. The alternatives,
that no norms apply to argumentation, and that any
norms that apply to argumentation are exclusively non-
moral, are rejected. Three arguments support the moral
normativity of argumentation. First, some standard
moral norms apply to argumentation in particular; sec-
ond, some standard obligations of argumentation seem
to have a moral supervenience in some situations; third,
there do seem to be moral vices and virtues attrib-
utable to arguers. However, the moral normativity of
argumentation, where it occurs, has only pro tanto ap-
plication.
[84] J. Anthony Blair. Commentary on Andrew Aberdein, “Virtue
argumentation and bias". In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benac-
quista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings
of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2016.
[85] Peter Boghossian & James Lindsay. The Socratic method, de-
feasibility, and doxastic responsibility. Educational Philosophy and
Theory, 50(3):244–253, 2018.
There is an extensive body of philosophical, edu-
cational, and popular literature explaining Socratic
pedagogy’s epistemological and educational ambitions.
However, there is virtually no literature clarifying the
relationship between Socratic method and doxastic re-
sponsibility. This article fills that gap in the literature
by arguing that the Socratic method models many of
the features of an ideally doxastically responsible agent.
It ties a robust notion of doxastic responsibility to the
Socratic method by showing how using defeaters to un-
dermine participants’ knowledge claims can facilitate
responsible belief. It then argues that more robust no-
tions of doxastic responsibility can be augmented by
constructs found in the American Philosophical Asso-
ciation’s Delphi Report. Finally, it shows how consid-
ering challenges (that is, entertaining defeaters) and
modifying beliefs accordingly are objectives of the So-
cratic method and crucial elements of what it means to
be a responsible believer.
[86] Patrick Bondy. Argumentative injustice. Informal Logic,
30(3):263–278, 2010.
The aim of this paper is to adapt Miranda Fricker’s con-
cept of testimonial injustice to cases of what I call “ar-
gumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s
social identity brings listeners to place too much or lit-
tle credibility in an argument. My recommendation is
to adopt a stance of “metadistrust”—we ought to dis-
trust our inclinations to trust or distrust members of
stereotyped groups.
[87] Patrick Bondy. The epistemic approach to argument evaluation:
Virtues, beliefs, commitments. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin
Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON,
2014.
This paper will have two parts. In the first, it will point
out the agreement between lists of paradigm epistemic
and argumentative virtues, and it will take that agree-
ment as prima facie support for the epistemic approach
to argument evaluation. Second, it will consider the dis-
agreement over whether successful argument resolution
requires change of belief or whether it only requires
change of commitment. It turns out that the epistemic
approach is neutral on that question.
[88] Patrick Bondy. Virtues, evidence, and ad hominem arguments.
Informal Logic, 35(4):450–466, 2015.
Argumentation theorists are beginning to recognize
that ad hominem arguments are often legitimate.
Virtue argumentation theorists argue that a character
trait approach to argument appraisal can explain why
ad hominems are legitimate, when they are legitimate.
But I argue that we do not need to appeal to virtue
argumentation theory to explain the legitimacy of ad
hominem arguments; a more straightforward eviden-
tialist approach to argument appraisal is also commit-
ted to their legitimacy. I also argue that virtue argu-
mentation theory faces some important problems, and
that whereas the virtue-theoretic approach in episte-
mology is (arguably) well-motivated, that motivation
does not carry over to virtue argumentation theory.
[89] Patrick Bondy. Bias in legitimate ad hominem arguments. In
Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation,
Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Con-
ference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
This paper will explain that, while justified biases
can give rise to both legitimate and illegitimate ad
hominem attacks, unjustified biases only give rise to il-
legitimate ad hominems. It will also point out that, just
as unjustified biases can make fallacious ad hominems
seem persuasive even when the bias is made explicit, so
too can unjustified biases make legitimate ad hominem
arguments seem unpersuasive, even when the bias is
made explicit.
[90] Patrick Bondy. Response to commentary on “Patrick Bondy,
Bias in legitimate ad hominem arguments”. In Patrick Bondy
& Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and
Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21,
2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
I am grateful to Andrew Aberdein for his thorough and
helpful commentary; he points out a number of places
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where I need to clarify my view. In this brief reply, I
will address three of his points.
[91] Eduard Bonet & Alfons Sauquet. Learning from the Iliad :
Virtues and persuasion. In Eduard Bonet, Bárbara Czarni-
awska, Deirdre McCloskey, & Hans Siggaard Jensen, eds.,
Second Conference on Rhetoric and Narratives in Management
Research: Proceedings, pp. 9–14. ESADE, Barcelona, 2010.
This chapter will discuss some outstanding examples
of persuasion that are presented in the Homeric poem
The Iliad. Even if it is a mythical narrative, it reflects
the influence of dialogues and poetry in the Heroic Ages
of Greek culture some centuries before the Golden Age
of Athens and the creation of the art of rhetoric. This
approach emphasizes the cultural development of nat-
ural skills of persuasion and relates them to the virtues
that are necessary for sustaining a democratic commer-
cial society.
[92] Sandra L. Borden. Aristotelian casuistry: Getting into the thick
of global media ethics. Communication Theory, 26(3):329–347,
2016.
I argue that much moral disagreement between cul-
tures centers on what metaethicists call “thick con-
cepts,” such as cruelty and courage. The main ques-
tion I will address is “What are the advantages of com-
bining virtue ethics with casuistry for addressing thick
concepts central to media ethics disagreements between
cultures?” A related secondary question is “How does
this framework compare with ‘global media ethics’ ap-
proaches that prioritize thin concepts, such as ‘right’
and ‘ought?” ’ I will argue that the virtue/casuistry
combination: (a) preserves the contexts that give thick
ethical concepts their meaning; (b) conceives of moral
agents as situated selves and confirms the value of
moral expertise; and (c) presses for closure while re-
sisting codification.
[93] Tracy Bowell. Commentary on Deep disagreement and patience
as an argumentative virtue, 2020. Presented at Evidence, Persua-
sion and Diversity: 12th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation, University of Windsor,
ON.
[94] Tracy Bowell. With all due respect: Controversial beliefs and
the limits of responsible argumentation. In Catarina Dutilh No-
vaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar, & Bart Ver-
heij, eds., Reason to Dissent: Proceedings of the 3rd European
Conference on Argumentation, Groningen 2019, vol. 1, pp. 621–
635. College Publications, London, 2020.
This paper considers whether there are limits to respon-
sible argumentation when confronting positions that
are a manifestation of bigotry, are racist, misogynis-
tic, homophobic, or highly offensive in other ways. Can
responsible arguing become irresponsible in such con-
texts? And are there situations in which a refusal to
engage is the most responsible way to deal with a par-
ticular position?
[95] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Virtue and argument:
Taking character into account. Informal Logic, 33(1):22–32, 2013.
In this paper we consider the prospects for an account
of good argument that takes the character of the arguer
into consideration. We conclude that although there is
much to be gained by identifying the virtues of the
good arguer and by considering the ways in which these
virtues can be developed in ourselves and in others,
virtue argumentation theory does not offer a plausible
alternative definition of good argument.
[96] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Critical thinking and the
argumentational and epistemic virtues. In Dima Mohammed &
Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
In this paper we argue that while a full-blown virtue-
theoretical account of argumentation is implausible,
there is scope for augmenting a conventional account of
argument by taking a character-oriented turn. We then
discuss the characteristics of the good epistemic citi-
zen, and consider approaches to nurturing these char-
acteristics in critical thinking students, in the hope of
addressing the problem of lack of transfer of critical
thinking skills to the world outside the classroom.
[97] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Virtue and inquiry:
Bridging the transfer gap. In Martin Davies & Ron Barnett,
eds., Palgrave Handbook of Critical Thinking in Higher Education,
pp. 233–245. Palgrave, London, 2015.
In this paper we suggest that a virtues-oriented ap-
proach to teaching critical thinking has the potential to
help bridge the transfer gap. If critical thinking skills
are not sticking, perhaps that is at least in part be-
cause students lack certain intellectual virtues or dispo-
sitions toward conscientious inquiry. We conclude with
some suggestions about how these virtues might be fos-
tered in the context of a first-year undergraduate crit-
ical thinking course.
[98] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Enquiring responsibly in
context: Role relativity and the intellectual virtues. In Dima Mo-
hammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Argumentation and Reasoned
Action: Proceedings of the First European Conference on Argu-
mentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015, vol. 2, pp. 301–309. College
Publications, London, 2016.
In previous work we have outlined a distinction between
three kinds of intellectual virtues: cognitive, regula-
tory and motivational. In the first part of this paper
we outline this distinction. Using it as a framework for
analysis, we develop some case studies through which
we consider which of those characteristics are most cru-
cial to inquiring responsibly when occupying particular
roles in professional and personal lives. We then con-
sider possible impediments to acquiring and exercising
those intellectual virtues.
[99] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Open-mindedness. In
Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation,
Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Con-
ference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
Dewey defines open-mindedness as “freedom from prej-
udice, partisanship, and other such habits as close the
mind and make it unwilling to consider new problems
and entertain new ideas" (1910, p. 30). It is commonly
included in lists of epistemic and argumentative virtues.
We begin this paper with brief discussion of various ac-
counts of open-mindedness. Our principal interest is in
what it is to behave as an open-minded enquirer. Draw-
ing on two cases, we consider whether open-minded
behaviour varies between the contexts of solitary and
community enquiry and whether inquirers face different
challenges to behaving open-mindedly in each of these
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contexts. We conclude that although group deliberation
introduces some extra barriers to open-mindedness, it
can also make it easier to achieve by providing an ex-
ternal check that is absent in solitary inquiry.
[100] Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury. Virtue argumentation
theory reconsidered: Towards a complete account of good argu-
ment. In Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat, eds., Argumenta-
tion and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference
on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017, vol. 2, pp. 107–114. College
Publications, London, 2018.
According to virtue argumentation theorists, virtues
displayed by the arguer are constitutive of good argu-
ment. In earlier work we raise some problems for this
approach, but as Paglieri points out, our objections
presuppose a view of what argument is, and what good
argument is, not accepted by virtue theorists. Here we
first clarify our position. Then, prompted by Paglieri
and Aberdein, we step back from this particular de-
bate to consider more general questions it raises.
[101] Antoine C Braet. Ethos, pathos and logos in Aristotle’s
Rhetoric: A re-examination. Argumentation, 6(3):307–320, 1992.
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, logos must be conceived as en-
thymematical argumentation relative to the issue of the
case. Ethos and pathos also can take the form of an
enthymeme, but this argumentation doesn’t relate (di-
rectly) to the issue. In this kind of enthymeme, the con-
clusion is relative to the ethos of the speaker or (reasons
for) the pathos of the audience. In an ideal situation—
with a good procedure and rational judges—logos dom-
inates and in the real situation of Aristotle’s time—
with an imperfect procedure and irrational judges—
ethos and pathos prevail.
[102] Hugh Breakey. The ethics of arguing. Inquiry, 2021. Forthcom-
ing.
Contemporary argumentation theory has developed an
impressive array of norms, goals and virtues applica-
ble to ideal argument. But what is the moral status
of these prescriptions? Is an interlocutor who fails to
live up to these norms guilty of a moral failing as well
as an epistemic or cognitive error? If so, why? In
answering these questions, I argue that deliberation’s
epistemic and cognitive goods attach to important eth-
ical goods, and that respect for others’ rationality, the
ethics of joint action, and the importance of consensus
join forces with these goods to provide strong reasons
for cleaving to high standards of argument. I sketch
an illustrative continuum of argument practices of dif-
ferent deliberative-cum-ethical standards, and consider
how one should ethically respond when faced with an
interlocutor employing less than ideal standards.
[103] Hugh Breakey. “That’s unhelpful, harmful and offensive!” Epis-
temic and ethical concerns with meta-argument allegations. Argu-
mentation, 2021. Forthcoming.
“Meta-argument allegations” consist of protestations
that an interlocutor’s speech is wrongfully offensive
or will trigger undesirable social consequences. Such
protestations are meta-argument in the sense that they
do not interrogate the soundness of an opponent’s ar-
gumentation, but instead focus on external features of
that argument. They are allegations because they im-
ply moral wrongdoing. There is a legitimate place for
meta-argument allegations, and the moral and epis-
temic goods that can come from them will be front
of mind for those levelling such allegations. But I argue
there is a dark side to such allegations, and their epis-
temic and moral costs must be seriously weighed. Meta-
argument allegations have a concerning capacity to de-
rail discussions about important topics, stymieing ar-
gumentational interactions and the goods they provide.
Such allegations can license efforts to silence, punish
and deter—even as they provoke the original speaker to
retaliate in kind. Used liberally, such allegations can es-
calate conflicts, block open-mindedness, and discourage
constructive dialogues. In response, I defend “argumen-
tational tolerance”—a principled wariness in employing
meta-argument allegations—as a virtue of ethical argu-
ment.
[104] Carl D Brell. Critical thinking as transfer: The reconstructive
integration of otherwise discrete interpretations of experience. Ed-
ucational Theory, 40(1):53–68, 1990.
Examines the theoretical underpinnings of the debate
on the transferability of critical thinking skills and
discusses methods of fostering critical thinking in the
classroom. The foremost task in teaching critical think-
ing is fostering in students habits of inquiry which lead
to a disposition to seek intellectual, moral, and social
integration.
[105] Alan Brinton. Quintilian, Plato, and the “vir bonus”. Philosophy
& Rhetoric, 16(3):167–184, 1983.
There are at least three possible readings of the vir
bonus doctrine in Book XII, and it seems clear that
Quintilian intends all three: (1) an orator ought to be
good; (2) an orator will be effective only if good; (3) an
orator is good as a matter of definition. The remainder
of this essay will be devoted to an examination of each
of these three, in turn, with some emphasis on connec-
tions between the second and third and Platonism.
[106] Alan Brinton. Ēthotic argument. History of Philosophy Quar-
terly, 3(3):245–258, 1986.
There has been extended discussion of “ethical proof”
by recent speech theorists; but it has for the most part
centered around diluted conceptions of ªθος and fo-
cused almost exclusively on empirical questions. It is
the question of the nature of the appeal to ªθος as a
form of argument which is the subject of the present
essay. Our discussion will begin with Aristotle’s con-
ception of “ethical proof” in the Art of Rhetoric, but
will then turn to the Nicomachean Ethics for a fuller
conception of ªθος and for materials which will be suf-
ficient for a more adequate account of its role in argu-
ment, with a view toward its justification. We will then
turn to some actual uses of ªθος in reasoning by Seneca
and other Stoics. Finally, we will consider briefly the
role of ªθος in wider contexts of argumentation.
[107] Wayne Brockriede. Arguers as lovers. Philosophy and Rhetoric,
5(1):1–11, 1972.
When the logician proclaims triumphantly, as a resuit
of the way he orders his premises, that Socrates is mor-
tal, he does not need to know anything about him-
self or his respondents (except that they are “rational"
and will follow the rules) to know the conclusion is en-
tailed by the premises. But when an arguer maintains
a philosophic position, a scientific theory, or a politi-
cal policy—in short, any substantive proposition—the
coarguer’s response may be influenced by who he is,
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who the arguer is, and what their relationship is. Per-
haps as good a way as any to distinguish the study of
logic from the study of argument is to understand that
logicians can safely ignore the influence of people on
the transaction; arguers cannot.
[108] Étienne Brown. Civic education in the post-truth era: Intellec-
tual virtues and the epistemic threats of social media. In Colin
Macleod & Christine Tappolet, eds., Shaping Citizens: Philo-
sophical Perspectives on Education, pp. 45–67. Routledge, London,
2019.
In section I, I argue that the current epistemic environ-
ment of liberal democracies – especially the one found
on social media – is not conducive to good democratic
decision-making by identifying three distinct threats
that relate to their use: epistemic bubbles, echo cham-
bers and misinformation. Section II argues that the ac-
quisition of a set of four intellectual virtues – open-
mindedness, intellectual caution, intellectual courage
and intellectual humility – is a partial remedy to these
epistemic threats. It also sketches pedagogical strate-
gies that can facilitate the acquisition of such virtues in
the classroom. Finally, section III discusses two possible
justifications for the inclusion of intellectual virtues in
school curricula. While the most straightforward way
to justify this claim is on intellectually perfectionist
grounds, I contend that individuals who reject intel-
lectual perfectionism can still support the teaching of
intellectual virtues for properly democratic reasons.
[109] Anthony Browne. The Retreat of Reason: Political Correctness
and the Corruption of Public Debate in Modern Britain. Civitas,
London, 2006.
Starting as a reaction to the dominant ideology, [po-
litical correctness] has become the dominant ideology.
It defines the terms and parameters of any national
debate. Anything that is not PC is automatically con-
troversial. Across much of the public sphere, it has re-
placed reason with emotion, subordinating objective
truth to subjective virtue.
[110] Katarzyna Budzyńska & Maciej Witek. Non-inferential as-
pects of ad hominem and ad baculum. Argumentation, 28:301–315,
2014.
The aim of the paper is to explore the interrelation
between persuasion tactics and properties of speech
acts. We investigate two types of arguments ad: ad
hominem and ad baculum. We show that with both of
these tactics, the structures that play a key role are
not inferential, but rather ethotic, i.e., related to the
speaker’s character and trust. We use the concepts of
illocutionary force and constitutive conditions related
to the character or status of the speaker in order to ex-
plain the dynamics of these two techniques. In keeping
with the research focus of the Polish School of Argu-
mentation, we examine how the pragmatic and rhetori-
cal aspects of the force of ad hominem and ad baculum
arguments exploit trust in the speaker’s status to in-
fluence the audience’s cognition.
[111] Nicholas C. Burbules. The virtues of reasonableness. In Mar-
gret Buchmann & Robert E. Floden, eds., Philosophy of Ed-
ucation 1991: Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting
of the Philosophy of Education Society, pp. 215–224. Philosophy
of Education Society, Normal, IL, 1992.
Becoming a reasonable thinker and actor has a central
place among our educational aims. Whatever else we
might want students to become, most accounts of edu-
cation include the desire to foster in them the habits of
thought of a reasonable, reflective, open-minded per-
son. Debates, however, arise over three issues: first,
exactly what becoming “rational” or “reasonable” en-
tails; second, how best to pursue that aim; and third,
what other educational aims we might hold, and how
they relate to or conflict with that goal. In this paper
I want to sketch some answers to these issues and sug-
gest a defensible conception of “reasonableness” as an
educational aim.
[112] Keith Burgess-Jackson. Famine, affluence, and hypocrisy. Phi-
losophy Study, 10(7):397–413, 2020.
The standard view among philosophers is that an ar-
guer’s hypocrisy (understood as failure to practice what
one preaches) has no bearing on either the merits of his
or her argument or the acceptability of the argument’s
conclusion. I challenge this view. Using the case of Peter
Singer, who has famously argued for a moral obligation
to relieve famine, but who does not, by his own admis-
sion, live in accordance with the standard he espouses,
I explain why (and how) an arguer’s hypocrisy matters.
If I am correct, then the standard view of the relation
between arguer and argument must be revised.
[113] T. Ryan Byerly. Introducing Logic and Critical Thinking: The
Skills of Reasoning and the Virtues of Inquiry. Baker Academic,
Grand Rapids, MI, 2017.
This robust, clear, and well-researched textbook for
classes in logic introduces students to both formal logic
and to the virtues of intellectual inquiry. Part 1 chal-
lenges students to develop the analytical skills of de-
ductive and inductive reasoning, showing them how to
identify and evaluate arguments. Part 2 helps students
develop the intellectual virtues of the wise inquirer.
The book includes helpful pedagogical features such
as practice exercises and a concluding summary with
definitions of key concepts for each chapter.
[114] T. Ryan Byerly. Teaching for intellectual virtue in logic and crit-
ical thinking classes: Why and how. Teaching Philosophy, 42(1):1–
27, 2019.
Introductory-level undergraduate classes in Logic or
Critical Thinking are a staple in the portfolio of many
Philosophy programs. A standard approach to these
classes is to include teaching and learning activities fo-
cused on formal deductive and inductive logic, some-
times accompanied by teaching and learning activities
focused on informal fallacies or argument construction.
In this article, I discuss a proposal to include an addi-
tional element within these classes—namely, teaching
and learning activities focused on intellectual virtues.
After clarifying the proposal, I identify three reasons in
favor of implementing it and I discuss how to implement
it, focusing on questions about pedagogical strategies
and pedagogical resources.
[115] Cheshire Calhoun. The virtue of civility. Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 29(3):251–275, 2000.
The decline of civility has increasingly become the sub-
ject of lament both in popular media and in daily con-
versation. Civility forestalls the potential unpleasant-
ness of a life with other people. Without it, daily social
exchanges can turn nasty and sometimes hazardous. Ci-
vility thus seems to be a basic virtue of social life. Moral
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philosophers, however, do not typically mention civil-
ity in their catalogues or examples of virtue. In what
follows, I want to suggest that civility is a particularly
interesting virtue for moral philosophers because giving
an adequate account of the virtue of civility requires us
to rethink the relationship between moral virtue and
compliance with social norms.
[116] Chris Campolo. Argumentative virtues and deep disagreement.
In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Ar-
gumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of
the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May
22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives
rise to an important practical problem: a deep dis-
agreement may in practice look and feel like a merely
stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique
two strategies for dealing with this practical problem.
According to their proponents these strategies exhibit
argumentative virtue, but I will show that they em-
body serious argumentative (and even moral) vices. I
will close by outlining several genuinely virtuous ap-
proaches to the problem.
[117] Chris Campolo. Commentary on: Michael Baumtrog’s “Consid-
ering the role of values in practical reasoning argumentation evalu-
ation”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of
Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA),
May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
[118] Chris Campolo. On staying in character: Virtue and the possi-
bility of deep disagreement. Topoi, 38(4):719–723, 2019.
The concept of deep disagreement is useful for high-
lighting skills and resources required for reasons-giving
to be effective in restoring cooperative or joint action.
It marks a limit. When it is instead understood as a
challenge to be overcome by using reasons, it leads to
significant practical, theoretical, and moral distortions.
[119] Jonathan Anthony Caravello. Empathy, Open-Mindedness
and Virtue in Argumentation. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cali-
fornia, Santa Barbara, 2018.
How should we respond when someone challenges the
very norms we assume when evaluating arguments? I
challenge a widely-accepted dogmatist answer accord-
ing to which we can justly assert or rely on foundational
norms or principles even when we know our interlocu-
tors reject them. I go on to develop a virtue-theoretic
approach to argumentation, highlighting the central
role played by open-mindedness and related virtues in
distinguishing good from bad arguments. The result-
ing theory elucidates the pragmatic nature of argumen-
tative circularity, offers normative guidance for those
looking to improve their discursive behavior, and makes
some progress towards resolving ongoing debates over
the proper response to peer disagreement.
[120] David Carr. Knowledge and truth in virtuous deliberation.
Philosophia, 48(4):1381–1396, 2020.
The overall aim of this paper is to explore the role of
knowledge and truth in the practical deliberation of
candidate virtuous agents. To this end, the paper con-
siders three criticisms of Julia Driver’s recent defence
of the prospect of ‘virtues of ignorance’ or virtues for
which knowledge may be considered unnecessary or un-
toward. While the present essay agrees with the gen-
eral drift of Driver’s critics that we should reject such
virtues construed as traits that deliberately embrace ig-
norance, it is more sympathetic to the suggestion that
virtue and virtues may need to accommodate some ab-
sence or deficit of knowledge and proceeds to further
scrutiny of this possibility. More radically, however,
the paper concludes by arguing that while knowledge
is an overall desideratum of virtue and virtuous con-
duct, there are circumstances in which even complete
knowledge may be insufficient to identify or determine
the precise course and direction of such conduct.
[121] J. Adam Carter & Daniella Meehan. Vices of distrust. Social
Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 8(10):25–32, 2019.
Vices of distrust are dangerous in their own right, and
in ways that often harm others along with oneself. The
three vices of distrust we want to explore—with a par-
ticular focus on their manifestations online—are: close-
mindedness, emulousness, and arrogance. Each con-
tributes to vicious distrust in its own distinctive way.
[122] John P. Casey. Revisiting the adversary paradigm. In Bart
Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, & Jean H.M.
Wagemans, eds., Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the In-
ternational Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 155–163.
Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2019.
Some argue that adversariality is extraneous to the core
concept of argument. I argue that if we take argument
to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two
considerations show that adversariality is an essential
part of it. First, beliefs are not under our direct vol-
untary control. Second, beliefs are costly both for the
psychological states they provoke and for the fact that
they are causally related to our actions.
[123] John P. Casey. Adversariality and argumentation. Informal
Logic, 40(1):77–108, 2020.
The concept of adversariality, like that of argument,
admits of significant variation. As a consequence, I ar-
gue, the question of adversarial argument has not been
well understood. After defining adversariality, I argue
that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather
than commitments, then two considerations show that
adversariality is an essential part of it. First, beliefs are
not under our direct voluntary control. Second, beliefs
are costly both for the psychological states they pro-
voke and for the fact that they are causally related to
our actions. As a result, argument involving agreement
can also be understood to be adversarial.
[124] John P. Casey & Daniel H. Cohen. Heroic argumentation:
On heroes, heroism, and glory in arguments. In Catarina Du-
tilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar, & Bart
Verheij, eds., Reason to Dissent: Proceedings of the 3rd Euro-
pean Conference on Argumentation, Groningen 2019, vol. 2, pp.
117–127. College Publications, London, 2020.
Despite objections, the argument-as-war metaphor re-
mains conceptually useful for organizing our thoughts
on argumentation into a coherent whole. More signifi-
cantly, it continues to reveal unattended aspects of ar-
gumentation worthy of theorizing. One such aspect is
whether it is possible to argue heroically, where diffi-
culty or peril preclude any obligation to argue, but to
do so would be meritorious if not indeed glorious.
[125] R. Michael Cassidy. Character and context: What virtue the-
ory can teach us about a prosecutor’s ethical duty to “seek justice".
Notre Dame Law Review, 82:635–698, 2006.
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Any attempt to regulate how prosecutors should “act”
in certain highly contextualized and nuanced situa-
tions by developing more specific normative rules is
unworkable. Prosecutorial discretion would be better
constrained in these areas by focusing on what type of
character traits prosecutors should possess or strive to
acquire. Only after we answer the critical preliminary
question of who we want our public prosecutors to “be”
can we possibly hope to discern what we expect our
prosecutors to “do.” In the concluding Part of the Ar-
ticle, I will demonstrate that a renewed emphasis on
character and virtue has direct implications for how
prosecutor’s offices should be structured and organized
in this country, and how individual prosecutors work-
ing within these offices should aspire to conduct their
professional lives.
[126] Emanuela Ceva. Just interactions in value conflicts: The Adver-
sary Argumentation Principle. Politics, Philosophy & Economics,
11(2):149–170, 2012.
This article discusses a procedural, minimalist ap-
proach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable
to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach
may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation
Principle (AAP): the idea that each side in a conflict
should be heard. I engage with Stuart Hampshire’s ef-
forts to justify the AAP and argue that those efforts
have failed to provide normatively cogent foundations
for it. I suggest deriving such foundations from a ba-
sic idea of procedural equality (all parties in a conflict
should be granted an equal chance to have a say) which
all conflicting parties could be thought to endorse. But
what happens once all parties have been heard if no
agreement is reached? Borrowing a distinction well
known to scholars of peace studies, but surprisingly ne-
glected by justice-driven political philosophers, I claim
that although the AAP might be inconclusive with re-
gard to resolving a conflict, it is a promising principle
for managing value conflicts justly. The AAP is thus
considered anew through the lens of conflict manage-
ment: as a principle of justice to characterize norma-
tively the way conflicting parties should interact for
their interaction to be morally justifiable to such par-
ties with a view to changing antagonistic conflict dy-
namics into cooperative ones.
[127] Melvin Chen & Lock Yue Chew. Causal reasoning and Meno’s
paradox. AI & Society, 2021. Forthcoming.
Causal reasoning is an aspect of learning, reasoning,
and decision-making that involves the cognitive ability
to discover relationships between causal relata, learn
and understand these causal relationships, and make
use of this causal knowledge in prediction, explana-
tion, decision-making, and reasoning in terms of coun-
terfactuals. Can we fully automate causal reasoning?
One might feel inclined, on the basis of certain ground-
breaking advances in causal epistemology, to reply in
the affirmative. The aim of this paper is to demon-
strate that one still has good skeptical grounds for
resisting any conclusions in favour of the automation
of causal reasoning. If by causal reasoning is meant
the entirety of the process through which we discover
causal relationships and make use of this knowledge in
prediction, explanation, decision-making, and reason-
ing in terms of counterfactuals, then one relies besides
on tacit knowledge, as might be constituted by or de-
rived from the epistemic faculty virtues and abilities
of the causal reasoner, the value systems and charac-
ter traits of the causal reasoner, the implicit knowledge
base available to the causal reasoner, and the habits
that sustain our causal reasoning practices. While cer-
tain aspects of causal reasoning may be axiomatized
and formalized and algorithms may be implemented to
approximate causal reasoning, one has to remain skep-
tical about whether causal reasoning may be fully auto-
mated. This demonstration will involve an engagement
with Meno’s Paradox.
[128] Gabriel Citron. Honesty, humility, courage, & strength: Later
Wittgenstein on the difficulties of philosophy and the philosophical
virtues. Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(25):1–24, 2019.
What qualities do we need in order to be good philoso-
phers? Wittgenstein insists that virtues of character –
such as honesty, humility, courage, and strength – are
more important for our philosophizing than the rele-
vant intellectual talents and skills. These virtues are
essential because doing good philosophy demands both
knowing and overcoming the deep-seated desires and
inclinations which lead us astray in our thinking, and
achieving such self-knowledge and self-overcoming de-
mands all of these virtues working in concert. In this
paper I draw together many of Wittgenstein’s seem-
ingly offhanded remarks on these issues in order to re-
construct his understanding of philosophy’s ‘difficulties
of the will’ and the virtues needed to overcome them.
[129] Michelle Ciurria. Critical thinking in moral argumentation con-
texts: A virtue ethical approach. Informal Logic, 32(2):239–255,
2012.
Michael Gilbert argues that Cartesian reasoning de-
fined as rational, linear thought processes preclusive
of emotions, intuitions and lived experience, i.e. “Nat-
ural Light Theory” (NLT), fails because it arbitrarily
excludes standard feminine forms of reasoning and ne-
glects the essentially social nature of argumentation.
In this paper, I supplement Gilbert’s view by showing
that NLT fails in a distinctive manner in moral argu-
mentation contexts. Specifically, by requiring arguers
to value truth and justice above their relationship with
their argumentative partner, it tends to alienate the
arguer from her moral motives, engendering a kind of
moral schizophrenia.
[130] Sherman J. Clark. The character of persuasion. Ave Maria Law
Review, 1(1):61–79, 2003.
A persuasive argument is one that responds to the
concerns and priorities of the particular person one
is trying to persuade, one that resonates with his or
her worldview and self-understanding. On this account,
when we persuade we have done more than offer a list
of reasons for holding an opinion or taking an action.
We have, whether consciously or not, evoked and ap-
pealed to some particular set of beliefs, concerns, and
priorities. In the process, we may have done more than
simply persuade that person on the issue at hand. We
may also, whether intentionally or not, have helped to
reinforce and entrench the particular “hierarchy of val-
ues” to which we have appealed.
[131] Sherman J. Clark. What we make matter. Michigan Law Re-
view, 109(6):849–862, 2011.
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I suggest that argument itself—including legal scholar-
ship, law teaching, political rhetoric, and public policy
advocacy—is also potentially constitutive. Moreover, I
would suggest that the ways in which we argue, and in
particular the assumptions on which we base our argu-
ments, are potentially constitutive not just of particu-
lar norms, but of something arguably deeper. What we
let or make matter in our collective conversation about
law and policy may help construct our sense of what
matters in life. And what we let matter in our lives de-
termines to some extent our capacity to thrive—to live
full and productive lives.
[132] Sherman J. Clark. To teach and persuade. Pepperdine Law Re-
view, 39(5):1371–1399, 2013.
Legal speech and religious speech inevitably do some
of the same work. Both are vehicles through which we
both talk about and become the kind of people we are.
Granted, those of us who teach and argue about the
law do not often conceive of our work in this way. That
is part of what I hope to begin to remedy in this es-
say. While the construction of character is a more ob-
vious aspect of religious than legal thought, law, in-
cluding legal argument, can be constitutive in similar
ways. If so—if our ways of talking about the law serve
some of the same ends as do our ways of talking about
religion—then we may be able to learn how better to
talk about the law by thinking about how we talk about
religion. I do not mean things like paragraph structure
or argument organization or the proper use of headings,
but rather something more subtle and more fundamen-
tal. One way to put it is this: legal speech can learn
from religious speech how to be less small, and perhaps
more ennobling.
[133] Sherman J. Clark. An apology for lawyers: Socrates and the
ethics of persuasion. Michigan Law Review, 117:1001–1017, 2019.
I hope here to highlight a set of concerns about the
impact of our speech that are deeper than mere civility
or even honesty. Following Socrates, I suggest that the
way we speak, particularly when we seek to persuade,
can play a role in forming the character of our listeners.
Arguments are, in that sense, potentially constitutive.
As Socrates describes and demonstrates, how we speak
to people can influence how they think about them-
selves and their world. And that in turn can influence
whether and how they thrive.
[134] Nuno M.M.S. Coelho. Controversy and practical reason in
Aristotle. In Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.M.S.
Coelho, eds., Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law: Theory, Prac-
tice and Justice, pp. 87–108. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013.
This chapter aims to show how the Aristotelian theory
of practical reasoning presupposes and mobilises a lin-
guistic community in a specific sense and to understand
the dialogical structure assumed by practical reason.
[135] Daniel H. Cohen. Argument is war . . . and war is hell: Philoso-
phy, education, and metaphors for argumentation. Informal Logic,
17(2):177–188, 1995.
The claim that argumentation has no proper role in
either philosophy or education, and especially not in
philosophical education, flies in the face of both conven-
tional wisdom and traditional pedagogy. There is, how-
ever, something to be said for it because it is really only
provocative against a certain philosophical backdrop.
Our understanding of the concept “argument" is both
reflected by and molded by the specific metaphor that
argument-is-war, something with winners and losers,
offensive and defensive moments, and an essentially ad-
versarial structure. Such arguments may be suitable for
teaching a philosophy, but not for teaching philosophy.
Surely, education and philosophy do not need to be
conceived as having an adversarial essence—if indeed
they are thought to have any essence at all. Accord-
ingly, philosophy and education need more pragmatic
goals than even Pierce’s idealized notion of truth as the
end of inquiry, e.g., the simple furtherance of inquiry.
For this, new metaphors for framing and understand-
ing the concept of argumentation are needed, and some
suggestions in that direction will be considered.
[136] Daniel H. Cohen. Logical fallacies, dialectical transgressions,
rhetorical sins, and other failures of rationality in argumentation.
In Frans H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A.
Willard, & A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, eds., Anyone
Who Has a View: Theoretical Contributions to the Study of Ar-
gumentation, pp. 109–122. Springer, Dordrecht, 2003.
Arguments are more than just sequences of inferences,
so we should not limit our thinking about bad argu-
ments to just those that include bad inferences. Ar-
guments include arguers, and there are more ways for
arguers to go wrong than simply to make bad infer-
ences. And arguments include audiences, whose pres-
ence creates further chances for problematic argumen-
tation. Argument analysis requires more than the tool-
box of logical fallacies generally provides. The task I
am undertaking here is outlining a new taxonomy of er-
rors in arguments, to include not just logical missteps—
fallacies—but also rhetorical and dialectical mistakes.
The organizing principle refers to the norms that are
violated, norms that are associated with the three dom-
inant conceptions—metaphors or models or paradigms,
as you prefer—for arguments. A second task, subse-
quent to the first and approached only tentatively here,
is completing the picture by the raising the possibility
of a new model.
[137] Daniel H. Cohen. Arguments that backfire. In David Hitch-
cock & Daniel Farr, eds., The Uses of Argument, pp. 58–65.
OSSA, Hamilton, ON, 2005.
One result of successful argumentation—able arguers
presenting cogent arguments to competent audiences—
is a transfer of credibility from premises to conclu-
sions. From a purely logical perspective, neither du-
bious premises nor fallacious inference should lower
the credibility of the target conclusion. Nevertheless,
some arguments do backfire this way. Dialectical and
rhetorical considerations come into play. Three inter-
related conclusions emerge from a catalogue of hap-
less arguers and backfiring arguments. First, there are
advantages to paying attention to arguers and their
contexts, rather than focusing narrowly on their argu-
ments, in order to understand what can go wrong in ar-
gumentation. Traditional fallacy identification, with its
exclusive attention to faulty inferences, is inadequate to
explain the full range of argumentative failures. Second,
the notion of an Ideal Arguer can be defined by contrast
with her less than ideal peers to serve as a useful tool
in argument evaluation. And third, not all of the ways
that arguers raise doubts about their conclusions are
pathological. On the contrary, some ways that doubts
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are raised concerning our intended conclusions are an
integral part of ideal argumentative practice.
[138] Daniel H. Cohen. Reply to my commentator. In Hans V.
Hansen, ed., Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground, pp.
1–2. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2007.
[139] Daniel H. Cohen. Virtue epistemology and argumentation the-
ory. In Hans V. Hansen, ed., Dissensus and the Search for Com-
mon Ground, pp. 1–9. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2007.
Virtue epistemology (VE) was modeled on virtue ethics
theories to transfer their ethical insights to epistemol-
ogy. VE has had great success: broadening our per-
spective, providing new answers to traditional ques-
tions, and raising exciting new questions. I offer a new
argument for VE based on the concept of cognitive
achievements, a broader notion than purely epistemic
achievements. The argument is then extended to cogni-
tive transformations, especially the cognitive transfor-
mations brought about by argumentation.
[140] Daniel H. Cohen. Now THAT was a good argument! On the
virtues of arguments and the virtues of arguers, 2008. Presented
to the Centro de Estudios de la Argumentación y el Razanamiento
(CEAR), Santiago, Chile.
I begin by noting three attractive features of – per-
haps even compelling reasons for – virtue argumenta-
tion theories. I then consider some objections that have
been raised to such approaches, one concerning virtue
approaches in epistemology and a set of related objec-
tions directed at the specific project of integrating the
aforementioned senses of “good argument.” Together,
the reasons for and the objections against VAT focus
and finalize the discussion on three interconnected con-
cepts: good arguments, good arguers, and good argu-
ing – leading to yet a third argument for the virtue
approach, viz. that there is an integrated and holistic
conception of good argument that escapes traditional
approaches to argument evaluation and that requires
its own special virtues.
[141] Daniel H. Cohen. Keeping an open mind and having a sense
of proportion as virtues in argumentation. Cogency, 1(2):49–64,
2009.
Virtue-based approaches to epistemology have enjoyed
notable success recently, making valuable contributions
to long-standing debates. In this paper, I argue, that
many of the results from Virtue Epistemology (VE) can
be carried over into the arena of argumentation theory,
but also that a virtue-based approach is actually bet-
ter suited for argumentation than it is for justification.
First, some of the unresolved challenges for VE, such as
the limitations of voluntarism with respect to beliefs,
do not have counterparts in argumentation. Second, a
new argument for VE based on the concept of cognitive
achievements broadens its applicability to arguments.
Third, because virtue-based approaches shift in focus
from products and processes to agents, and arguments
are essentially inter-agent transactions, important new
questions come into focus, along with signposts lead-
ing to their resolution. Questions about different roles
in argument (protagonists, antagonists, judges, specta-
tors) and the virtues needed for each, come into focus,
as do questions about when, why and with whom to ar-
gue, which often get lost in the shadow of the primary
question, how we should argue. Finally, two specific
virtues—open-mindedness and a sense of proportion—
are offered as test cases for Virtue Argumentation The-
ory.
[142] Daniel H. Cohen. Reply to my commentator. In Juho Ritola,
ed., Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, pp. 1–2. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2009.
[143] Daniel H. Cohen. Sincerity, Santa Claus arguments and dis-
sensus in coalitions. In Juho Ritola, ed., Argument Cultures:
Proceedings of OSSA 09, pp. 1–8. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2009.
It is a virtue of virtue theory approaches to argumen-
tation that they integrate many of the different factors
that make arguments good arguments. The insights of
virtue argumentation are brought to bear on a vari-
ety of versions of the requirement that good arguments
must have good premises, concluding that a sincer-
ity condition serves better than truth or assertability
conditions, despite apparently counterintuitive conse-
quences for arguments involving heterogeneous coali-
tions.
[144] Daniel H. Cohen. For argument’s sake. TEDxColbyCollege,
2013. Online at https://www.ted.com/talks/daniel_h_cohen_
for_argument_s_sake/transcript?language=en.
Why do we argue? To out-reason our opponents, prove
them wrong, and, most of all, to win! . . . Right?
Philosopher Daniel H. Cohen shows how our most com-
mon form of argument—a war in which one person
must win and the other must lose—misses out on the
real benefits of engaging in active disagreement.
[145] Daniel H. Cohen. Skepticism and argumentative virtues. Co-
gency, 5(1):9–31, 2013.
If arguing is a game that philosophers play, then it’s a
rigged game. Although many theories of argumentation
explicitly connect argumentation with reason, rational-
ity, and knowledge, it contains certain built-in biases
against knowledge and towards skepticism. Argumenta-
tion’s skeptical biases can be put into three categories:
those built into the rules of play, those embedded in the
skills for playing, and finally some connected to the de-
cision to play. Three ancient philosophers from different
traditions serve exemplifying case studies: the Middle
Way Buddhist Nagarjuna, the Greek Pyrrhonian Sex-
tus Empiricus, and the Chinese Taoist Zhuangzi. They
have very different argumentation styles and they reach
very different kinds of skepticism, but in each case,
there is an organic connection between their argumen-
tation and their skepticism: Nagarjuna produced ar-
guments for the Truth of No Truth; Sextus generated
strategies for counter-argumentation; while Zhuangzi
deftly avoided all direct argumentation—in an implicit
argument against arguing. I conclude that Virtue Ar-
gumentation Theory, with its focus on arguers and
their skills, provides the best lens for understanding the
lessons to be learned about argumentation and skepti-
cism from this idiosyncratic trio.
[146] Daniel H. Cohen. Virtue, in context. Informal Logic, 33(4):471–
485, 2013.
Virtue argumentation theory provides the best frame-
work for accommodating the notion of an argument
that is “fully satisfying” in a robust and integrated
sense. The process of explicating the notion of fully
satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of
arguers to include all of an argument’s participants, in-
cluding judges, juries, and interested spectators. And
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that, in turn, requires expanding the concept of an ar-
gument itself to include its entire context.
[147] Daniel H. Cohen. Commentary on: Katharina von Radziewsky’s
“The virtuous arguer: One person, four characters”. In Dima
Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumenta-
tion: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
[148] Daniel H. Cohen. Missed opportunities in argument evaluation.
In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell, &
A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, eds., Proceedings of ISSA
2014: Eighth Conference of the International Society for the Study
of Argumentation, pp. 257–265. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2015.
Why do we hold arguers culpable for missing obvious
objections against their arguments but not for miss-
ing obvious lines of reasoning for their positions? In
both cases, their arguments are not as strong as they
could be. Two factors cause this: adversarial models
of argumentation and the permeable boundaries sepa-
rating argumentation, meta-argumentation, and argu-
ment evaluation. Strategic considerations and dialecti-
cal obligations partially justify the asymmetry; virtue
argumentation theory explains when and why it is not
justified.
[149] Daniel H. Cohen. Reasonable agents and reasonable arguers:
Rationalization, justification, and argumentation. In Dima Mo-
hammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Argumentation and Reasoned
Action: Proceedings of the First European Conference on Argu-
mentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015, vol. 2, pp. 357–366. College
Publications, London, 2016.
Data from neuroscience suggest that, contrary to the
conference theme, argumentation and reasoning are not
the main vehicles for our decisions and actions. They
are “fifth wheels” on those vehicles: ornate but ineffec-
tive appendages whose maintenance costs exceed their
contributions. Although the data, their interpretations,
and their putative implications all deserve challenge,
this paper explores how to accept and incorporate these
findings into a coherent view of what we do when we
reason.
[150] Daniel H. Cohen. The virtuous troll: Argumentative virtues
in the age of (technologically enhanced) argumentative pluralism.
Philosophy and Technology, 30(2):179–189, 2017.
Technology has made argumentation rampant. We can
argue whenever we want. With social media venues for
every interest, we can also argue about whatever we
want. To some extent, we can select our opponents and
audiences to argue with whomever we want. And we
can argue however we want, whether in carefully rea-
soned, article-length expositions, real-time exchanges,
or 140-character polemics. The concepts of arguing, ar-
guing well, and even being an arguer have evolved with
this new multiplicity and diversity; theory needs to
catch up to the new reality. Successful strategies for
traditional contexts may be counterproductive in new
ones; classical argumentative virtues may be liabilities
in new situations. There are new complications to the
theorist’s standard questions – What is an argument?
and Who is an arguer? – while new ones move into
the spotlight – Should we argue at all? and If so,
why? Agent-based virtue argumentation theory pro-
vides a unifying framework for this radical plurality by
coordinated redefinitions of the concepts of good ar-
guers and good arguments. It remains true that good
arguers contribute to good arguments, and good ar-
guments satisfy good arguers, but the new diversity
strains the old unity. Ironically, a unifying factor is pro-
vided by an examining those paragons of bad arguers,
argument trolls whose contributions to arguments are
not very good, not really contributions, and, ultimately,
not genuine argumentation.
[151] Daniel H. Cohen. Argumentative virtues as conduits for reason’s
causal efficacy: Why the practice of giving reasons requires that
we practice hearing reasons. Topoi, 38(4):711–718, 2019.
Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a
great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns
out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our
positions are seldom either the real reasons or the ef-
fective causes of why we have those positions. We are
not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less
disheartening observation is that while we may be very
effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not
that good at getting reasons. We are not as reasons-
responsive as we like to think. Reasoning and argu-
mentation are, on this view, charades without effect.
This paper begins by identifying a range of theoretical
responses to the idea that reasoning and argumentation
have little casual role in our thoughts and actions, and,
consequently, that humans are not the reasons-giving,
reasons-responsive agents that we imagine ourselves to
be. The responses fall into three categories: challenging
the data and their interpretations; making peace with
the loss of autonomy that is implied; and seeking ways
to expand the causal footprint of reasoning and argu-
mentation, e.g., by developing argumentative virtues.
There are indeed possibilities for becoming more ratio-
nal and more reasons-responsive, so the reports of our
demise as the rational animal are greatly exaggerated.
[152] Daniel H. Cohen. No argument is an island: Argumentation
between arguments. In Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gor-
don R. Mitchell, & Jean H.M. Wagemans, eds., Proceedings
of the Ninth Conference of the International Society for the Study
of Argumentation, pp. 210–216. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2019.
Argumentation theory often focuses very narrowly on
a very narrow conception of arguments, but some as-
pects of argumentation need a broader backdrop than
the study of discrete arguments affords. Much of what
makes argumentation important occurs before and af-
ter arguers engage. This paper examines the category of
“inter-argument argumentative virtues” that are char-
acteristic of good arguers when they are preparing for
and processing arguments rather than actively arguing.
[153] Daniel H. Cohen. Mill and the duty to argue. In J. Anthony
Blair & Christopher W. Tindale, eds., Rigour and Reason:
Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen, pp. 30–51. Windsor
Studies in Argumentation, Windsor, ON, 2020.
John Stuart Mill situated “logic”, in his broad sense of
the term, at the confluence of empiricist epistemology,
utilitarian ethics, and liberal political theory. Thus, he
often commented on argumentation, especially as it ap-
pears in public forums concerning the body politic.
Mill’s theory of argumentation, as reconstructed by
Hans V. Hansen, is not comfortably encapsulated in
the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, despite the com-
mon association, but most resources of contemporary
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argumentation theories are already present – along with
some virtues of its own. This paper uses Mill’s theory
to address two important but often overlooked ques-
tions: Why should we argue, when we should? and
Why shouldn’t we argue, when we should not?
[154] Daniel H. Cohen & George Miller. What virtue argumenta-
tion theory misses: The case of compathetic argumentation. Topoi,
35(2):451–460, 2016.
While deductive validity provides the limiting upper
bound for evaluating the strength and quality of in-
ferences, by itself it is an inadequate tool for evalu-
ating arguments, arguing, and argumentation. Similar
remarks can be made about rhetorical success and di-
alectical closure. Then what would count as ideal ar-
gumentation? In this paper we introduce the concept
of cognitive compathy to point in the direction of one
way to answer that question. It is a feature of our ar-
gumentation rather than my argument or your argu-
ment. In that respect, compathy is like the harmonies
achieved by an accomplished choir, the spontaneous
coordination of athletic teamwork, or the experience
of improvising jazz musicians when they are all in the
flow together. It is a characteristic of arguments, not
a virtue that can be attributed to individual arguers.
It makes argumentation more than just the sum of its
individual parts. The concept of cognitive compathy
is brought into focus by locating it at the confluence
of two lines of thought. First, we work up to the con-
cept of compathy by contrasting it with empathy and
sympathy in the context of emotions, which is then
transplanted into epistemic, cognitive, and argumen-
tative soil. Second, the concept is analytically linked
to ideal argumentation by way of authenticity in com-
munication. In the final section, we explore the extent
to which argumentative virtues are conducive to pro-
ducing compathetic argumentation, but reach the un-
happy conclusion that the extra value of compathetic
argumentation also transcends the evaluative reach of
virtue argumentation theory.
[155] Daniel H. Cohen & Katharina Stevens. Virtuous vices: On
objectivity and bias in argumentation. In Patrick Bondy &
Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias:
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21,
2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objec-
tivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, but objectiv-
ity is itself a bias? We argue that objectivity is indeed
a bias but an argumentative virtue nonetheless. Using
courtroom argumentation as a case study, we analyze
and explain objectivity’s contextually variable value.
The conclusions from this study ground a response to
recent criticisms from Goddu and Godden regarding
the conceptual foundations of virtue-based approaches
to argumentation.
[156] John M. Collins. Agent-relative fallacies. In Frans H.
van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, David Godden, & Gordon
Mitchell, eds., Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the Interna-
tional Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 281–288. Rozen-
berg/Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2011.
My topic is an issue in the individuation and epistemol-
ogy of fallacious inferences. My thesis is that there are
instances of reasoning that are fallacious not in them-
selves, that are not intrinsically fallacious, but are falla-
cious only relative to particular reasoning agents. This
seems like a peculiar notion. It would seem that if it
was fallacious for you to reason a certain way, and I
do the same thing, I would be committing a fallacy as
well. Bad reasoning is bad reasoning, no matter who is
doing it. But it is useful to ask: What would it take
for it to be possible for there to be such a thing as an
agent-relative fallacy? Here are two sets of conditions,
the obtaining of either of which would be sufficient for
the existence of agent-relative, or extrinsic, fallacies.
Type One is that there are two agents who are in-
trinsically alike, molecule-for-molecule doppelgangers,
one of whom is reasoning fallaciously while the other
is not, due to differences in their respective environ-
ments. The other scenario, Type Two, is that there are
two agents (who are not doppelgangers) who engage
in intrinsically identical instances of reasoning, one of
whom reasons fallaciously while the other does not, due
to differences located elsewhere in their minds that af-
fect the epistemic status of their respective inferences.
I will attempt to demonstrate that it is at least pos-
sible for agents to meet either set of conditions, and
that in fact some people do meet the Type Two condi-
tions, so agent-relative fallacies are not only possible,
but actual.
[157] Celeste Michelle Condit. Crafting virtue: The rhetorical
construction of public morality. Quarterly Journal of Speech,
73(1):79–97, 1987.
Recent theorists have tended to deprecate the role of
rhetoric in constructing public morality, and have re-
sorted to “privatized” models of morality. This essay
outlines weaknesses in the foundational metaphors of
that position and offers a theory of the rhetorical craft-
ing of public morality. Morality is described as hu-
manly generated, objectively constrained, and contin-
gent. The theory is illustrated and substantiated by a
description of the public moral struggle over moral jus-
tice for Afro-Americans.
[158] John J. Conley. A critical pedagogy of virtue. Inquiry: Critical
Thinking Across the Disciplines, 8(4):9–10,25, 1991.
The pedagogy of virtue has identified certain specific
habits of intellect and will which characterize human
flourishing. In the intellectual realm, virtue theory tra-
ditionally distinguishes between speculative and prac-
tical virtues. The speculative virtues are those habits of
thought which permit the intellect to pursue truth for
its own sake. The practical virtues are those habits of
mind which guide the intellect in pursuing knowledge
for the sake of action.
[159] John J. Conley. Critical assent and character. Inquiry: Critical
Thinking Across the Disciplines, 12(1-2):24–26, 1993.
In replying to Griffin’s critique, I would like to clar-
ify my conception of the dynamics of assent within the
context of critical thinking. I would also like to sug-
gest a recent area in critical-thought literature where
some resources for a more affirmative concept of critical
inquiry have emerged. This is the resurgence of virtue
theory in the description of the noetic agent committed
to the process of critical scrutiny.
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[160] Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn. Normative theories of argumen-
tation: Are some norms better than others? Synthese, 190:3579–
3610, 2013.
Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—
play a critical role in the study of informal argumenta-
tion, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making
and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide
a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules
and standards have been central to the study of rea-
soning, and behavior more generally, there has been
little discussion within psychology about why (or in-
deed if) they should be considered normative despite
the considerable philosophical literature that bears on
this topic. In the current paper, we ask what makes
something a norm, with consideration both of norms
in general and a specific example: norms for informal
argumentation. We conclude that it is both possible
and desirable to invoke norms for rational argument,
and that a Bayesian approach provides solid normative
principles with which to do so.
[161] Vasco Correia. The ethics of argumentation. Informal Logic,
32(2):219–238, 2012.
Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume
that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the
rationality of debates. Yet empirical research on human
inference shows that people systematically fall prey to
cognitive and motivational biases which give rise to var-
ious forms of irrational reasoning. Inasmuch as these
biases are typically unconscious, arguers can be unfair
and tendentious despite their genuine efforts to follow
the rules of argumentation. I argue that arguers remain
nevertheless responsible for the rationality of their rea-
soning, insofar as they can (and arguably ought to)
counteract such biases by adopting indirect strategies
of argumentative self-control.
[162] Vasco Correia. Biased argumentation and critical thinking. In
Thierry Herman & Steve Oswald, eds., Rhetoric and Cogni-
tion: Theoretical Perspectives and Persuasive Strategies, pp. 89–
110. Peter Lang, Bern, 2014.
This paper sought to elucidate the problem of how
goals and emotions can influence people’s reasoning in
everyday-life debates. By distinguishing between three
categories of motivational biases, we were able to show
that arguers tend to engage in different forms of fal-
lacious reasoning depending on the type of motive
that underlies their tendentiousness. We have exam-
ined some plausible connections between certain types
of biases and certain types of fallacies, but many other
correlations could be found.
[163] Vasco Correia. Arguments and decisions in contexts of uncer-
tainty. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Argumen-
tation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the First European
Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015, vol. 2,
pp. 367–378. College Publications, London, 2016.
This article argues that debiasing techniques meant to
reduce biases in argumentation and decision-making
are more effective if they rely on environmental con-
straints, rather than on cognitive improvements. I iden-
tify the four main factors that account for the inef-
ficiency of critical thinking with regard to debiasing
and claim that extra-psychic strategies are more reli-
able tools for counteracting biases in contexts of uncer-
tainty. Finally, I examine several examples of debiasing
strategies that involve contextual change.
[164] Vasco Correia. Accountability breeds response-ability: Contex-
tual debiasing and accountability in argumentation. In Patrick
Brézillon, Roy Turner, & Carlo Penco, eds., Modeling and
Using Context: 10th International and Interdisciplinary Confer-
ence, CONTEXT 2017, pp. 127–136. Springer, Cham, 2017.
While there is growing consensus over the need to coun-
teract biases in contexts of argumentation and decision-
making, researchers disagree over which debiasing tech-
niques are likely to be most effective. I attempt to show
that contextual debiasing is more effective than cogni-
tive debiasing in preventing biases, although I challenge
the claim that critical thinking is utterly ineffective. In
addition, a distinction is introduced between two types
of contextual debiasing: situational correction, and dis-
positional correction. Drawing on empirical work on ac-
countability, I argue that the later type of correction is
more likely to prove effective against biases in everyday
contexts. Holding arguers accountable is a contextual
constraint that has the virtue of also enhancing cogni-
tive skills and virtues.
[165] Vasco Correia. Contextual debiasing and critical thinking: Rea-
sons for optimism. Topoi, 37(1):103–111, 2018.
In this article I argue that most biases in argumenta-
tion and decision-making can and should be counter-
acted. Although biases can prove beneficial in certain
contexts, I contend that they are generally maladaptive
and need correction. Yet critical thinking alone seems
insufficient to mitigate biases in everyday contexts. I
develop a contextualist approach, according to which
cognitive debiasing strategies need to be supplemented
by extrapsychic devices that rely on social and environ-
mental constraints in order to promote rational reason-
ing. Finally, I examine several examples of contextual
debiasing strategies and show how they can contribute
to enhance critical thinking at a cognitive level.
[166] Cesare Cozzo. Cogency and context. Topoi, 38(3):505–516, 2019.
The problem I address is: how are cogent inferences
possible? In §1 I distinguish three senses in which
we say that one is “compelled” by an inference: auto-
matic, seductive-rhetorical and epistemic compulsion.
Cogency (in my sense) is epistemic compulsion: a co-
gent inference compels us to accept its conclusion, if
we accept its premises and we aim at truth. In §§2–3 I
argue that cogency is intelligible if we consider an in-
ference as a compound linguistic act in which several
component acts (assertions and hypotheses) are related
to one another by a commitment that the premises sup-
port the conclusion. Non-automatic inferences are pri-
marily public acts in an intersubjective context. But
cogency arises in special contexts described in §4, epis-
temic contexts, where the participants care for truth,
i.e. are intellectually virtuous. An inference is cogent
in an epistemic context if it stands up to all the ob-
jections raised in the context. In §5 I consider three
different kinds of cogent inferences. In §6 I argue that
in all three cases cogency is fallible and propose a falli-
bilist variety of inferentialism. In §7 I distinguish con-
text of utterance and contexts of evaluation. Cogency
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is relative to epistemic contexts of evaluation. However,
validity, i.e. stable cogency, is transcontextual.
[167] Anna Cremaldi & Jack M. C. Kwong. Is open-mindedness a
moral virtue? Ratio, 30(3):343–358, 2017.
Is open-mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this
question has not received much attention from philoso-
phers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that
there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In partic-
ular, we show that the extant account of openminded-
ness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears
to show that exercising the character trait may not be
virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much
stronger argument can be made for the case that open-
mindedness is a moral virtue by appealing to the notion
of moral understanding. Specifically, we provide a new
rationale as to why we should exercise open-mindedness
and offer several arguments to allay the concern that
doing so can at times cause us to be in an epistemically
and morally weaker position.
[168] Randall R Curren. Critical thinking and the unity of virtue.
Philosophy of Education Society Yearbook, 10:158–165, 1998.
Two prominent features of the current educational-
theoretical landscape are the mountains of literature
on critical thinking and on moral education. Between
them lies a fertile wilderness, where the streams fed by
those mighty sources vanish in a lush tangle of confu-
sion. Those who sit on the mountains above look across
with suspicion, and are hesitant to descend from the se-
curity of the high ground and meet each other below
in the darkness of a jungle floor where friends and en-
emies may be hard to distinguish. From the vantage
point of these heights it is not easy to detect, through
the overgrowth of supposition and forgetting, the paths
of previous expeditions and the neglected remnants of
their outposts, the bodies of thought once laid out so
carefully, lying long since in a vegetative state. Lit-
tle notice is taken, and not much made, of the fact
that the dominant aim of higher education, from its
birth in fifth-century Athens onward, was good judg-
ment (phronesis), which was understood to be a prod-
uct of both virtue and reason and the consummation
of both.
[169] Jeanine Czubaroff. Justice and argument: Toward development
of a dialogical argumentation theory. Argumentation and Advo-
cacy, 44(1):18–35, 2007.
Based on an examination of Josina Makau and Debian
Marty’s Cooperative Argumentation, and James Cross-
white’s The Rhetoric of Reason, this essay identifies
concepts and premises central to a dialogical argumen-
tation theory and argues that that theory may be fur-
ther developed by concepts and principles from Ivan
Boszormenyi-Nagy’s contextual theory, a theory based
on Martin Buber’s philosophical anthropology. The pa-
per begins by identifying central concepts and premises
of the emerging dialogical argumentation theory, devel-
ops the resultant model of dialogical argumentation in
light of concepts from contextual theory, and concludes
with a discussion of the implications of the relational-
ethical view of argument for argumentation and rhetor-
ical studies.
[170] Adam Dalgleish, Patrick Girard, & Maree J. Davies. Crit-
ical thinking, bias and feminist philosophy: Building a better
framework through collaboration. Informal Logic, 37(4):351–369,
2017.
Philosophers often seek the truth through methods
taught under the banner “Critical thinking”. For most,
some variation on this method is used to organize
thoughts and filter away subjectivity and biases. Femi-
nist philosophers have highlighted a critical set of short-
comings within such methods that are yet to be fully
addressed. In this paper, we explore these critiques and
how they can be mitigated by incorporating elements
from critical pedagogy and dispositional thinkers. The
result is a set of recommendations for improved critical
thinking methods which better account for contextual-
ized bias while also more accurately tracking the truth.
[171] Paul Danler. The linguistic-discursive creation of the speaker’s
ethos for the sake of persuasion: A key aspect of rhetoric and
argumentation. In Gabrijela Kišiček & Igor Ž. Žagar, eds.,
What do We Know about the World? Rhetorical and Argumenta-
tive Perspectives, vol. 1 of Windsor Studies in Argumentation, pp.
64–83. CRRAR, Windsor, ON, 2013.
The central topic of this brief study is the linguistic-
discursive creation of ethos in rhetorical and argumen-
tative texts. In order to understand why ethos plays
a fundamental role in those text types it seems nec-
essary to first discuss the very notions of rhetoric and
argumentation. The main goal of rhetorical and/or ar-
gumentative texts is persuasion. For this reason it also
has to be clarified how persuasion works in those text
types. After that we will look at the topic of ethos from
various points of view: ethos beside pathos and logos
as one of the key elements of rhetoric; Aristotle’s clas-
sification of the constituents of ethos into phronesis,
eunoia, and arétè; ethos seen almost as a mask in the
Jungian sense; the distinction between ethos as a dis-
cursive phenomenon and ethos as a prediscursive phe-
nomenon; the role of topoi and doxa in the construction
of ethos and finally the differentiation between rhetor-
ical argumentation and linguistic argumentation, the
latter of which being of particular interest for our ap-
plied analysis. In that final part we will eventually ana-
lyze a few exemplary morphosyntactic structures which
in a way create the speaker’s ethical portrait or, to put
it differently, which discursively construct the speaker’s
ethos. The speeches we will draw upon were delivered
by Mussolini between 1921 and 1941.
[172] Jeffrey Davis & David Godden. Adversarial listening in argu-
mentation. Topoi, 2021. Forthcoming.
Adversariality in argumentation is typically theorized
as inhering in, and applying to, the interactional
roles of proponent and opponent that arguers occupy.
This paper considers the kinds of adversariality lo-
cated in the conversational roles arguers perform while
arguing—specifically listening. It begins by contending
that the maximally adversarial arguer is an arguer who
refuses to listen to reason by refusing to listen to an-
other’s reasons. It proceeds to consider a list of lousy
listeners in order to illustrate the variety of ways that
the conversational role of listener can be performed
adversarially. Because conversational roles, while not
adversarial by nature, can be enacted adversarially,
arguers are properly subject to praise and blame for
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their performances of these roles. Thus, the paper con-
cludes, argumentation theory stands in need of an ar-
ticulated normative vocabulary and theory to codify,
apply, explain, and justify the norms of listening gov-
erning, guiding, and appraising arguers’ performances
of listening in argumentation.
[173] Phillip Deen. Inquiry and virtue: A pragmatist-liberal argument
for civic education. Journal of Social Philosophy, 43(4):406–425,
2012.
I present two types of argument for liberal-democratic
virtues, both of which are grounded in the pragmatist
thought of Charles Peirce and John Dewey. The first
type relies on their substantive teleological accounts of
truth and moral flourishing. The second type, however,
is based on their account of the general conditions of
inquiry and not on any substantive ontology or moral
ideal. I argue that, under conditions of liberal plural-
ism, the latter is more practically viable and morally
justifiable. I conclude by applying the general argument
for liberal-democratic virtue to the case of civic educa-
tion and by addressing some objections. The argument
from a pragmatist account of inquiry shows the legit-
imacy of coerced civic education while giving due re-
spect to the plurality of moral traditions among those
being coerced.
[174] Julia Dietrich. Knowledge and virtue in the Regula Pastoralis of
Gregory the Great: The development of Christian argumentation
for the late sixth century. Journal of Late Antiquity, 8(1):136–167,
2015.
The Regula Pastoralis of Gregory the Great constructs
a model of pastoral authority that stresses the impor-
tance of the pastor’s virtuous life to the success of his
preaching: not only will his example be the strongest
testimony to his belief, but his own understanding of
the truth will be clearer if it is not obscured by his re-
fusal to recognize his own vices. In adopting such an
epistemology, in which virtue is the ground of knowl-
edge, Gregory is participating in a centuries-long de-
bate about the ultimate locus of authority in Chris-
tian discourse: what gives credibility to a claim? Such
an epistemology by itself, however, does not provide
any mechanism for resolving disagreements. Living in
a period when the fragmentation of the Church into
a number of national churches was a very real threat,
Gregory created a model of argumentation that could
contain controversy. He vested the ultimate authority
in the hierarchy of church office, insisting that pride is
corrupting and thereby circumscribing the knowledge
claims that could be made on the basis of virtue.
[175] Huiling Ding. Confucius’s virtue-centered rhetoric: A case study
of mixed research methods in comparative rhetoric. Rhetoric Re-
view, 26(2):142–159, 2007.
This paper employs mixed methods, namely, corpus
linguistic and rhetorical analysis methods, to examine
Confucius’s theory on language, persuasion, and virtue
as reflected in the Analects. The triangulation of meth-
ods allows in-depth analysis of Confucius’s use of key
concepts surrounding the language–virtue relationship
and the way these concepts operate in different levels
of persuasion. The study shows Confucius’s theory as
a virtue-centered rhetoric. For him, virtuous conduct,
rather than artful words, should be employed as the
primary persuasive tool.
[176] Marianne Doury. The virtues of argumentation from an amoral
analyst’s perspective. Informal Logic, 33(4):486–509, 2013.
Many French-speaking approaches to argumentation
are deeply rooted in a linguistic background. Hence,
they “naturally” tend to adopt a descriptive stance on
argumentation. This is why the issue of “the virtues of
argumentation”—and, specifically, the question of what
makes an argument virtuous—is not central to them.
The argumentative norms issue nevertheless cannot be
discarded, as it obviously is crucial to arguers them-
selves: the latter often behave as if they were invested
with some kind of argumentative policing duty when
involved in dissensual exchanges. We describe several
researches developing a descriptive approach to such
ordinary argumentative policing: we claim that the
virtues of argumentation may be an issue even for an
amoral analyst. We will connect this issue with linguis-
tic remarks on the lexicon of refutation in English and
in French.
[177] Iovan Drehe. Argumentational virtues and incontinent arguers.
Topoi, 35(2):385–394, 2016.
Argumentation virtue theory is a new field in argumen-
tation studies. As in the case of virtue ethics and virtue
epistemology, the study of virtue argumentation draws
its inspiration from the works of Aristotle. First, I dis-
cuss the specifics of the argumentational virtues and
suggest that they have an instrumental nature, mod-
eled on the relation between the Aristotelian intellec-
tual virtue of ‘practical wisdom’ and the moral virtues.
Then, inspired by Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia, I
suggest that a theory of fallacy in argumentation virtue
theory can be built upon the concept of ‘incontinence’.
[178] Iovan Drehe. Fallacy as vice and/or incontinence in decision-
making. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Ar-
gumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the First Eu-
ropean Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015,
vol. 2, pp. 407–415. College Publications, London, 2016.
In my paper I aim to present a possible approach to the
theory of fallacy specific to virtue argumentation the-
ory. This shall be done employing conceptual pairs as
virtue/vice or continence/incontinence, and illustrated
by means of Aristotelian practical syllogisms. Based on
these considerations I will then focus on two topics: 1.
the possibility of a causal relation between incontinence
and vice; 2. the difference between sophisms and par-
alogisms from the perspective of virtue argumentation.
[179] Iovan Drehe. The virtuous citizen: Regimes and audiences. Stu-
dia Universitatis Babes,-Bolyai, Philosophia, 62(2):59–76, 2017.
The purpose of the present paper is to sketch the possi-
bility of an audience theory specific to virtue argumen-
tation taking as a starting point what Aristotle has to
say about political audiences in the context of specific
political constitutions and building on insights offered
by the New Rhetoric argumentation theory of Chaïm
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca and the responsi-
bilist virtue epistemology of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski.
[180] R. A. Duff. The limits of virtue jurisprudence. Metaphilosophy,
34(1–2):214–224, 2003.
In response to Lawrence Solum’s advocacy of a ‘virtue–
centred theory of judging’, I argue that there is indeed
important work to be done in identifying and character-
ising those qualities of character that constitute judicial
virtues—those qualities that a person needs if she is to
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judge well (though I criticise Solum’s account of one
of the five pairs of judicial vices and virtues that he
identifies—avarice and temperance). However, Solum’s
more ambitious claims—that a judge’s vice necessarily
corrupts her decisions, and that in at least some con-
texts we must define a legally correct decision as one
that would be reached by a virtuous judge—should be
rejected: we can undermine the former by attending
to the requirements of due process, and the latter by
attending to the ways in which a judge would try to
justify her decision.
[181] John Duffy. Virtuous arguments. Inside Higher Ed, 2012.
Online at http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/03/16/
essay-value-first-year-writing-courses.
The Rush Limbaugh debate and other examples of po-
litical incivility point to the need for the kind of instruc-
tion offered in many first-year writing courses, writes
John Duffy.
[182] John Duffy. Ethical dispositions: A discourse for rhetoric and
composition. JAC, 34(1–2):209–237, 2014.
In this paper, I will argue that to teach writing is by
definition to teach ethics; more specifically it is to teach
what I will call “ethical dispositions,” or the commu-
nicative practices of honesty, accountability, compas-
sion, intellectual courage, and others. I will propose
that the teaching of writing is “always and already” the
teaching of ethics, and that in the discourse of ethical
dispositions we are offered a language through which
we may tell the story of our discipline and effectively
intervene in the conduct of public argument. I will con-
clude by suggesting that an engagement with what I
am calling “ethical dispositions” may help us rediscover
and perhaps recover an older, richer, more fully realized
tradition of ethics that we have forgotten or purpose-
fully discarded.
[183] John Duffy. Enactments of virtue, 2016. Presented at Conference
on College Composition and Communication.
What does it mean to teach ethical discourse? How can
we help students develop ethical habits of speech and
writing? In the very brief time we have today, I’d like
to consider toward that end three concepts, three ways
of thinking about pedagogy of rhetorical ethics. And
these concepts are situation, exemplar, and dissensus,
or pronounced disagreement within groups of people.
[184] John Duffy. Reconsidering virtue. The Journal of the Assembly
for Expanded Perspectives on Learning, 21:3–8, 2016.
Whether or not the concept of virtue will find a place
in Writing Studies remains to be seen. I have tried to
suggest that it provides a language for thinking about
the ethics of rhetorical practice, and that it may offer
us a way out of the bind alleys of our current dysfunc-
tional discourse. But I think it finally does more than
that. In the tradition of the virtues we find, or so it
seems to me, the very telos or purpose of our work as
teachers and scholars of writing: why we do what we
do. Why do we care so deeply about the teaching of
writing? Toward what ends do we work? What visions
move and animate us?
[185] John Duffy. The good writer: Virtue ethics and the teaching of
writing. College English, 79(3):229–250, 2017.
I will attempt in this essay to address the following:
∗ What is “virtue”? “Virtue ethics”? What do we un-
derstand these terms to mean? How do we derive from
these terms the construct of “rhetorical virtues”? ∗Why
virtue ethics for writing studies, and why now? What
reasons—political, cultural, and rhetorical—suggest a
disciplinary reconsideration of the virtues? ∗ Finally,
what might a commitment to rhetorical virtues mean
in the writing classroom? How might it shape teachers’
and students’ understandings of what it means to be a
“good writer”?
[186] John Duffy. The impossible virtue: Teaching tolerance. Rhetoric
Review, 37(4):364–370, 2018.
When to be tolerant or intolerant, how to justify the
decisions one makes, how to express these judgments
in speech and writing, and finally what it means to be
a tolerant speaker and writer in the intolerant rhetori-
cal climate of the contemporary U.S.—these are among
the lessons we teach each day, in different ways, in our
rhetoric and writing courses. In teaching such lessons,
we have the opportunity to make explicit, for our stu-
dents and ourselves, the language of the impossible
virtue of tolerance.
[187] John Duffy. Provocations of Virtue: Rhetoric, Ethics, and the
Teaching of Writing. Utah State University Press, Logan, UT,
2019.
In Provocations of Virtue, John Duffy explores the
indispensable role of writing teachers and scholars
in counteracting the polarized, venomous “post-truth”
character of contemporary public argument. Teach-
ers of writing are uniquely positioned to address the
crisis of public discourse because their work in the
writing classroom is tied to the teaching of ethical
language practices that are known to moral philoso-
phers as “the virtues”—truthfulness, accountability,
open-mindedness, generosity, and intellectual courage.
Drawing upon Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and
the branch of philosophical inquiry known as “virtue
ethics,” Provocations of Virtue calls for the reclama-
tion of “rhetorical virtues” as a core function in the
writing classroom. Duffy considers what these virtues
actually are, how they might be taught, and whether
they can prepare students to begin repairing the broken
state of public argument. In the discourse of the virtues,
teachers and scholars of writing are offered a common
language and a shared narrative—a story that speaks
to the inherent purpose of the writing class and to what
is at stake in teaching writing in the twenty-first cen-
tury. This book is a timely and historically significant
contribution to the field and will be of major interest to
scholars and administrators in writing studies, rhetoric,
composition, and linguistics as well as philosophers and
those exploring ethics.
[188] Matthew Duncombe. Is the elenchus an example of virtuous ad-
versariality?, 2017. Presented at Ninth European Congress of An-
alytic Philosophy (ECAP9), LMU Munich.
[189] Gerry Dunne. The dispositions of critical thinkers. Think,
17(48):67–83, 2018.
Most theorists agree that the ability to think critically
is distinct from the disposition to do so. Many of us
may have the ability to be critical thinkers, but unless
we are consistently and internally motivated to think
and reason this way, these abilities are effectively re-
dundant. Such dispositions are both intellectual char-
acter traits, and dispositions to behave in certain ways.
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As such, the first step to understanding critical think-
ing requires us to develop an operationalized taxonomy
of critical thinking dispositions. To avoid explicating
these dispositions in abstracto, this article draws upon
a murder trial in order to demonstrate the central role
dispositions play in critical thinking.
[190] Gerry Dunne. Critical Thinking: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspec-
tive. Ph.D. thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2019.
This dissertation seeks to cultivate a deeper concep-
tual understanding of critical thinking within the phi-
losophy of education tradition. For until such time as
theorists understand what critical thinking is, includ-
ing, how it works, educators will remain unclear as to
what sort of educational accomplishments are required
if one is to be rightly considered a critical thinker, and
what means are likely to be successful in teaching peo-
ple to think critically. Within this context, the disserta-
tion argues for a neo-Aristotelian conceptualization of
critical thought based on Harvey Siegel’s (1988, p.23)
“reasons-assessment” criteria. Here I argue for the im-
portance of critical thought embodying the prototyp-
ical phronimos, where habituated deliberative excel-
lence accurately determines undefeated or decisive rea-
sons for normatively-calibrated actions in the practical
domain. This judgment (proairesis) is based on stress-
testing the strength of normatively-calibrated reasons
supporting a given course of action. Drawing on theo-
rists such as, Dunne (1993), Paul & Elder (2002; 2005;
2007; 2009), and Siegel (1988; 1997; 2017), I proffer
a new conceptual explication of criticality, one which
integrates phronetic deliberation and judgment with
a deep sensitivity and responsiveness to the probative
force of reasons-normativity in accurately determining
undefeated reasons for “knowing what one should do”
in the practical domain (Anscombe, 1957, p13).
[191] Rory Duthie & Katarzyna Budzynska. Classifying types
of ethos support and attack. In Sanjay Modgil, Katarzyna
Budzynska, & John Lawrence, eds., Computational Models of
Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2018, pp. 161–168. IOS Press,
Amsterdam, 2018.
Endorsing the character of allies and destroying cred-
ibility of opponents is a powerful tactic for persuad-
ing others, impacting how we see politicians and how
we vote in elections, for example. Our previous work
demonstrated that ethos supports and attacks use dif-
ferent language, we hypothesise that further distinc-
tions should be made in order to better understand
and implement ethotic strategies which people use in
real-life communication. In this paper, we use the Aris-
totelian concept of elements of ethos: practical wis-
dom, moral virtue and goodwill, to determine specific
grounds on which speakers can be endorsed and criti-
cised. We propose a classification of types of ethos sup-
ports and attacks which is empirically derived from our
corpus. The manual classification obtains a reliable Co-
hen’s kappa κ = 0.52 and weighted κ = 0.7. Finally, we
develop a pipeline to classify ethos supports and attacks
into their types depending on whether endorsement or
criticism is grounded in wisdom, virtue or goodwill.
The automatic classification obtains a solid improve-
ment of macro-averaged F1-score over the baseline of
10%, 25%, 9% for one vs all classification, and 16%,
18%, 10% for pairwise classification.
[192] Catarina Dutilh Novaes. Virtuous adversariality as a model
for philosophical inquiry, 2014. Presented at Edinburgh Women in
Philosophy Group Spring Workshop on Philosophical Methodolo-
gies.
In my talk, I will develop a model for philosophical
inquiry that I call ‘virtuous adversariality’, which is
meant to be a response to critics from both sides [those
who criticize and those who endorse adversariality in
philosophy]. Its key feature is the idea that a certain
form of adversariality, more specifically disagreement
and debate, is indeed at the heart of philosophy, but
that philosophical inquiry also has a strong cooper-
ative, virtuous component which regulates and con-
strains the adversarial component. The main inspira-
tion for this model comes from ancient Greek dialectic.
[193] Catarina Dutilh Novaes. Metaphors for argumentation, 2017.
Presented at Ninth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy
(ECAP9), LMU Munich.
Argumentation is very often conceived as a form of
battle; as the title of an influential piece by D. Co-
hen (1996) summarizes, ‘Argument is war... and war is
hell!’ This conceptualization of argumentation, while
still widely held, has also been forcefully criticized in
particular by feminist writers. But if argumentation is
not war, what is it then? In this talk, I explore alterna-
tive metaphors/conceptualizations for argumentation,
as well as their implications for philosophical practice.
I discuss in particular the well-known argumentation-
as-therapy metaphor, and a novel argumentation-as-
social-exchange metaphor, which I am currently devel-
oping.
[194] Catarina Dutilh Novaes. The role of trust in argumentation.
Informal Logic, 40(2):205–236, 2020.
Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and
information. Given that the receiver of an argument
purportedly engages first and foremost with its content,
one might expect trust to play a negligible epistemic
role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue
on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role in
argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social
epistemological account of argumentation inspired by
social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form
of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument with
two real-life examples: vaccination hesitancy, and the
undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of
information by authoritarian politicians.
[195] Catarina Dutilh Novaes. Who’s afraid of adversariality? Con-
flict and cooperation in argumentation. Topoi, 2020. Forthcoming.
Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in
argumentation has been extensively discussed within
different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two
extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should
(ideally at least) never be adversarial, as we should al-
ways aim for cooperative argumentative engagement;
argumentation should be and in fact is always adver-
sarial, given that adversariality (when suitably concep-
tualized) is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I
here defend the view that specific instances of argu-
mentation are (and should be) adversarial or coopera-
tive to different degrees. What determines whether an
argumentative situation should be primarily adversar-
ial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and
background conditions external to the argumentative
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situation itself, in particular the extent to which the
parties involved have prior conflicting or else conver-
gent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider
three teloi that are frequently associated with argu-
mentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building
telos, and the conflict management telos. I start with a
brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, coop-
eration, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main
lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversar-
iality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi
of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the
roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them.
[196] Kyla Ebels-Duggan. Educating for autonomy: An old-fashioned
view. Social Philosophy & Policy, 31(1):257–275, 2014.
In this essay, I argue that we cannot adequately char-
acterize the aims of education in terms of narrowly in-
tellectual virtues or some formal conception of what it
is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires
us to rely on, and to communicate, further substantive
normative commitments. To put my point another way,
there is no adequate ideal of being a good thinker di-
vorced from the content of what such a person thinks
or the commitments that she has.
[197] Linda H. Edwards. Advocacy as an exercise in virtue: Lawyer-
ing, bad facts, and Furman’s high-stakes dilemma. Mercer Law
Review, 66:425–446, 2015.
In the spirit of virtue ethics, this paper uses the pri-
mary defense brief in the consolidated cases known as
Furman v. Georgia as an example of how good advo-
cacy can help a lawyer practice virtue, particularly in
what may be the most difficult brief-writing dilemma
of all: dealing with bad facts.
[198] Douglas Ehninger. Validity as moral obligation. The Southern
Speech Journal, 33(3):215–222, 1968.
In controversy as a method of decision making the va-
lidity of the conflicting cases can be enforced neither
by the “club” of logic nor by the “club” of fact; in-
stead it depends on the conscience and good will of
the disputants and hence is neither more nor less than
a matter of moral obligation on their part.
[199] Linda Elder. Richard Paul’s contributions to the field of critical
thinking studies and to the establishment of first principles in crit-
ical thinking. Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines,
31(1):8–33, 2016.
Beginning in his PhD program, and over a period of
years in the 1960s, Richard Paul thoughtfully exam-
ined and deliberately critiqued existing theories of logic
and reasoning. This laid the foundation for what was
to become a long and splendid career of scholarship,
culminating in the reconstruction and enrichment of
the theory of logic, of reasoning, and of critical rea-
soning. Paul took what was a very narrow conception
of reasoning (still used widely among philosophers to-
day), and broadened it to more accurately represent
what in fact happens in human thinking when peo-
ple reason. He captured the idea of universal intellec-
tual standards by exploring standards typically used
by skilled reasoners, and then assembling these stan-
dards into a constellation of ideas easily understandable
by scholars attempting to reason at the highest levels
within their fields, as well as by everyday persons. Rec-
ognizing the importance of placing ethics at the heart
of a substantive conception of critical thinking, Paul
cultivated and extensively developed the theory of in-
tellectual virtues; early on Paul distinguished between
what he termed strong sense (or ethical) critical think-
ing and weak sense (or unethical) critical thinking, and
staunchly advocated for fostering critical thinking in
the strong sense – in education and throughout soci-
ety. Paul realized that, without intervention in egocen-
tric and sociocentric tendencies, the mind was likely
to miss pathologies in thinking. He revolutionized our
conceptions of reasoning, of critical reasoning and of
logic, and called into question both historical and con-
temporary conceptions of philosophy itself. Paul made
it clear that neither metaphysics, nor formal logic, nor
mathematical reasoning, nor informal logic, nor argu-
mentation, nor any other individual subject could ever
adequately guide the human mind through the myriad
complexities it faces in dealing with the difficult prob-
lems of real life. Following the tradition of Socrates,
Paul continually emphasized the importance of devel-
oping deep conceptual understandings based in foun-
dational ideas and principles of analysis and critique
and tested through the real living of one’s life. Paul’s
work laid the groundwork for what may be termed first
principles in critical thinking and for a legitimate field
of critical thinking studies, a field which has yet to
emerge due to a number of complex academic, social,
and political barriers.
[200] Robert H Ennis. A taxonomy of critical thinking dispositions
and abilities. In Joan Boykoff Baron & Robert Sternberg,
eds., Teaching Thinking Skills: Theory and Practice, pp. 9–26. W.
H. Freeman, New York, NY, 1987.
[201] Robert H. Ennis. Critical thinking dispositions: Their nature
and assessability. Informal Logic, 18(2–3):165–182, 1996.
Assuming that critical thinking dispositions are at least
as important as critical thinking abilities, Ennis ex-
amines the concept of critical thinking disposition and
suggests some criteria for judging sets of them. He con-
siders a leading approach to their analysis and offers as
an alternative a simpler set, including the disposition to
seek alternatives and be open to them. After examining
some gender-bias and subject-specificity challenges to
promoting critical thinking dispositions, he notes some
difficulties involved in assessing critical thinking dispo-
sitions, and suggests an exploratory attempt to assess
them.
[202] Robert H. Ennis. Commentary on: Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kings-
bury and Tracy Bowell’s “Measuring critical thinking about deeply
held beliefs”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds.,
Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
The authors, all critical thinking teachers, have pre-
sented the results of a comparison of five possible ways
to measure critical thinking, the fifth of which served
as the criterion variable for judging the others. The ul-
timate goal is to have a valid critical thinking test to
check the effectiveness of different approaches to teach-
ing critical thinking.
[203] Peter A. Facione. The disposition toward critical thinking: Its
character, measurement, and relationship to critical thinking skill.
Informal Logic, 20(1):61–84, 2000.
Theorists have hypothesized that skill in critical think-
ing is positively correlated with the consistent internal
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motivation to think and that specific critical thinking
skills are matched with specific critical thinking dispo-
sitions. If true, these assumptions suggest that a skill-
focused curriculum would lead persons to be both will-
ing and able to think. This essay presents a research-
based expert consensus definition of critical thinking,
argues that human dispositions are neither hidden nor
unknowable, describes a scientific process of developing
conventional testing tools to measure cognitive skills
and human dispositions, and summarizes recent em-
pirical research findings that explore the possible rela-
tionship of critical thinking skill and the consistent in-
ternal motivation, or disposition, to use that skill. Em-
pirical studies indicate that for all practical purposes
the hypothesized correlations are not evident. It would
appear that effective teaching must include strategies
for building intellectual character rather than relying
exclusively on strengthening cognitive skills.
[204] Peter A. Facione & Noreen C. Facione. Critical thinking for
life: Valuing, measuring, and training critical thinking in all its
forms. Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 28(1):5–
25, 2013.
This essay describes the questions which shaped and
continue to fuel Peter and Noreen Facione’s passion-
ate involvement with critical thinking, its definition,
measurement, training, and practical application to ev-
eryday decisions, big and small. In reflecting on their
work they say “we have identified three groups of ques-
tions: those vexing, recurring questions that motivate
us to explore critical thinking, those scholarly ques-
tions around which we organized our empirical and
conceptual research, and those urgent practical ques-
tions which demand the development of applications
and assessment solutions. We conclude with two recom-
mendations for the consideration of all those who value
fair-minded, well-reasoned, reflective decision making.”
[205] Frank Fair. Commentary on: Benjamin Hamby’s “Willingness
to inquire: The cardinal critical thinking virtue”. In Dima Mo-
hammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation:
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
[206] Thomas B. Farrell. Sizing things up: Colloquial reflection as
practical wisdom. Argumentation, 12:1–14, 1998.
This essay reintroduces Rhetoric as the principle art for
giving emphasis and importance to contested matters;
in other words, for making things matter. In a specu-
lative reading of the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition,
Aristotle’s interpretations of magnitude, contengency
and practical wisdom are critically examined from both
an aesthetic and an ethical–political point of view. The
concluding discussion attempts to apply these same
concepts to a growing dilemma in the present age. The
dilemma is that monumental changes in scale have all
but eroded the prospects for engaged encounters with
contemporary contingency. It remains the challenge of
rhetorical practice to reframe actions and events so that
they and we may hold some hope for an engaged civic
life.
[207] Colin Farrelly. Virtue epistemology and the democratic life. In
Nancy E. Snow, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Virtue, pp. 841–
858. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
Integrating insights from the Ancient Greeks (e.g. con-
cerning virtue, eudaimonia, and the original meaning
of “democracy”), John Dewey, and recent work in virtue
epistemology, this chapter develops a virtue-based de-
fense of democracy, one that conceives of democracy
as an inquiry-based mode of social existence. This ac-
count of democracy is developed by responding to three
common concerns raised against democracy, which the
author calls the Irrationality Problem, the Problem of
Autonomy, and the Epistocracy Objection. Virtue epis-
temology can help elucidate the link between democ-
racy and human flourishing by drawing attention to
democracy’s potential for cultivating and refining the
“intellectual virtues” (e.g. intellectual humility, fairness
in evaluating the arguments of others, the social virtue
of being communicative, etc.) constitutive of the good
life.
[208] Matt A. Ferkany. The moral limits of open-mindedness. Edu-
cational Theory, 69(4):403–419, 2019.
Epistemologists have long worried that the willingness
of open-minded people to reconsider their beliefs in
light of new evidence is both a condition of improving
their beliefs and a risk factor for losing their grip on
what they already know. In this article, Matt Ferkany
introduces and attempts to resolve a moral variation of
this puzzle: a willingness to engage people whose moral
ideas are strange or repugnant (to us) looks like both
a condition of broadening our moral horizons, and a
risk factor for doing the wrong thing or becoming bad.
Ferkany pursues a contractualist line of argument ac-
cording to which such hazardous engagement is a virtue
only when it matters to our interlocutors whether they
can justify themselves to us on terms we can accept—
for our sake or for the sake of their own virtue, not
instrumentally or to get something out of us. When it
does not so matter, openness can be unintelligent or
gullible—in other words, not virtuous.
[209] Maurice A. Finocchiaro. Commentary on Andrew Aberdein,
“Fallacy and argumentational vice”. In Dima Mohammed &
Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
[210] David Fleming. The space of argumentation: Urban design,
civic discourse, and the dream of the good city. Argumentation,
12(2):147–166, 1998.
In this paper, I explore connections between two disci-
plines not typically linked: argumentation theory and
urban design. I first trace historical ties between the
art of reasoned discourse and the idea of civic virtue.
I next analyze discourse norms implicit in three theo-
ries of urban design: Jane Jacobs’ The Death and Life
of Great American Cities (1961), Christopher Alexan-
der’s A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Con-
struction (1977), and Peter Katz’s The New Urban-
ism: Toward an Architecture of Community (1994). I
then propose a set of ‘settlement’ issues of potential in-
terest to both urban designers and argumentation the-
orists: size, density, heterogeneity, publicity, security,
and identity. I conclude by suggesting that the ‘good
city’ be seen as both a spatial and a discursive entity.
From such a perspective, good public discourse is de-
pendent, at least in part, on good public space; and
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good public space is defined, at least in part, as a con-
text conducive to good public discourse.
[211] Shawn D Floyd. Could humility be a deliberative virtue? In
Douglas Henry & Michael Beaty, eds., The Schooled Heart:
Moral Formation in American Higher Education, pp. 155–170.
Baylor University Press, Waco, TX, 2007.
Democratic education requires people who desire to
practice civility, mutual respect, and reasoned debate;
it requires people who are motivated to recognize the
integrity of views they do not accept. According to
the account I have provided here, one cannot sustain
such practices without having been shaped by the right
kinds of dispositions. Humility is just such a disposi-
tion, and for this reason we should include it within
democratic education’s catalogue of virtues. In short,
we should consider humility a deliberative virtue. Of
course, a person might be reluctant to embrace the
theological commitments that accompany traditional
accounts of humility. And while my defense of humility
does not require her to accept those commitments, her
allegiance to democratic education may be measured
by whether she is willing to consider and evaluate their
alleged truth. At the very least, she should recognize
that humility—a virtue on which the success of our de-
liberative practices depends—is tied to and bequeathed
by the Christian tradition.
[212] William W Fortenbaugh. Persuasion through character and
the composition of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Rheinisches Museum für
Philologie, 134(2):152–156, 1991.
Aristotle recognized that presentations of good char-
acter need not aim at working an emotional effect.
They may be intended to establish the credibility of the
speaker and so to meet the demands of soberminded
auditors. Aristotle, therfore, created a third mode of
persuasion which he labeled “persuasion through char-
acter” and placed alongside argumentational and emo-
tional appeal.
[213] William W. Fortenbaugh. Aristotle on persuasion through
character. Rhetorica, 10(3):207–244, 1992.
In his work on rhetoric—his Τèχνη ûητορικ —Aristotle
established the framework with which many of us, per-
haps most of us, still approach the subject. In particu-
lar, the Stagirite recognized three modes of persuasion:
namely, through the character of the orator, through
the emotions of the hearers and through the arguments
of the speech. In addition, he marked off style from de-
livery and distinguished all of the foregoing from ar-
rangement conceived of as the parts of an oration. His
discussion of the three modes of persuasion takes place
in the first two books; and his remarks on delivery,
style and the parts of an oration are found in the third
book. None of that is news. Nor is the fact that Aris-
totle’s treatment of persuasion presupposes some fun-
damental advances in logic and philosophical psychol-
ogy. The development of a formal dialectic underlies
the account of rhetorical argumentation, and clarifying
the relationship between thought and emotion is basic
to the account of persuasion through the hearers. Less
clear, however, is the thinking that stands behind Aris-
totle’s discussion of persuasion through character. That
is not to say that the subject has been passed over in
the scholariy literature. In fact, it has recently received
considerable attention, and advances have been made.
But there is, I think, room for further study; and in my
own case, it may be time to collect scattered remarks
and to attempt a comprehensive analysis.
[214] Martin Clay Fowler. The Ethical Practice of Critical Thinking.
Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC, 2008.
Critical thinking is not just private pondering, nimble
mental gymnastics, or a bland set of teachable skills.
Yet some critical thinking texts describe skills of logical
deduction, inference, and argument as if thinking were
something other than an activity which real people do
together. The Ethical Practice of Critical Thinking ex-
plores the ethical questions it poses: When we learn
and uphold worthy standards of thinking, how does this
also help us to sustain discussion? How is upholding
personal dignity and respecting one another interwo-
ven with thinking at our very best about issues which
matter for us? How can we begin, develop, and sustain
a meeting, group, or organization as a place worthy
of our best thinking and our best ethical skills? We
collaborate in critical thinking by taking each other’s
thinking seriously. That means that we listen objec-
tively, we dig and research with curiosity, and we ar-
gue with care. But we care more about how we treat
each other than our arguments. This allows us to think
and work our way through conflicts so that our com-
munity of discourse becomes stronger instead of falling
apart. Open this door to ethical relationships, and we
can ask some new questions of critical thinking: Are
fallacies just blameless mistakes in reasoning or should
we be morally ashamed of them at times? Is mathe-
matical reasoning above and beyond ethics or is critical
thinking with numbers just as soaked with ethical im-
plications as the ways in which we argue with words?
Finally, in a media culture which churns words, num-
bers, and, of course, images into a mundane, hectic,
distracting, and ultimately stupefying torrent of infor-
mation, how can critical thinkers not only survive but
thrive together to think hard and keep thinking?
[215] Janie M. Harden Fritz. Communication ethics and virtue. In
Nancy E. Snow, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Virtue, pp. 700–
721. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
Virtue approaches to communication ethics have ex-
perienced a resurgence over the last decades. Tied to
rhetoric since the time of Aristotle, virtue ethics offers
scholars in the broad field of communication an ap-
proach to ethics based on character and human flour-
ishing as an alternative to deontology. In each ma-
jor branch of communication scholarship, the turn to
virtue ethics has followed a distinctive trajectory in re-
sponse to concerns about the adequacy of theoretical
foundations for academic and applied work in commu-
nication ethics. Recent approaches to journalism and
media ethics integrate moral psychology and virtue
ethics to focus on moral exemplars, drawing on the
work of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse, or ex-
plore journalism as a MacIntyrean tradition of practice.
Recent work in human communication ethics draws on
MacIntyre’s approach to narrative, situating communi-
cation ethics within virtue structures that protect and
promote particular goods in a moment of narrative and
virtue contention.
[216] Jerry Frug. Argument as character. Stanford Law Review,
40(4):869–927, 1988.
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I shall discuss legal argument in terms of how in mak-
ing arguments the speaker or writer “show[s] himself to
be of a certain character” and seeks to have his listen-
ers (or readers) identify with that kind of character.
When we advance arguments, we say “be like me” (or,
at least, be like the character I am presenting myself
to be in this argument). When we respond, “yes, that’s
what I think” after listening to another’s arguments,
we expose and foster an aspect of our own character,
advancing a conception of who we consider ourselveves
to be. Arguments soothe, nurture, move people toward
a conception of themselves. They also offend, disturb
or repel us. In both these ways, they help create the
character of those who respond to them. People often
say that arguments appeal to values, but values are not
“things” people “have” on which they “base” their deci-
sions. Values are defined, modified, rejected, nurtured,
suppressed and clarified in the process of forming one’s
character.
[217] Lisa Fuller. Harm, “no-platforming” and the mission of the uni-
versity: A reply to McGregor. In Mark Christopher Navin &
Richard Nunan, eds., Democracy, Populism, and Truth, pp. 91–
101. Springer, Cham, 2020.
Joan McGregor argues that “colleges and universities
should adopt as part of their core mission the devel-
opment of skills of civil discourse” rather than engag-
ing in the practice of restricting controversial speakers
from making presentations on campuses. I agree with
McGregor concerning the need for increased civil dis-
course. However, this does not mean universities should
welcome speakers to publicly present any material they
wish without restriction or oversight. In this paper,
I make three main arguments: (i) Colleges and uni-
versities have a duty to protect members of the cam-
pus community from the harm and exclusion resulting
from hateful or harmful speech, in the same way that
they must protect them from sexual assaults and con-
cussions. (ii) In the vast majority of cases, this duty
can be fulfilled by holding speakers to standards of dis-
course that prevail in academic debate, and insisting on
a number of procedural requirements. (iii) We should
be wary of conservative arguments framed in terms of
free speech, because they can be deployed to undermine
important functions of the university in a democratic
society, namely, to teach students how to be discerning
citizens, and to protect thinkers willing to be critical of
the government and the ruling classes.
[218] Dov M. Gabbay & John Woods. Fallacies as cognitive virtues.
In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, & Tero Tulen-
heimo, eds., Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy,
pp. 57–98. Springer, Dordrecht, 2009.
In its recent attention to reasoning that is agent-based
and target-driven, logic has re-taken the practical turn
and recovered something of its historic mission. In
so doing, it has taken on in a quite general way a
game-theoretic character, precisely as it was with the
theory of syllogistic refutation in the Topics and On
Sophistical Refutations, where Aristotle develops win-
ning strategies for disputations. The approach that the
present authors take toward the logic of practical rea-
soning is one in which cognitive agency is inherently
strategic in its orientation. In particular, as is typi-
cally the case, individual agents set cognitive targets
for themselves opportunistically, that is, in such ways
that the attainment of those targets can be met with
resources currently or forseeably at their disposal. This
is not to say that human reasoning is so game-like as
to be utterly tendentious. But it does make the point
that the human player of the cognitive game has no
general stake in accepting undertakings that he has no
chance of making good on. Throughout its long history,
the traditional fallacies have been characterized as mis-
takes that are attractive, universal and incorrigible. In
the present essay, we want to begin developing an alter-
native understanding of the fallacies. We will suggest
that, when they are actually employed by beings like
us, they are defensible strategies in game-theoretically
describable pursuit of cognitive (and other) ends.
[219] John Gage. In pursuit of rhetorical virtue. Lore, 5(1):29–37, 2005.
I am imagining a sense of form, a sense of beauty,
a sense of playfulness, a sense of humility, a sense of
compassion and justice, a sense of musicality, a sense
of humor, seen in their rhetorical manifestations. How
therapeutic for our sick rhetorical culture would it be
if these virtues guided the choice of how to argue? But
it occurs to me that this is the wrong question, since
there may be no rhetorical action that does not arise
from some felt sense of its rightness, perhaps in both
the strategic and ethical sense. So, how much more in-
teresting would our critique of our rhetorical culture be
if we thought of arguments as deriving from and there-
fore revealing such qualities of character? Not in order
to call names and judge those who sometimes fail, as
we all do, but in order to in-habit such qualities in our
own arguments. The ethical question for any act of ar-
gumentation, then, is not “Is this virtuous?” in order
to praise or blame the character of the speaker, but in-
stead “From what virtue does this arise?” and “Can I
make it my own?”
[220] John T. Gage. What is rhetorical phronesis? Can it be taught?
Rhetoric Review, 37(4):327–334, 2018.
The questions I use as my title derive from the assump-
tion that since rhetorical actions may be judged as ethi-
cal as well as effective, the teaching of such actions must
entail, at some level, a theory of moral deliberation. In
thinking about what an ethical rhetoric requires and
how to teach it, phronesis—as practical wisdom in the
moral realm—provides a helpful concept, but one that
is elusive or perhaps even unknowable. It is the paradox
of teaching something that may be both theoretically
necessary and necessarily enigmatic that prompts this
inquiry.
[221] Robert K. Garcia & Nathan L. King. Getting our minds out of
the gutter: Fallacies that foul our discourse (and virtues that clean
it up). In Michael W. Austin, ed., Virtues in Action: New Es-
says in Applied Virtue Theory, pp. 190–206. Palgrave-Macmillan,
2013.
Contemporary discourse is littered with nasty and de-
railed disagreements. In this paper we hope to help
clean things up. We diagnose two patterns of thought
that often plague and exacerbate controversy. We illus-
trate these patterns and show that each involves both
a logical mistake and a failure of intellectual charity.
We also draw upon recent work in social psychology
to shed light on why we tend to fall into these pat-
terns of thought. We conclude by suggesting how the
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intellectual virtues can militate against these fallacies,
focusing on the virtues of charity and humility.
[222] Eugene Garver. The ethical criticism of reasoning. Philosophy
and Rhetoric, 31(2):107–130, 1998.
I contend that in matters of practical argument and
judgment, ethical criteria apply to arguments, not only
arguers. Because our judgments of arguments are of-
ten ethical, and appropriately so, the arguments them-
selves are ethical. When an argument is ethical, we re-
spond and evaluate ethically. Understanding and judg-
ing practical argument is as much an ethical matter
as it is a logical matter. An alternative way of putting
my thesis is to say that judging ethical arguments—
indeed, arguments in general—takes intellectual virtues
and, more controversially, that those same intellectual
virtues are the subject of our judgments.
[223] Eugene Garver. For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning,
Character, and the Ethics of Belief. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, IL, 2004.
What role does reason play in our lives? What role
should it play? And are claims to rationality liber-
ating or oppressive? For the Sake of Argument ad-
dresses questions such as these to consider the relation-
ship between thought and character. Eugene Garver
brings Aristotle’s Rhetoric to bear on practical reason-
ing to show how the value of such thinking emerges
when members of communities deliberate together, per-
suade each other, and are persuaded by each other.
That is to say, when they argue. Garver roots delib-
eration and persuasion in political friendship instead
of a neutral, impersonal framework of justice. Through
incisive readings of examples in modern legal and po-
litical history, from Brown v. Board of Education to
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, he demonstrates how acts of deliberation and per-
suasion foster friendship among individuals, leading to
common action amid diversity. In an Aristotelian sense,
there is a place for pathos and ethos in rational thought.
Passion and character have as pivotal a role in practical
reasoning as logic and language.
[224] Lorenzo Gasbarri. Responsible rhetoric. In Jan Klabbers,
Maria Varaki, & Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, eds.,
Towards Responsible Global Governance, pp. 75–93. Unigrafia,
Helsinki, 2018.
These are the three constituent elements of rhetoric:
the speech, or logos; the disposition of the audience, or
pathos; the character of the speaker, or ethos. One of
the purposes of this paper is to show their interrelations
in the realm of global governance. Despite its fragmen-
tation in different academic traditions, the constituent
elements of rhetoric do not have internal hierarchy and
they all take part in shaping legal debates. This pa-
per aims at describing how there can be a responsible
rhetoric without privileging one element over the other.
The purpose is to identify a form of rhetoric that is not
only aimed at ‘winning’ an argument, but to obtain co-
operation towards global common goods. As Aristotle
pointed out, the art of rhetoric is not about defeating
an opponent, but it is the ability ‘to see the available
means of persuasion’.
[225] José Ángel Gascón. Arguing as a virtuous arguer would argue.
Informal Logic, 35(4):467–487, 2015.
A virtue approach to argumentation would focus on
the arguers’ character rather than on her arguments.
Therefore, it must be explained how good arguments
relate to virtuous arguers. This article focuses on this
issue. It is argued that, besides the usual logical, dialec-
tical, and rhetorical standards, a virtuously produced
good argument must meet two additional requirements:
the arguer must be in a specific state of mind, and the
argument must be broadly conceived of as an argumen-
tative intervention and thus excel from every perspec-
tive.
[226] José Ángel Gascón. Hacia una teoría de la virtud argu-
mentativa. Revista Electrónica de Investigación en Filosofía y
Antropología, 5:23–33, 2015. In Spanish.
[227] José Ángel Gascón. Prácticas argumentativas y virtudes int-
electuales: Una mirada intercultural. Revista Iberoamericana de
Argumentación, 10:1–39, 2015. In Spanish.
This article offers a brief overview of the argumenta-
tive practices and the traits that are regarded as intel-
lectual virtues in Judaism and Buddhist India, as well
as several criticisms and proposals for argumentation
theory from the ranks of Feminism. The motivation for
this work is the aspiration to develop a theory of ar-
gumentative virtues that takes into account the variety
of cultures and that avoids ethnocentrism as much as
possible.
[228] José Ángel Gascón. ¿Es posible (y deseable) una teoría de la
virtud argumentativa? In Actas I Congreso internacional de la
Red española de Filosofía, vol. 11, pp. 41–51. 2015. In Spanish.
[229] José Ángel Gascón. What could virtue contribute to argu-
mentation? In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon
Mitchell, & A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, eds., Proceed-
ings of ISSA 2014: Eighth Conference of the International Society
for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 43–49. Sic Sat, Amsterdam,
2015.
In this paper I argue that a virtue approach to argu-
mentation would not commit the ad hominem fallacy
provided that the object study of our theory is well de-
limited. A theory of argumentative virtue should not
focus on argument appraisal, but on those traits that
make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative
practices. Within this framework, argumentation the-
ory could study argumentative behaviour in a broader
sense, especially from an ethical point of view.
[230] José Ángel Gascón. Pursuing objectivity: How virtuous can you
get? In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumen-
tation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
While, in common usage, objectivity is usually re-
garded as a virtue, and failures to be objective as vices,
this concept tends to be absent in argumentation the-
ory. This paper will explore the possibility of taking ob-
jectivity as an argumentative virtue. Several problems
immediately arise: could objectivity be understood in
positive terms—not only as mere absence of bias? Is
it an attainable ideal? Or perhaps objectivity could be
explained as a combination of other virtues?
[231] José Ángel Gascón. Virtue and arguers. Topoi, 35(2):441–450,
2016.
Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible with-
out committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is
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affirmative, provided that the object study of our the-
ory is well delimited. My proposal is that a theory of
argumentative virtue should not focus on argument ap-
praisal, as has been assumed, but on those traits that
make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative
practices. An agent-based approach in argumentation
should be developed, not in order to find better grounds
for argument appraisal, but to gain insight into argu-
mentative habits and excellence. Only this way can we
benefit from what a virtue argumentation theory really
has to offer.
[232] José Ángel Gascón. Willingness to trust as a virtue in argumen-
tative discussions. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński,
eds., Argumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the
First European Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June
2015, vol. 1, pp. 91–107. College Publications, London, 2016.
The virtue of critical thinking has been widely empha-
sised, especially the habit of calling into question any
standpoint. While that is important, argumentative
practice is not possible unless the participants display a
willingness to trust. Otherwise, continuous questioning
by one party leads to an infinite regress. Trust is neces-
sary in order to allow for testimony and expert opinion,
but also to exclude unwarranted suspicions that could
damage the quality of an argumentative discussion.
[233] José Ángel Gascón. Brothers in arms: Virtue and pragma-
dialectics. Argumentation, 31(4):705–724, 2017.
Virtue argumentation theory focuses on the arguers’
character, whereas pragma-dialectics focuses on argu-
mentation as a procedure. In this paper I attempt to ex-
plain that both theories are not opposite approaches to
argumentation. I argue that, with the help of some non-
fundamental changes in pragma-dialectics and some re-
strictions in virtue argumentation theory, it is possible
to regard these theories as complementary approaches
to the argumentative practice.
[234] José Ángel Gascón. A Virtue Theory of Argumentation. Ph.D.
thesis, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED),
2017.
[235] José Ángel Gascón. La teoría de la virtud argumentativa:
¿un mero complemento moral? Revista Iberoamericana de Ar-
gumentación, 17:61–74, 2018. In Spanish.
The place that belongs to virtue argumentation theory
in the field of argumentation studies has been recently
discussed by Gensollen, who proposes that it should
be characterized as a complementary theory that deals
with moral evaluation. Against this assessment, in the
present article I argue that a virtue approach to argu-
mentation is not restricted to moral evaluation, but it is
also relevant to the study of human cognition and rea-
soning. Moreover, I criticize such a distinction between
“complementary” and “fundamental” theories, as well
as the criterion Gensollen uses in order to demarcate
them.
[236] José Angel Gascón. Virtuous arguers: Responsible and reli-
able. In Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat, eds., Argumentation
and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on
Argumentation, Fribourg 2017, vol. 1, pp. 105–122. College Publi-
cations, London, 2018.
Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such
as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from
such traits the quality of arguments does not immedi-
ately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a
virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad ar-
guments. How could virtue argumentation theory com-
bine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an
analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both re-
sponsibilist and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller pic-
ture of the virtuous arguer.
[237] José Ángel Gascón. Virtuous arguers: Responsible and reliable.
Argumentation, 32(2):155–173, 2018.
Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such
as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from
such traits the quality of arguments does not immedi-
ately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a
virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad ar-
guments. How could virtue argumentation theory com-
bine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an
analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both re-
sponsibilist and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller pic-
ture of the virtuous arguer.
[238] José Ángel Gascón. Pensadores autónomos, pensadores irra-
cionales. Disputatio, 9, 2020. In Spanish.
We are living, it is often said, in a time that is charac-
terised by the rise of irrational beliefs and the disregard
of scientific knowledge. However, our time is also char-
acterised by the praise—at least in words—of critical
thinking against unreflective gullibility. It is doubtless
necessary to take various factors into account in or-
der to explain this apparent paradox. In this paper I
will focus on one factor that concerns our very con-
ception of critical thinking and that, in my view, con-
tributes to the escalation of irrationality: the exaltation
of autonomy. I will argue that the emphasis of cogni-
tive autonomy both by philosophy and by the divulga-
tion of critical thinking turns out to be harmful in two
respects. On the one hand, the praise of cognitive au-
tonomy may cause the rejection of scientific knowledge
that contradicts our personal experience. This is per-
haps most clearly seen in the case of those who believe
in pseudo-therapies. On the other hand, the emphasis
on autonomous reflection contributes to the formation
of a false confidence in biased reasoning. Against these
two problems, I will defend the epistemic virtues of ra-
tional trust and argumentation.
[239] Juan Gefaell Borrás. Virtudes y argumentos: Hacia un en-
foque virtuoso de la argumentación, 2018. Preprint online at
https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.28334.56645. In Spanish.
The virtue approach to argumentation is an approach
to the philosophical field of argumentation that gives a
primordial role to the psychological dispositions of the
subjects that argue. In general terms, the supporters of
this approach maintain that the different branches of
argumentation (such as formal or informal logic) do not
account for all the aspects necessary for argumentative
processes to be performed correctly. According to these
authors, it is necessary to take into account a set of
psychological traits of ethical character (the virtues),
which ensure that the logical resources and different
types of reasoning are applied properly. In the present
article we will make a brief exposition of the virtue
approach to argumentation. First, we will address its
precedents in other philosophical disciplines, which can
be found in virtue ethics and in virtue epistemology. In
fact, a thread can be drawn from the application of
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the doctrine of virtues to ethics, through virtue episte-
mology, and ending in the argumentative virtues them-
selves, which are no more than the extrapolation of the
virtues to the field of argumentation. Secondly, we will
present the argumentative virtues approach historically
and we will discuss some of the problems that such an
approach faces. Finally, not to leave aside the practical
character that in one way or another is usually present
in all virtue approaches, we will offer a provisional ty-
pology of what the argumentative virtues should be.
[240] Mario Gensollen. Virtudes argumentales: Hacia una cultura de
la paz. Euphyía, 6:115–131, 2012. In Spanish.
[241] Mario Gensollen. Virtudes y vicios argumentativos: A veinte
años de Vértigos Argumentales, de Carlos Pereda. Tópicos,
47:159–195, 2014. In Spanish.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the importance
and relevance of Carlos Pereda’s thought in argumen-
tation theory, focusing on his work entitled Vértigos
Argumentales, which has as its central purpose the de-
fense of an emphatic reason, not deprived of uncer-
tainty, but neither of objectivity. Keeping in mind that
Carlos Pereda’s theory of argumentation is close to his
conception of rationality, the author turns to the anal-
ysis of issues that intersect, such as epistemic virtues,
the concept of rationality, an ethics of argumentation,
etc. The paper concludes with the view of argumenta-
tion through the concept of ‘practice’, where different
aspects to be considered in argumentative action are
pointed out. It concludes that Vértigos Argumentales
formulated and developed some basic intuitions that
are present in the contemporary debate about argu-
mentation and virtue.
[242] Mario Gensollen. Virtudes Argumentativas: Conversar en un
Mundo Plural. IMAC, Aguascalientes, 2015. In Spanish.
We live in a plural world. It is increasingly clear to us
that other people have beliefs, desires and wishes dif-
ferent from our own. They live different or opposing
lifestyles. Plurality is a fact. This means that it is not
something that we may like or not like: it is something
we have to deal with. Each essay in this book seeks
to illuminate a perspective or relationship. One central
concern guides them all: what role should argumenta-
tion play in public life? For this reason, some essays
seek to clarify the relationship between argumentation,
imposition and other forms of violence; sketch some as-
pects of our argumentative culture; or deal with some
particular problem in our public life in which argumen-
tation plays (or should play) a central role. All share
the principle that it is necessary to notice the character
traits (be they virtuous or vicious) of those who argue.
Virtues and argumentative vices have a high explana-
tory potential with respect to what often happens when
we argue in public life.
[243] Mario Gensollen. El lugar de la teoría de la virtud argumen-
tativa en la teoría de la argumentación contemporánea. Revista
Iberoamericana de Argumentación, 15:41–59, 2017. In Spanish.
In this paper my purpose is to locate Virtue Argumen-
tation Theory’s place within Contemporary Argumen-
tation Theory. There are some possibilities that have
been opened in considering argumentation as a commu-
nicative practice. I consider some typical features of ar-
gumentative practice that are relevant to locate Virtue
Argumentation Theory, and indicate some difficulties
that are faced by contemporary theorists of argumen-
tation. Then, from the previous coordinates, I seek to
locate virtue argumentation theorists as bidders of a
complementary approach to the logical approach or to
the pragma-dialectical approach, while they consider
argumentation as a cooperative practice. Finally, my
point is that the possibility opened with Virtue Argu-
mentation Theory is the moral analysis and evaluation
of argumentation.
[244] Carol Ann Giancarlo & Peter A Facione. A look across four
years at the disposition toward critical thinking among undergrad-
uate students. The Journal of General Education, 50(1):29–55,
2001.
This article examines the critical thinking (CT) dispo-
sitions, as measured by the California Critical Thinking
Disposition Inventory, of students at a four-year, pri-
vate, liberal arts, comprehensive university. This paper
follows up results first published in 1995. The present
findings represent another snapshot of CT dispositions
among students who participated in 1996 and during
the original investigation in 1992. Longitudinal results
about students tested as freshman in 1992 and again as
seniors in 1996 are presented. Cross sectional results are
reported as well. Questions explored include the rela-
tionship between the disposition toward critical think-
ing, as measured by the CCTDI, and students’ major,
gender, class level, and grade point average.
[245] Michael A. Gilbert. Arguments & arguers. Teaching Philoso-
phy, 18(2):125–138, 1995.
The author assesses three major problems in criti-
cal reasoning methods as taught in introductory logic
courses. First, the author critiques the use of fallacies
as a mode of analysis. Second, the author objects to
the negative outlook expressed in the name “critical
reasoning.” Lastly, the author scrutinizes the critical
reasoning method’s lack of focus on the people that
are arguing or their relevance to the arguments under
examination. The author suggests that critical reason-
ing should focus more on the process of argumentation
rather than treating the argument presented as an ar-
tifact since the argumentative process takes place be-
tween people who are in disagreement. Critical reason-
ing should not be replaced but expanded and modified
to a new method which embraces arguers and not just
their arguments.
[246] Michael A. Gilbert. Informal logic and intersectionality. In
H. V. Hansen & R. C. Pinto, eds., Reason Reclaimed: Es-
says in Honor of J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnston, pp.
229–241. Vale, Newport News, VA, 2007.
Informal Logic, as presented by both Blair and John-
son describes a system of organization and analysis of
arguments that can be applied in a multitude of con-
texts. While some minimal background and descrip-
tion of situation is required to undertake an analysis,
the system does not take into account the personal
makeup of the proponent or, when appropriate, the in-
terlocutor. The speakers do not have gender, cultural,
racial, geographic, class or educational characteristics
that may be relevant to understanding or judging their
arguments. This essay undertakes an investigation of
the need for incorporating psychosocial information re-
garding the participants and what consequences that
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has for Informal Logic. The results suggest that the ar-
gument analysis component of Informal Logic is best
viewed as a skeleton, that prior to judging the legiti-
macy of an argument based on such an analysis the con-
text must be fleshed out by relations of person, power,
and so on. So, forms of argument, for example, that
are not legitimate in one culture may be acceptable in
another. Fallacy theory must also be amended so that
intersectional differences become relevant. E.g., an in-
dividual in a position of power may be committing an
ad baculum when the same words spoken by someone
not in power may be admissible.
[247] Michael A. Gilbert. Natural normativity: Argumentation the-
ory as an engaged discipline. Informal Logic, 27(2):149–161, 2007.
Natural normativity describes the means whereby so-
cial and cultural controls are placed on argumenta-
tive behaviour. The three main components of this are
Goals, Context, and Ethos, which combine to form a
dynamic and situational framework. Natural normativ-
ity is explained in light of Pragma-dialectics, Informal
Logic, and Rhetoric. Finally, the theory is applied to
the Biro-Siegel challenge.
[248] Michael A. Gilbert. Arguing with People. Broadview Press, Pe-
terborough, ON, 2014.
Arguing with People brings developments from the field
of Argumentation Theory to bear on critical thinking in
a clear and accessible way. This book expands the crit-
ical thinking toolkit, and shows how those tools can be
applied in the hurly-burly of everyday arguing. Gilbert
emphasizes the importance of understanding real argu-
ments, understanding just who you are arguing with,
and knowing how to use that information for successful
argumentation. Interesting examples and partner ex-
ercises are provided to demonstrate tangible ways in
which the book’s lessons can be applied.
[249] Michael A. Gilbert. Rules is rules: Ethos and situational
normativity. In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon
Mitchell, & A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, eds., Proceed-
ings of ISSA 2014: Eighth Conference of the International Society
for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 467–474. Sic Sat, Amsterdam,
2015.
One question in the debate between the rhetorical and
dialectical approaches concerns the availability of rules
and standards. Are there objective standards, or are
they changeable and situational? In Part One I briefly
identify three concepts, context, audience and ethos.
In Part Two I focus on ethos and how it is endemic to
argument with familiars. Part Three shows that ethos
concerns many local factors is situational. Finally, in
Part Four, it is shown how the pragma-dialectical Rule
1 is situational.
[250] Michael A. Gilbert. Ethos, familiars and micro-cultures. In
Fabio Paglieri, Laura Bonelli, & Silvia Felletti, eds., The
Psychology of Argument: Cognitive Approaches to Argumentation
and Persuasion, pp. 275–285. College Publications, London, 2016.
In this chapter I want to examine the nature of personal
ethotic standings that we, as individual arguers, apply
to others and seek to have applied to us. Toward this
end three core concepts of Persuasion Theory, knowl-
edgeability, trustworthiness, and liking will be used as
meta-concepts in an analysis of Grice’s maxims as they
apply to individual judgments of ethos. Grice’s maxims,
and adherence to them, provide a ready and familiar
frame for those traits that tend to create positive ethos.
In addition, it will be argued that Grice’s maxims need
to be localized for both cultural and specific context.
Using Gilbert’s notion of familiars we will examine how
the maxims apply both across the board and in specific
contexts in forming and maintaining personal ethotic
standing.
[251] Michael A. Gilbert. Familiars: Culture, Grice and super-duper
maxims. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Ar-
gumentation and Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the First Eu-
ropean Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015,
vol. 2, pp. 431–438. College Publications, London, 2016.
Gilbert has introduced and expanded on the concept of
“familiars”. This talk argues that the concept is central
to the idea of everyday argumentation. Using Grice’s
ideas on cooperation it is argued that cultures and fields
may have differing rule sets dictated by meta-maxims
or Super-Duper maxims. These must be considered for
successful argumentation.
[252] Michael A. Gilbert. Emotional inference: Making, using and
transparency in argumentative contexts. In Steve Oswald & Di-
dier Maillat, eds., Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of
the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017,
vol. 1, pp. 129–145. College Publications, London, 2018.
Emotion always plays a role in arguing. While it can be
misused and over used, a good argument must use emo-
tion in order to proceed to a fair and virtuous conclu-
sion. This leads to the importance of inferring emotions,
which is subject to a number of variables: the rhetori-
cal skill of the arguers, the kind of argument, and the
goals of the arguers. So, emotional inferences are not
always possible, always accurate, or always expected.
Rather, emotional states and reactions are frequently
inferred from facial and body expressions, tonality, and
context, and can be extremely useful in the process of
argumentation.
[253] Ananta Kumar Giri. Gandhi, Tagore and a new ethics of argu-
mentation. Journal of Human Values, 7(1):43–63, 2001.
Discourse, dialogue and deliberation are important
frames for thinking about and creating an ideal inter-
subjective condition and a dignified society at present.
This article presents the contours of such a new ethics
of argumentation by carrying out a detailed discussion
of the relationship between Gandhi and Tagore, and
the way they argued with each other. Their arguments
and counter-arguments were not for the sake of win-
ning any egotistic victory but for exploring truth. It
also connects this new ethics of argumentation in dia-
logue with the agenda of moral argumentation offered
by Jurgen Habermas, the heart-touching social theorist
of our time.
[254] David Godden. Commentary on: Chris Campolo’s “Argumen-
tative virtues and deep disagreement”. In Dima Mohammed &
Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
I will begin by highlighting what I take to be the most
important features of Campolo’s view and the perspec-
tive it offers on deep disagreements. Second, I will con-
trast Campolo’s advice concerning the use of reason
when faced with seemingly intractable disagreements,
or disagreements having the appearance of depth, with
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the advice offered by Adams (2005). Finally, I will con-
clude with some points which I suggest might be repar-
ative of this difference.
[255] David Godden. On the priority of agent-based argumentative
norms. Topoi, 35(2):345–357, 2016.
This paper argues against the priority of pure, virtue-
based accounts of argumentative norms (VA). Such ac-
counts are agent-based and committed to the priority
thesis: good arguments and arguing well are explained
in terms of some prior notion of the virtuous arguer ar-
guing virtuously. Two problems with the priority the-
sis are identified. First, the definitional problem: vir-
tuous arguers arguing virtuously are neither sufficient
nor necessary for good arguments. Second, the priority
problem: the goodness of arguments is not explained
virtuistically. Instead, being excellences, virtues are in-
strumental in relation to other, non-aretaic goods—in
this case, reason and rationality. Virtues neither con-
stitute reasons nor explain their goodness. Two options
remain for VA: either provide some account of reason
and rationality in virtuistic terms, or accept them as
given but non-aretaic goods. The latter option, though
more viable, demands the concession that VA cannot
provide the core norms of argumentation theory.
[256] Geoff C. Goddu. Commentary on Gascón’s Willingness to trust
as a virtue in argumentative discussions. In Dima Mohammed
& Marcin Lewiński, eds., Argumentation and Reasoned Action:
Proceedings of the First European Conference on Argumentation,
Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015, vol. 1, pp. 109–112. College Publications,
London, 2016.
[257] Geoff C. Goddu. What (the hell) is virtue argumentation? In
Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Argumentation and
Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the First European Conference
on Argumentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015, vol. 2, pp. 439–448.
College Publications, London, 2016.
The purpose of this paper is (i) to determine the nature
of virtue argumentation—to determine what aspect of
argumentation the theory is trying to explain and (ii)
to pose some challenges that such a theory needs to
overcome.
[258] Karen E Godzyk. Critical thinking disposition and transforma-
tional leadership behaviors: A correlational study. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Phoenix, 2008.
One of the greatest challenges confronting organiza-
tions is how to select and develop leaders. The dearth
of inexpensive, easily administered assessment instru-
ments contributes to the problem. The current explana-
tory, quantitative study examined the correlation be-
tween the critical thinking disposition and leadership
behaviors of leaders in service industries in the United
States. The study results indicate a moderately posi-
tive correlation between the critical thinking disposi-
tion and transformational behaviors of the study par-
ticipants. The finding supports further research into
whether critical thinking disposition could be used to
predict leadership emergence. The study result has po-
tential implications for trait theory of leadership and
leadership development and may provide the founda-
tion for a new model of leadership assessment: leader-
ship disposition.
[259] Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury, & Tracy Bowell. Mea-
suring critical thinking about deeply held beliefs. In Dima Mo-
hammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation:
Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inven-
tory (CCTDI) is a commonly used tool for measur-
ing critical thinking dispositions. However, research on
the efficacy of the CCTDI in predicting good think-
ing about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. In
this paper we report on preliminary results from our
ongoing study designed to gauge the usefulness of the
CCTDI in this context.
[260] Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury, & Tracy Bowell. Re-
sponse to our commentator. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin
Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON,
2014.
[261] Ilan Goldberg, Justine Kingsbury, Tracy Bowell, &
Darelle Howard. Measuring critical thinking about deeply
held beliefs. Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines,
30(1):40–50, 2015.
The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inven-
tory (CCTDI) is a commonly used tool for measur-
ing critical thinking dispositions. However, research on
the efficacy of the CCTDI in predicting good think-
ing about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. In
this paper we report on our study that was designed
to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in this context,
and take some first steps towards designing a better
method for measuring strong sense critical thinking.
[262] G. Thomas Goodnight. The virtues of reason and the problem
of other minds: Reflections on argumentation in a new century.
Informal Logic, 33(4):510–530, 2013.
From early modernity, philosophers have engaged in
skeptical discussions concerning knowledge of the ex-
istence, state, and standing of other minds. The ana-
logical move from self to other unfolds as controversy.
This paper reposes the problem as an argumentation
predicament and examines analogy as an opening to
the study of rhetorical cognition. Rhetorical cognition
is identified as a productive process coming to terms
with an other through testing sustainable risk. The pa-
per explains how self-sustaining risk is theorized by
Aristotle’s virtue ethics in the polis. Moral hazard is
identified as a threat to modern argument communi-
ties.
[263] Jerry Green. Metacognition as an epistemic virtue. Southwest
Philosophy Review, 35(1):117–129, 2019.
Metacognition, often glossed as ‘thinking about think-
ing’ or ‘cognition about cognition,’ is a buzzword in
education, a battleground in philosophy of mind, and
a central area of study in psychology. But it is rarely
discussed in epistemology, which is somewhat surpris-
ing given its deep roots in the field stretching back to
Plato’s Charmides and Aristotle’s De Anima. In this
paper, I will argue that metacognition deserves a bigger
role in epistemology. More specifically, I will argue that
metacognition qualifies as an epistemic virtue, and is
therefore of interest in the currently flourishing subfield
of virtue epistemology.
[264] Pedro H. Haddad Bernat. Epistemic virtue and acceptance in
legal fact-finding. Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea, 1(1):181–205,
2016.
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The purpose of this paper is to outline the way in which
an epistemic virtue approach can be used to address
epistemological issues in law. My claim is that respon-
sibilism is the right kind of approach. First, I will briefly
examine the difference between this conception and the
reliabilist conception of intellectual virtues. Then, I will
explore two major responsibilist projects that contain
several features required for an appropriate virtue ap-
proach to legal fact-finding. Next I will discuss the be-
lief/acceptance dichotomy and attempt to show that it
is acceptance – rather than belief – the right type of
propositional attitude to be held by legal fact-finders,
and that it may be regulated by intellectual virtues.
In the end, it will be argued that the conjunction of a
responsibilist epistemology and a theory of acceptance
constitutes a good theoretical framework for the anal-
ysis of legal reasoning about matters of fact.
[265] Pedro H. Haddad Bernat. Epistemología de virtudes robusta:
Sobre los límites y las posibilidades de su aplicación a la prueba de
los hechos en el derecho. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana De
Filosofía, 49:5–26, 2017. In Spanish.
The purpose of this paper is to define the general fea-
tures of a suitable epistemology for law. In particular,
the paper is concerned with a very influential project
that is nowadays offered in the literature: robust virtue
epistemology. As I will show here, such a project is un-
tenable for law, since a satisfactory and complete epis-
temology of legal proof requires the conjunction of both
the agent’s perspective (the “trier-of-facts”) and the in-
quiry system’s perspective (the rules of evidence).
[266] Benjamin Hamby. The Virtues of Critical Thinkers. Ph.D. thesis,
McMaster University, 2014.
Critical thinking is an educational ideal with an accu-
mulating canon of scholarship, but conceptualizing it
has nevertheless remained contentious. One important
issue concerns how critical thinking involves an inter-
play between cognitive abilities and associated char-
acter traits, dispositions, and motivations. I call these
and other aspects of the critical thinker “critical think-
ing virtues”, taking them to be intellectual excellences
of character, cultivated by people who tend to aim to-
wards making reasoned judgments about what to do or
believe. The central virtue that motivates any critical
thinker to engage her skills in critical thinking I call
“willingness to inquire”, connecting the character of the
person to the skills she must use consistently to be a
critical thinker. Willingness to inquire is the virtue that
ranges over the application of all critical thinking skills,
a basic motivational drive guiding a person towards the
educational ideal. Other critical thinking virtues, such
as open-mindedness, fairness, and respect for dialecti-
cal partners, also facilitate the appropriate application
of critical thinking skills in a process of inquiry. Ped-
agogues should therefore seek not only to instruct for
skills, but also to explicitly mention and instruct for
the virtues as well. I conclude by offering curricular
recommendations in this regard.
[267] Benjamin Hamby. Willingness to inquire: The cardinal critical
thinking virtue. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds.,
Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
The willingness to suspend judgment while thinking
carefully in an effort to reach a reasoned judgment,
what I call the “willingness to inquire”, stands behind
all skilled thinking that contributes to critical think-
ing. The willingness to inquire is therefore a more pri-
mary critical thinking virtue than open-mindedness,
fair-mindedness, or intellectual courage, because with-
out the disposition to employ the skills that aim toward
reasoned judgment, there is no way to employ those
skills appropriately to that end.
[268] Benjamin Hamby. Willingness to inquire: The cardinal critical
thinking virtue. In Martin Davies & Ron Barnett, eds., Pal-
grave Handbook of Critical Thinking in Higher Education, pp. 77–
87. Palgrave, London, 2015.
The willingness to suspend judgment while thinking
carefully in an effort to reach a reasoned judgment,
what I call the “willingness to inquire”, stands behind
all skilled thinking that contributes to critical think-
ing. The willingness to inquire is therefore a more pri-
mary critical thinking virtue than open-mindedness,
fair-mindedness, or intellectual courage, because with-
out the disposition to employ the skills that aim toward
reasoned judgment, there is no way to employ those
skills appropriately to that end.
[269] Dale Hample. Arguing skill. In J. O. Greene & B. R.
Burleson, eds., Handbook of Communication and Social Interac-
tion Skills, pp. 439–477. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah,
NJ, 2003.
Many argumentative interactions proceed more or less
as we would wish, with good reasons given and ac-
knowledged. If this were always so, there would be no
more use for this chapter than one on proper breath-
ing during communication. But the fact is that some-
times we experience disagreement without reasoning,
as when small chiuldren or enraged adults simply ex-
change demands. Sometimes reasons are present but
fail elementary tests of textual coherence or connec-
tion to the other person. Sometimes reasons are given,
answered, and then simply repeated. All of these are
examples of incompetence, and people can learn to do
better.
[270] Dale Hample. The arguers. Informal Logic, 27(2):163–178, 2007.
I wish to argue in favor of a particular orientation, one
expressed in Brockriede’s remark that “arguments are
not in statements but in people”. While much has been
gained from textual analyses, even more will accrue by
additional attention to the arguers. I consider that tex-
tual materials are really only the artifacts of arguments.
The actual arguing is done exclusively by people, ei-
ther the argument producers or receivers, and never by
words on a page. In fact, most of our textual interpre-
tations are quietly founded on the assumption that the
artifact is fully informative about what people think.
[271] Stuart Hampshire. Justice is strife. Proceedings and Addresses
of the American Philosophical Association, 65(3):19–27, 1991.
Let us keep the supposed superior faculty of the mind,
reason, with its long aristocratic history, in its proper
place as an equal alongside the other thoughtful ac-
tivities assigned to the imagination. Let there be no
philosopher-kings, and no substantial principles of jus-
tice which are to be permanently acceptable to all ra-
tional agents, seeking harmony and unanimous agree-
ment. Rather political prudence, recognized as a high
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virtue, must expect a perpetual contest between hostile
conceptions of justice and must develop acceptable pro-
cedures for regulating and refereeing the contest. The
contests are unending if only because what is generally
thought substantially just and fair today will not be
thought just and fair tomorrow. This is as it should be,
always provided that the old and new moral claims can
expect finally to be given a hearing. The rock-bottom
justice is in the contests themselves, in the tension of
open opposition, always renewed.
[272] Stuart Hanscomb. Teaching critical thinking virtues and vices:
The case for Twelve Angry Men. Teaching Philosophy, 42(3):173–
195, 2019.
In the film and play Twelve Angry Men, Juror 8 con-
fronts the prejudices and poor reasoning of his fellow
jurors, exhibiting an unwavering capacity not just to
formulate and challenge arguments, but to be open-
minded, stay calm, tolerate uncertainty, and negoti-
ate in the face of considerable group pressures. In a
perceptive and detailed portrayal of a group delibera-
tion a ‘wheel of virtue’ is presented by the characters
of Twelve Angry Men that allows for critical thinking
virtues and vices to be analysed in context. This arti-
cle makes the case for (1) the film being an exceptional
teaching resource, and (2), drawing primarily on the
ideas of Martha Nussbaum concerning contextualised
detail, emotional engagement, and aesthetic distance,
its educational value being intimately related to its be-
ing a work of fiction.
[273] Hans V. Hansen. Studying argumentation behaviour. In Ron
Von Burg, ed., Dialogues in Argumentation, vol. 3 of Wind-
sor Studies in Argumentation, pp. 34–54. CRRAR, Windsor, ON,
2016.
Starting from the observation that argumentation stud-
ies have low recognition value both within and with-
out the academy, and mindful of the current desider-
ata that academic research should be relevant outside
the academy, I introduce the concept of an argumen-
tation profile as a panacea for our ills. Argumentation
profiles are sketches of the argumentation behaviour
of either individuals or groups (such as political par-
ties) and are based on concepts unique to argumenta-
tion studies such as argumentation schemes, dialogical
roles and responsiveness. It is argued that argumenta-
tion profiles would be of interest to voters as well as
political parties.
[274] Kathleen Sandell Hardesty. An(other) Rhetoric: Rhetoric,
Ethics, and the Rhetorical Tradition. Master’s thesis, University
of South Florida, 2013.
With a theoretical focus, this study traces and ex-
amines how rhetoric’s relation to ethics has trans-
formed over the past 60 years from our discipline’s Aris-
totelian/Platonic/Socratic inheritance to the introduc-
tion of multiple new perspectives and voices. In suggest-
ing that the goal of rhetoric is more than persuasion—a
major focus of the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition
dominant in the field of rhetoric and composition in the
early 20th Century—this study traces a “turn” within
our discipline from “confrontational” rhetoric to “invi-
tational” rhetoric. It suggests that invitational rhetoric
challenges a strict definition of rhetoric as persuasion,
seeks instead to understand rather than convert, sup-
port camaraderie and mutuality (if not unity) instead
of reinforcing dominant power relationships, challenge
the speaker as much as the audience, and privilege
listening and invitation over persuasion when appro-
priate. Rhetorical ethics is defined as the ethical deci-
sions made in the everyday interactions that constantly
invite us to make rhetorical choices that inevitably
have consequences in the world. The study examines
kairos/sophistic rhetoric, identification, and responsi-
bility to establish a potential framework for rhetori-
cal ethics, as well as listening and acknowledgement
as methods for enacting this model. The ambition is a
rhetoric of ethics that attends to everyday situations;
accommodates different, often “silenced,” voices; and
offers the possibility of an ethical encounter with oth-
ers.
[275] Lee Hardy, Del Ratzsch, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, &
Gregory Mellema. The Little Logic Book. Calvin College Press,
Grand Rapids, MI, 2013.
Written by four members of the Calvin College phi-
losophy department, The Little Logic Book is a valu-
able resource for teachers and undergraduate students
of philosophy. In addition to providing clear introduc-
tions to the modes of reasoning students encounter in
their philosophy course readings, it includes a nuanced
description of common informal fallacies, a narrative
overview of various philosophical accounts of scientific
inference, and a concluding chapter on the ethics of
argumentation.
[276] William Hare. In Defence of Open-Mindedness. McGill-Queens
University Press, Montreal, 1985.
William Hare believes that open-mindedness – the dis-
position to form a belief, and if necessary to revise
or reject it, in the light of available evidence and ar-
gument – stands in need of a defence because it is
under widespread attack. In this sequel to his highly
regarded Open-mindedness and Education [1979], he
examines the numerous ways in which opposition to
open-mindedness is expressed, and shows how these
criticisms can be countered. He argues that the gen-
eral indictment of open-mindedness as a habit of mind
leading to nihilism and scepticism, as well as to neglect
of the emotions, is based upon a misunderstanding of
the nature of the concept, which in his opinion is by
no means incompatible with personal commitment and
confidence. Similar confusions are exposed in such areas
as elementary schooling, moral education, educational
standards, methods of teaching, the administration of
schools, and the teaching of science. In each of these
areas, examples are taken from the writings of influen-
tial critics to illustrate the nature of the doubts con-
cerning open-mindedness – doubts that are carefully
analysed and show to rest ultimately upon erroneous
assumptions. And since he believes that many who set
out to champion open-mindedness manage to confuse
this ideal with other notions, Hare undertakes in a con-
cluding chapter to protect the ideal from its would-be
friends and supporters.
[277] William Hare. Bertrand Russell on critical thinking. Journal of
Thought, 36(1):7–16, 2001.
The ideal of critical thinking is a central one in Russell’s
philosophy, though this is not yet generally recognized
in the literature on critical thinking. For Russell, the
ideal is embedded in the fabric of philosophy, science,
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liberalism and rationality, and this paper reconstructs
Russell’s account, which is scattered throughout nu-
merous papers and books. It appears that he has de-
veloped a rich conception, involving a complex set of
skills, dispositions and attitudes, which together de-
lineate a virtue which has both intellectual and moral
aspects. It is a view which is rooted in Russell’s epis-
temological conviction that knowledge is difficult but
not impossible to attain, and in his ethical conviction
that freedom and independence in inquiry are vital.
Russell’s account anticipates many of the insights to
be found in the recent critical thinking literature, and
his views on critical thinking are of enormous impor-
tance in understanding the nature of educational aims.
Moreover, it is argued that Russell manages to avoid
many of the objections which have been raised against
recent accounts. With respect to impartiality, thinking
for oneself, the importance of feelings and relational
skills, the connection with action, and the problem of
generalizability, Russell shows a deep understanding of
problems and issues which have been at the forefront
of recent debate.
[278] William Hare. Is it good to be open-minded? International
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 17(1):73–87, 2003.
Open-mindedness is properly thought of as a kind
of critical receptiveness in which our willingness to
consider new ideas is guided by our best judgment
with respect to the available evidence. Genuine open-
mindedness requires finding some middle ground be-
tween being ready to entertain every idea seriously and
being excessively resistant to reasonable possibilities.
This line of thought suggests a natural connection with
an Aristotelian account of virtue as involving a mean
between two extremes to be determined by the use of
practical wisdom. We may go too far in the direction of
critical skepticism and lose sight of open-mindedness;
but it is no mark of open-mindedness to be willing to
embrace absurdity, to be unwilling ever to draw a con-
clusion, or to be ready to abandon a promising line of
inquiry merely to pursue some other possibility.
[279] William Hare. Open-minded inquiry: A glossary of key concepts.
Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 23(3):37–41,
2004.
This is a brief guide to the ideal of open-minded inquiry
by way of a survey of related notions. Making special
reference to the educational context, the aim is to offer
teachers an insight into what it would mean for their
work to be influenced by this ideal, and to lead stu-
dents to a deeper appreciation of open-minded inquiry.
From assumptions to zealotry, the glossary provides an
account of a wide range of concepts in this family of
ideas, reflecting a concern and a connection through-
out with the central concept of open-mindedness itself.
An intricate network of relationships is uncovered that
reveals the richness of this ideal; and many confusions
and misunderstandings that hinder a proper apprecia-
tion of open-mindedness are identified.
[280] William Hare. Why open-mindedness matters. Think, 13:7–15,
2006.
Open-mindedness involves a readiness to give due con-
sideration to relevant evidence and argument, espe-
cially when factors present in the situation tempt one
to resist such consideration, with a view to increasing
our awareness, understanding and appreciation, avoid-
ing error, and reaching true and defensible conclusions.
It means being critically receptive to alternative possi-
bilities and new ideas, resisting inflexible and dogmatic
attitudes, and sincerely trying to avoid whatever might
suppress or distort our reflections. Open-mindedness is
relevant to whatever views we presently hold in the
sense that we remain committed to reconsidering them
in the light of new questions, doubts, and findings; and
it also involves maintaining a certain outlook through-
out the entire process of inquiry, whereby we remain
willing to accept whatever view proves in the end to
have the strongest evidential and reasoned support.
[281] William Hare. Socratic open-mindedness. Paideusis, 18(1):5–16,
2009.
A philosophical conception of open-minded inquiry first
emerges in western philosophy in the work of Socrates.
This paper develops an interpretation of Socratic open-
mindedness drawing primarily on Socratic ideas about
(i) the requirements of serious argument, and (ii) the
nature of human wisdom. This account is defended
against a number of objections which mistakenly inter-
pret Socrates as defending, teaching, or inducing skep-
ticism, and neglecting the value of expert wisdom. The
ongoing significance of Socratic open-mindedness as an
ideal of inquiry is brought out through examination of
a notorious Canadian case in the context of forensic
pathology.
[282] William Hare & Terry McLaughlin. Four anxieties about
open-mindedness: Reassuring Peter Gardner. Journal of Philos-
ophy of Education, 32(2):283–292, 1998.
In this article four anxieties expressed by Peter Gardner
about our conception of open-mindedness and its ed-
ucational implications are examined. It is argued that
none of Gardner’s anxieties undermine our view that
open-mindedness requires neither neutrality nor inde-
cision with respect to a matter in question, but rather
that open-mindedness is compatible with holding of be-
liefs and commitments about such matters provided
that the beliefs and commitments are formed and held
in such a way that they are open to revision in the light
of evidence and argument.
[283] Donald Hatcher. Critical thinking and epistemic obligations.
Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 14(3):28–40,
1995.
I shaIl argue that how we behave with respect to form-
ing our beliefs is as moraIly significant as other moraIly
significant actions. As a result, there is a moral imper-
ative to teach critical thinking, and teachers are un-
der a moral obligation to help students acquire those
skills and dispositions commonly associated with criti-
cal thinking. Not to do so may weIl be unethical.
[284] Donald Hatcher. Commentary on: Tracy Bowell and Justine
Kingsbury’s “Critical thinking and the argumentational and epis-
temic virtues”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds.,
Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
[285] Deborah K. Heikes. The Virtue of Feminist Rationality. Con-
tinuum, New York, NY, 2012.
Feminist philosophers have been some of the most vo-
cal critics of reason and rationality. While most femi-
nists realize that rationality is a concept that cannot
VIRTUES AND ARGUMENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 39
be entirely abandoned, few have considered how to con-
struct a positive account of rationality. This book rep-
resents a sustained argument for a feminist theory of
rationality. It opens by asking the question: is rea-
son inherently masculine? Deborah K. Heikes goes
on to answer this question negatively and to exam-
ine what feminists actually want from a theory of ra-
tionality, specifying what a virtue theory of rational-
ity is and how it works. She identifies those features
that feminists believe are central to reason, identify-
ing four dichotomies that are central to feminist think-
ing (mind/body, reason/emotion, identity/difference,
objectivity/subjectivity), and argues that they can be
captured by conceiving of rationality as a virtue con-
cept. She further demonstrates how a specifically femi-
nist theory of rationality can provide objective grounds
for feminists’ moral, political and epistemic agendas.
[286] Deborah K. Heikes. Rationality, Representation, and Race. Pal-
grave Macmillan, London, 2016.
During the Enlightenment, rationality becomes not a
property belonging to all humans but something that
one must achieve. This transformation has the effect of
excluding non-whites and non-males from the domain
of reason. Heikes seeks to uncover the source of this
exclusion, which she argues stems from the threat of
subjectivism inherent in modern thinking. As an alter-
native, she considers post-Cartesian reactions of mod-
ern representationalism as well as ancient Greek under-
standings of mind as simply one part of a functionally
diverse soul. In the end, she maintains that treating ra-
tionality as an evolutionarily situated virtue concept al-
lows for an understanding of rationality that recognizes
diversity and that grounds substantive moral concepts.
[287] Tempest Henning. Bringing wreck. Symposion, 5(2):197–211,
2018.
This paper critically examines non-adversarial feminist
argumentation model specifically within the scope of
politeness norms and cultural communicative practices.
Asserting women typically have a particular mode of
arguing which is often seen as ‘weak’ or docile within
male dominated fields, the model argues that the fem-
inine mode of arguing is actually more affiliative and
community orientated, which should become the stan-
dard within argumentation as opposed to the Adver-
sary Method. I argue that the non- adversarial femi-
nist argumentation model (NAFAM) primarily focuses
on one demographic of women’s communicative styles
– white women. Taking an intersectional approach, I
examine practices within African American women’s
speech communities to illustrate the ways in which the
virtues and vices purported by the NAFAM fails to
capture other ways of productive argumentation.
[288] Tempest Henning. “I said what I said” – Black women and argu-
mentative politeness norms. In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Hen-
rike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar, & Bart Verheij, eds.,
Reason to Dissent: Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference
on Argumentation, Groningen 2019, vol. 1, pp. 269–283. College
Publications, London, 2020.
This paper seeks to complicate two primary norms
within argumentation theory: 1. engaging with one’s
interlocutors in a ‘pleasant’ tone and 2. speaking di-
rectly to one’s target audience/interlocutor. Moreover,
I urge argumentation theorists to explore various cul-
tures’ argumentative norms and practices when at-
tempting to formulate more universal theories regard-
ing argumentation. Ultimately, I aim to show that the
two previously mentioned norms within argumentation
obscures and misrepresents many argumentative prac-
tices within African American Vernacular English – or
Ebonics, specifically the art of signifying.
[289] James A. Herrick. Rhetoric, ethics, and virtue. Communication
Studies, 43(3):133–149, 1992.
This essay explores the possibility of grounding an
ethic of rhetoric in virtues suggested by the practice of
rhetoric itself. For clues regarding rhetorical virtues, it
examines the connection between rhetoric and virtues
in a variety of rhetorical and literary critics. Finally, an
initial effort to identify several rhetorical virtues is un-
dertaken following suggestions by Alasdair MacIntyre.
Rhetorical virtues, it is argued, are discovered by ex-
amining the goods inherent to rhetoric, as well as the
sources of cooperation and the standards of excellence
implied by the practice of rhetoric. The possibility of
a virtues oriented pedagogy of communication is also
considered.
[290] Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter. Thinking about persons: Loci
personarum in humanist dialectic between Agricola and Kecker-
mann. History and Philosophy of Logic, 38(1):1–23, 2017.
Loci personarum, ‘topics for persons’ were used in Latin
rhetoric for the description of persons, their external
circumstances, physical attributes, or qualities of char-
acter. They stood in the way of fusing rhetoric and di-
alectic, the goal of sixteenth-century ‘humanistic’ logic:
the project of a unified theory of invention depends on
the exclusion of loci personarum from the domain of di-
alectic proper. But still they cannot easily be replaced
in the classroom. Bartholomaeus Keckermann resolved
these difficulties: he proposed to abandon the notion
that loci personarum could play a role in finding new
arguments concerning persons. So they pose no risks for
a unified theory of invention, because they can only be
used for the exposition of information that we already
have. Since loci personarum are concerned with indi-
viduals, the knowledge about individuals that is avail-
able to us is inescapably circumstantial and contingent,
defying the claim of generality or necessity of dialectic
made by Keckermann’s sixteenth-century predecessors.
However, our thinking about persons is primarily inter-
ested in those aspects that we do not share with other
members of our species. For Keckermann, persons are
therefore logically different from most individuals be-
longing to other species.
[291] Chris Higgins. Open-mindedness in three dimensions. Paideusis,
18(1):44–59, 2009.
In this programmatic essay, I approach the question
“What is open-mindedness?" through three more spe-
cific questions, each designed to foreground a dis-
tinct dimension along which the analysis of open-
mindedness might proceed: When is open-mindedness?
What is not open-mindedness? and, Where is open-
mindedness? The first question refers to the tem-
poral dimension of open-mindedness, which I analyze
in terms of Dewey’s distinction between recognition
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and perception and the psychoanalytic concept of dis-
avowal. The second question refers to the dialectical di-
mension of open-mindedness, to what the many aspects
of closed-mindedness reveal about open-mindedness.
Here I recall Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. The third
question refers to the dimension of scale, asking what
open- and closed-mindedness look like on the interper-
sonal and social levels. To bring out this third dimen-
sion, I draw on Jonathan Lear’s reading of the Republic
and psychoanalytic group dynamics theory. Through
these three related inquiries I show the range of this
central intellectual virtue and bring out its connections
to two central, related features of the moral life: the
need for integration and the need for openness to new-
ness and complexity.
[292] Michael J. Hoppmann. Is it reasonable to be funny? In Bart
Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, & Jean H.M.
Wagemans, eds., Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the In-
ternational Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 521–527.
Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2019.
This essay addresses the relationship between norms
of reasoning and norms of humour: To what extend
can one be funny and reasonable at the same time?
For this purpose, a normative system of reasoning (i.e.
the model of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion)
is contrasted with three approaches to humour: an-
cient rhetorical humour, and the modern Script-based
Semantic Theory of Humour (SSTH) and the Benign
Violation Theory (BVT) respectively.
[293] Moira Howes. Commentary on: Mark Young’s “Virtuous agency
as a ground for argument norms”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin
Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON,
2014.
Young argues—successfully in my view—that we need
not rely on unreflective intuitions to ground argument
norms and that intellectual virtues can ground them
instead. His suggestion is engaging, provocative, and
has interesting implications for a variety of issues in
argumentation. In response, I have suggested a few op-
tions for further exploration including relevant work in
reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemologies, the
problem of achieving epistemic value through intellec-
tual vice, the relation of virtuous argument norms to
ethotic argument, and the role of intellectual commu-
nity in the development of virtue epistemic argument
norms.
[294] Moira Howes. Does happiness increase the objectivity of arguers?
In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Ar-
gumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of
the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May
22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
At first glance, happiness and objectivity seem to have
little in common. I claim, however, that subjective and
eudaimonic happiness promotes arguer objectivity. To
support my claim, I focus on connections between hap-
piness, social intelligence, and intellectual virtue. Af-
ter addressing objections concerning unhappy objective
and happy unobjective arguers, I conclude that commu-
nities should value happiness in argumentative contexts
and use happiness as an indicator of their capacity for
objective argumentation.
[295] Moira Howes. Objectivity, intellectual virtue, and community.
In Flavia Padovani, Alan Richardson, & Jonathan Y. Tsou,
eds., Objectivity in Science: New Perspectives from Science and
Technology Studies, pp. 173–188. Springer, Cham, 2015.
In this paper I argue that the objectivity of persons is
best understood in terms of intellectual virtue, the te-
los of which is an enduring commitment to salient and
accurate information about reality. On this view, an
objective reasoner is one we can trust to manage her
perspectives, beliefs, emotions, biases, and responses to
evidence in an intellectually virtuous manner. We can
be confident that she will exercise intellectual careful-
ness, openmindedness, fairmindedness, curiosity, perse-
verance, and other intellectual virtues in her reasoning.
[296] Moira Howes & Catherine Hundleby. The epistemology of
anger in argumentation. Symposion, 5(2):229–254, 2018.
While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help
arguers and audiences to reason together in argumen-
tation. Anger can provide information about premises,
biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement
that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prema-
turely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of
certain premises and underscore the importance of re-
lated inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger
can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation.
[297] Michael Huemer. Is critical thinking epistemically responsible?
Metaphilosophy, 36(4):522–531, 2005.
There are at least three strategies we might take in ap-
proaching controversial issues: (i) we might accept the
conclusions of experts on their authority, (ii) we might
evaluate the relevant evidence and arguments for our-
selves, or (iii) we might give up on finding the answers.
Students of “critical thinking” are regularly advised to
follow strategy (ii). But strategies (i) and (iii) are usu-
ally superior to (ii), from the standpoint of the goal of
gaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones.
[298] Catherine Hundleby. Aggression, politeness, and abstract ad-
versaries. Informal Logic, 33(2):238–262, 2013.
Trudy Govier argues in The Philosophy of Argument
that adversariality in argumentation can be kept to
a necessary minimum. On her account, politeness can
limit the ancillary adversariality of hostile culture but
a degree of logical opposition will remain part of argu-
mentation, and perhaps all reasoning. Argumentation
cannot be purified by politeness in the way she hopes,
nor does reasoning even in the discursive context of
argumentation demand opposition. Such hopes assume
an idealized politeness free from gender, and reasoners
with inhuman or at least highly privileged capabilities
and no need to learn from others or share understand-
ing.
[299] Catherine Hundleby. Commentary on Tempest Henning’s “ ‘I
said what I said’ – Black women and argumentative politeness
norms”. In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan
Albert Van Laar, & Bart Verheij, eds., Reason to Dissent:
Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Argumentation,
Groningen 2019, vol. 1, pp. 285–288. College Publications, Lon-
don, 2020.
Tempest Henning takes a short piece by Scott Aikin
and Robert Talisse and a certain thread in feminist phi-
losophy of argument, pulling on their assumptions to
reveal tacit problems generally at work in argumenta-
tion theory. I agree with Henning’s call for theorists to
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pay better attention to actual practices of arguing and
that the failure to do so is both an ethical and epistemo-
logical problem with argumentation theory. However, I
suggest that argumentation scholarship has resources
that can be developed to address her concerns.
[300] Emery J. Hyslop-Margison. The failure of critical thinking:
Considering virtue epistemology as a pedagogical alternative. Phi-
losophy of Education Society Yearbook, 15:319–326, 2003.
In this essay, I want to argue that the lack of success
enjoyed by critical thinking instruction arises at least in
part from the significant conceptual and epistemolog-
ical errors embedded in the discourse surrounding the
term. These persistent errors follow from the fallacious
Cartesian metaphysics on which mental process terms
are often predicated. Rather than attempting to reha-
bilitate critical thinking, then, I propose jettisoning the
concept in favor of a potentially more fruitful pedagog-
ical approach free of this Cartesian baggage. Although
the idea of epistemic virtue has been largely ignored
in mainstream educational discourse, it may provide a
more effective strategy to enrich the intellectual devel-
opment of students.
[301] Marianne Janack & John Adams. Feminist epistemologies,
rhetorical traditions and the ad hominem. In Christine Mason
Sutherland & Rebecca Sutcliffe, eds., The Changing Tradi-
tion: Women in the History of Rhetoric, pp. 213–224. University
of Calgary Press, Calgary, 1999.
This understanding of the ad hominem and the sin it
embodies—the sin of irrelevance—has recently come
under examination by philosophers and scholars in the
discipline of speech communication. The ad hominem
and its presumed invalidity has also been an issue for
feminist epistemological projects, either directly or in-
directly. We will begin with a discussion of the rela-
tionship between feminist epistemological projects and
the ad hominem, and then move to a discussion of the
argument against understanding the ad hominem as a
fallacy in all cases, presented by Douglas Walton in
A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy. We will then orches-
trate a conversation between Lorraine Code and Dou-
glas Walton to examine where Code’s feminist project
overlaps with Walton’s project and where they part
company, and conclude with some remarks on how
these projects differ from other social epistemological
projects.
[302] Gary Jason. Does virtue epistemology provide a better account
of the ad hominem argument? A reply to Christopher Johnson.
Philosophy, 86(1):95–119, 2011.
Christopher Johnson has put forward in this journal
the view that ad hominem reasoning may be more gen-
erally reasonable than is allowed by writers such as
myself, basing his view on virtue epistemology. I re-
view his account, as well as the standard account, of
ad hominem reasoning, and show how the standard ac-
count would handle the cases he sketches in defense of
his own view. I then give four criticisms of his view
generally: the problems of virtue conflict, vagueness,
conflation of speech acts, and self-defeating counsel. I
then discuss four reasons why the standard account is
superior: it better fits legal reality, the account of other
fallacies, psychological science, and political reality.
[303] Casey Rebecca Johnson. For the sake of argument: The nature
and extent of our obligation to voice disagreement. In Casey Re-
becca Johnson, ed., Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Episte-
mology of Making Disagreement Public, pp. 97–108. Routledge,
London, 2018.
Johnson builds on the idea that agents, at least some-
times, have an epistemic obligation to voice disagree-
ments. Any of four background theories, inspired by in-
fluential work in social epistemology, can generate these
obligations. However, each background theory gener-
ates obligations with different characteristics. Johnson
explores these differences by looking at the extent and
limits of each. Key questions include the conditions un-
der which agents should voice their disagreement, and
to what extent that disagreement must be sincere. One
way of asking this second question is to ask, to what
extent are we epistemically obligated to play devil’s ad-
vocate?
[304] Casey Rebecca Johnson. Intellectual humility and empathy by
analogy. Topoi, 38(1):221–228, 2019.
Empathy can be terribly important when we talk to
people who are different from ourselves. And it can be
terribly important that we talk to people who are differ-
ent precisely about those things that make us different.
If we’re to have productive conversations across differ-
ences, then, it seems we must develop empathy with
people who are deeply different. But, as Laurie Paul
and others point out, it can be impossible to imag-
ine oneself as someone who is deeply different than
oneself—something that plausible definitions of empa-
thy seem to require. How then, can these terribly im-
portant conversations take place? I argue that philo-
sophical and psychological work on intellectual humil-
ity can show us a way to empathize and have these
conversations even when we can’t imagine ourselves as
the other.
[305] Christopher M. Johnson. Reconsidering the ad hominem. Phi-
losophy, 84:251–266, 2009.
Ad hominem arguments are generally dismissed on the
grounds that they are not attempts to engage in ra-
tional discourse, but are rather aimed at undermining
argument by diverting attention from claims made to
assessments of character of persons making claims. The
manner of this dismissal however is based upon an un-
likely paradigm of rationality: it is based upon the pre-
sumption that our intellectual capacities are not as lim-
ited as in fact they are, and do not vary as much as they
do between rational people. When we understand ratio-
nality in terms of intellectual virtues, however, which
recognize these limitations and provide for the com-
plexity of our thinking, ad hominem considerations can
sometimes be relevant to assessing arguments.
[306] Ralph H. Johnson. Commentary on: Adam Auch’s “Virtuous ar-
gumentation and the challenges of hype”. In Dima Mohammed &
Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
[307] Christopher Lyle Johnstone. An Aristotelian trilogy: Ethics,
rhetoric, politics, and the search for moral truth. Philosophy and
Rhetoric, 13(1):1–24, 1980.
Aristotle’s writings on the subjects of ethics, rhetoric,
and politics advance a view in which these arts are
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fundamentally interrelated. Moreover, this view im-
plies some striking and significant conclusions concern-
ing the proper function of communication in human-
ity’s search for virtue and well-being. This essay ex-
plores and seeks to clarify the relationship in Aristotle’s
thought among these arts, and argues finally for a uni-
fying vision of moral virtue, suasive speech, and the de-
liberative activities of the polis. For Aristotle, the polit-
icai life of the human community is the agency by which
individuai moral visions are tested, clarified, modified,
and shared, giving rise to the particular moral truths
that serve to ground individuai conduct and social pol-
icy, and thus that serve to guide the development of
individuai character and community life.
[308] Charlotte Jørgensen. Commentary on: Moira Kloster’s “The
virtue of restraint: Rebalancing power in arguments”. In Dima
Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumenta-
tion: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
[309] Chenise S. Kanemoto. Bushido in the courtroom: A case for
virtue-oriented lawyering. South Carolina Law Review, 57:357–
386, 2005.
This essay employs the samurai and their virtue-
oriented bushido code as a conceptual framework for
legal professionalism and civility to promote a greater
consciousness of virtue-oriented lawyering—the hall-
mark of an ethical and socially responsible lawyer.
However, I do not purport to be an expert on bushido or
the virtues it represents, for these topics have been the
subject of philosophical discourse for centuries. I hope
to illuminate the congruence between bushido and the
modern practice of law as a way to inspire thoughtful
reflection on legal professionalism in a meaningful way.
[310] Artur Ravilevich Karimov. Deep disagreement and argumen-
tative virtues. Obwestvo, 2018(1), 2018. Online at https://doi.
org/10.24158/fik.2018.1.3. In Russian.
Deep disagreement is a disagreement about epistemic
principles relating to the choice of justification and
argumentation methods. Relying on the conceptual
metaphor of “hinges” by Wittgenstein, the researchers
conclude that deep disagreement cannot be resolved.
This conclusion leads to relativism in the argumenta-
tion theory. The purpose of the study is to show that,
in case of deep disagreement, one can theoretically de-
termine which of parties in dispute has better epistemic
status and, consequently, is argumentatively virtuous.
To substantiate this thesis, we propose carrying out
such thought experiment as an epistemic method game
by M. Lynch and applying the virtue argumentation
theory by D. Cohen and A. Aberdein. This research has
a purely theoretical, philosophical aim to criticize rel-
ativism in argumentation theory and justify its regula-
tory status. The right moves in argumentation are such
that an agent with the entire argumentative virtues
would prefer, and wrong moves, or argumentative fal-
lacies, are such that an agent with argumentative vices
would make.
[311] David Kary. Critical thinking and epistemic responsibility. In
Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argu-
mentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of
the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May
22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
An argument developed by Michael Huemer raises
doubts about the epistemic responsibility of taking a
‘critical thinking’ approach to belief formation. This
paper takes issue with Huemer’s depiction of critical
thinking as an approach that rejects all reliance on the
intellectual authority of others, and it offers a more
realistic depiction. The paper ultimately contends that
Huemer’s argument fails because it rests on an impover-
ished and unaccountably individualistic notion of epis-
temic responsibility.
[312] Steven B. Katz. The ethic of expediency: Classical rhetoric,
technology, and the Holocaust. College English, 54(3):255–275,
1992.
I will argue that the ethic of expediency in Western cul-
ture which Aristotle first treated systematically in the
Rhetoric, the Nicomachean Ethics, and especially the
Politics, was rhetorically embraced by the Nazi regime
and combined with science and technology to form the
“moral basis” of the holocaust. While there is a concern
for ethics in the field of technical communication, and
while few in our society believe expediency is an ade-
quate moral basis for making decisions, I will suggest
that it is the ethic of expediency that enables delibera-
tive rhetoric and gives impulse to most of our actions in
technological capitalism as well, and I will explore some
of the implications and dangers of a rhetoric grounded
exclusively in an ethic of expediency
[313] Ian James Kidd. Charging others with epistemic vice. The
Monist, 99(2):181–197, 2016.
This paper offers an analysis of the structure of epis-
temic vice-charging, the critical practice of charging
other persons with epistemic vice. Several desiderata
for a robust vice-charge are offered and two deep obsta-
cles to the practice of epistemic vice-charging are then
identified and discussed. The problem of responsibility
is that few of us enjoy conditions that are required for
effective socialisation as responsible epistemic agents.
The problem of consensus is that the efficacy of a vice-
charge is contingent upon a degree of consensus be-
tween critic and target that is unlikely or impossible
where vice-charging is most likely to be provoked. It
emerges that a robust critical practice of vice-charging
is possible in principle, but very difficult in practice.
[314] Ian James Kidd. Intellectual humility, confidence, and argumen-
tation. Topoi, 35(2):395–402, 2016.
In this paper, I explore the relationship of virtue, argu-
mentation, and philosophical conduct by considering
the role of the specific virtue of intellectual humility
in the practice of philosophical argumentation. I have
three aims: first, to sketch an account of this virtue;
second, to argue that it can be cultivated by engaging
in argumentation with others; and third, to problema-
tize this claim by drawing upon recent data from social
psychology. My claim is that philosophical argumen-
tation can be conducive to the cultivation of virtues,
including humility, but only if it is conceived and prac-
ticed in appropriately ‘edifying’ ways.
[315] Ian James Kidd. Epistemic vices in public debate: The case of
‘new atheism’. In Christopher Cotter, Philip Quadrio, &
Jonathan Tuckett, eds., New Atheism: Critical Perspectives
and Contemporary Debates, pp. 51–68. Springer, Dordrecht, 2017.
In this chapter, my concern is with a set of criticisms
that, though quite familiar, are surprisingly neglected
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in the literature on the new atheists: that the new athe-
ists typically evince negative character traits, or vices,
such as arrogance, dogmatism, and closed-mindedness.
[316] Ian James Kidd. Martial metaphors and argumentative virtues
and vices. In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch, eds.,
Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspec-
tives, pp. 25–38. Routledge, London, 2020.
This Chapter challenges the common claim that vi-
cious forms of argumentative practice, like interper-
sonal arrogance and discursive polarisation, are caused
by martial metaphors, such as ARGUMENT AS WAR.
I argue that the problem isn’t the metaphor, but our
wider practices of metaphorising and the ways they are
deformed by invidious cultural biases and prejudices.
Drawing on feminist argumentation theory, I argue that
misogynistic cultures distort practices of metaphorising
in two ways. First, they spotlight some associations be-
tween the martial and argumentative domains while oc-
cluding others, resulting in a sort of myopia. Second,
those cultures interfere with a phenomenon I label nor-
mative isomorphism—the capacity of some structural
metaphors to enable (and often encourage) a transfer
of normative chracater traits from the source domain
to the target domain. Crucially, the normative status
of character trait often changes across domains—traits
that are virtuous in the martial domain are often vi-
cious in the argumentative domain, and vice versa. Sex-
ist myopia tends to deform practices of metaphorising
by interfering with normative isomorphism by privi-
leging the transfer across domains of traits that reca-
pitulate invidious cultural constructions of masculinity
in terms of aggression, domination, and violence. Basi-
cally, the problem isn’t the metaphors, but the cultures.
[317] R. Jay Kilby. Critical thinking, epistemic virtue, and the signif-
icance of inclusion: Reflections on Harvey Siegel’s theory of ratio-
nality. Educational Theory, 54(3):299–313, 2004.
Among proponents of critical thinking, Harvey Siegel
stands out in his attempt to address fundamental epis-
temological issues. Siegel argues that discursive inclu-
sion of diverse groups should not be confused with ra-
tional justification of the outcome of inquiry. He main-
tains that epistemic virtues such as inclusion are nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for rational judgment, and
that if we are to avoid falling prey to relativism, cri-
teria are needed to distinguish which of these virtues
are indeed rational. However, the author argues that at
least some of Siegel’s own rational criteria cannot pass
the “necessary or sufficient” standard by which he mea-
sures epistemic virtues. Moreover, reliance upon crite-
ria fails to settle conflict in cases of disagreement over
what constitutes authoritative evidence. Jürgen Haber-
mas’s theory of communicative rationality can help us
to overcome this impasse, because it provides a non-
relativistic basis for justifying inclusion and giving it a
place of priority in practical reasoning.
[318] Hye-Kyung Kim. Critical thinking, learning and Confucius: A
positive assessment. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 37(1):71–
87, 2003.
In this paper I argue that Confucius’ view of learning
in the Analects entails critical thinking. Although he
neither specified the logical rules of good reasoning nor
theorised about the structure of argument, Confucius
advocated and emphasised the importance of critical
thinking. For Confucius reflective thinking of two sorts
is essential to learning: (1) reflection on the materials
of knowledge, in order to synthesise and systemise the
raw materials into a whole, and to integrate them into
oneself as wisdom; (2) reflection on oneself, (a) in or-
der to ensure that such synthesis, systemisation, and
integration proceed in an open-minded, fair and au-
tonomous way, and (b) in order to integrate knowledge
with the self, that is, to internalise it until it becomes
oneself.
[319] Robert H. Kimball. What’s wrong with argumentum ad bacu-
lum? Reasons, threats, and logical norms. Argumentation, 20:89–
100, 2006.
A dialogue-based analysis of informal fallacies does not
provide a fully adequate explanation of our intuitions
about what is wrong with ad baculum and of when it
is admissible and when it is not. The dialogue-based
analysis explains well why mild, benign threats can be
legitimate in some situations, such as cooperative bar-
gaining and negotiation, but does not satisfactorily ac-
count for what is objectionable about more malicious
uses of threats to coerce and to intimidate. I propose an
alternative deriving partly from virtue theory in ethics
and epistemology and partly from Kantian principles
of respect for persons as ends-in-themselves. I exam-
ine some specific kinds of social relations, e.g., parent-
child and partner relationships, and ask what kinds of
threats are permissible in these relationships and espe-
cially what is wrong with the objectionable threats. My
explanation is framed in terms of the good character
and contributing virtues of the ideal parent or partner
on the one hand, and the bad character and contribut-
ing vices of the abusive parent or violent partner on
the other. This analysis puts the discussion of threats
in the context of virtue theory, of human flourishing,
and of the kind of social relations it is best to have. In
general, what’s wrong with argumentum ad baculum
should be explained in terms of the intentions, pur-
poses, and character of threateners, and the differences
in intentions and purposes for which threats are made.
The characters of those who make the threats will pro-
vide the criteria for distinguishing benign and malicious
threats.
[320] Nathan L. King. Perseverance as an intellectual virtue. Synthese,
191(15):3501–3523; 3779–3801, 2014.
Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused
on the analysis of such intellectual virtues as re-
sponsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-
mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom.
Absent from the literature is an extended examination
of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. The present
paper aims to fill this void. In Sect. 1, I clarify the
concept of an intellectual virtue, and distinguish in-
tellectual virtues from other personal characters and
properties. In Sect. 2, I provide a conceptual analy-
sis of intellectually virtuous perseverance that places
perseverance in opposition to its vice-counterparts, in-
transigence and irresolution. The virtue is a matter of
continuing in one’s intellectual activities for an appro-
priate amount of time, in the pursuit of intellectual
goods, despite obstacles to one’s attainment of those
goods. In Sect. 3, I explore relations between intel-
lectually virtuous perseverance and other intellectual
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virtues. I argue that such perseverance is necessary for
the possession and exercise of several other intellectual
virtues, including courage. These connections highlight
the importance of perseverance in a comprehensive ac-
count of such virtues.
[321] Stephen Klaidman & Tom L. Beauchamp. The Virtuous Jour-
nalist. Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1987.
This book is for anyone interested in the subject of
moral integrity in journalism, whether they are journal-
ists, the subjects and sources of news stories, or con-
sumers of news. Each chapter provides an analytical
framework for examining fundamental concepts such
as truth, bias, harm, trust, manipulation, and account-
ability. The principles developed in this framework are
used throughout the book to analyze concrete cases.
[322] Moira Kloster. Commentary on: Suzanne McMurphy’s “Trust,
distrust, and trustworthiness in argumentation: Virtues and falla-
cies”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of
Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA),
May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
This paper is part of an increasingly rich contribu-
tion to argument studies from disciplines studying hu-
man interaction in general. The paper is an invitation,
rather than an argument, and my response is to accept
the invitation. The paper offers current empirical data
and theoretical considerations to ground our discussion
of trust. It also invites us to consider some specific ques-
tions about how argumentation theory might incorpo-
rate this new information. I shall offer a preliminary
exploration of where this might take us.
[323] Moira Kloster. The virtue of restraint: Rebalancing power in ar-
guments. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues
of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Con-
ference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
Is argument a game everyone should be able to play?
If it is, current argument practices do not yet level the
playing field enough for a fair game. We may build in
subtle imbalances that work against people who cannot
easily adapt to the most common patterns of argumen-
tative interaction. We need better ways to build trust,
to create safety, and adapt goals in order to bring ev-
eryone into the game.
[324] Moira Kloster. Another dimension to deep disagreements:
Trust in argumentation. Topoi, 2021. Forthcoming.
It has typically been assumed that affective and so-
cial components of disagreement, such as trust and fair
treatment, can be handled separately from substantive
components, such as beliefs and logical principles. This
has freed us to count as “deep” disagreements only those
which persist even between people who have no animos-
ity towards each other, feel equal to one another, and
are willing to argue indefinitely in search of truth. A
reliance on such ideal participants diverts us from the
question of whether we have swept away the opportu-
nity for some real arguers to have their voices heard,
and for those voices to determine the real substance
of the disagreement. If affective and social issues need
to be assessed side by side with belief differences and
reasoning paradigms, investigating trust may assist us
to understand and make progress on the affective and
social components that are involved in disagreement.
[325] Christian Kock. Virtue reversed: Principal argumentative vices
in political debate. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński,
eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th Interna-
tional Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argu-
mentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
Contributing to an understanding of the true virtues
of argumentation, this paper sketches and exemplifies
a theoretically reasoned but simple typology of argu-
mentative vices or ‘malpractices’ that are rampant in
political debate in modern democracies. The typology
reflects, in negative, a set of argumentative norms, thus
making a bid for something that civic instruction might
profitably teach students at all levels about deliberative
democracy.
[326] Jessica Koehler, Olga Pierrakos, Michael Lamb, Alana
Demaske, Carlos Santos, Michael D Gross, & Dy-
lan Franklin Brown. What can we learn from character educa-
tion? A literature review of four prominent virtues in engineering
education. In American Society for Engineering Education Virtual
Conference. 2020.
The complexity of problems that engineers address re-
quires knowledge, skills, and abilities that extend be-
yond technical engineering expertise, including team-
work and collaboration, problem- solving, curiosity
and lifelong learning, cultural awareness, and ethi-
cal decision-making. How do we prepare engineering
students to develop these essential capacities? One
promising approach is to integrate character education
into the undergraduate curriculum. Using an estab-
lished and commonly used taxonomy advanced by the
Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues at the Uni-
versity of Birmingham, this paper explores the extent
to which virtues are already incorporated into engineer-
ing education. Four prominent virtues in undergradu-
ate engineering education are detailed in this paper:
(1) critical thinking (an intellectual virtue), (2) empa-
thy (a moral virtue), (3) service (a civic virtue), and (4)
teamwork (a performance virtue). By conducting a lit-
erature review of these four virtues, we gain insight into
how engineering educators already infuse virtues into
engineering education and identify the gaps and oppor-
tunities that exist to enrich undergraduate engineer-
ing education through a virtue framework. Although
virtues are part of engineering education, our findings
reveal that most engineering educators do not explicitly
describe these concepts as “virtues” and tend to treat
them instead as “skills.” While virtues and skills are
developed in similar ways, we identify four distinctions
that reveal the added benefits of recasting and cultivat-
ing these capacities as virtues: 1) virtues, unlike skills
alone, are necessarily ordered to morally good ends, 2)
virtues have a motivational component that skills often
lack, 3) virtues involve evaluating and addressing po-
tential conflicts among values, and 4) virtues are inter-
connected and mutually reinforcing in ways that skills
often are not. These conceptual distinctions have prac-
tical implications for undergraduate engineering edu-
cation, enabling educators to draw on the pedagogical
literature in character education to help students con-
sider their values and develop the most relevant virtues
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across a four-year curriculum. This more comprehen-
sive and holistic approach empowers students and fu-
ture engineers to better navigate the complexity of real-
world ethical decision-making and develop the virtues
needed to serve the greater good.
[327] Miklós Könczöl. Ad misericordiam revisited. Studies in Logic,
Grammar and Rhetoric, 55(1):115–129, 2018.
The paper discusses the nature and functioning of argu-
mentum ad misericordiam, a well-known but less the-
orised type of argument. A monograph by D. Walton
(1997) offers an overview of definitions of misericordia
(which he eventually translates as ‘pity’), as well as
the careful analysis of several cases. Appeals to pity,
Walton concludes, are not necessarily fallacious. This
view seems to be supported and further refined by the
critical remarks of H. V. Hansen (2000), as well as the
recent work of R. H. Kimball (2001, 2004) and A. Ab-
erdein (2016) focusing on the virtue ethical aspects of
such arguments. There is, on this account, a differ-
ence between ad misericordiam arguments and falla-
cies, even though the former may be fallacious in some
cases. In this paper I argue for a narrower concept of ad
misericordiam, as distinguished from the more generic
class of appeals to pity, limiting it to cases in which
someone asks for the non-application of a certain rule,
clearly relevant to their case, with reference to some
(unfavourable) circumstance, which is, however, irrele-
vant for the application of the rule.
[328] Miklós Könczöl. Fairness and legal gaps in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
In Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, &
Jean H.M. Wagemans, eds., Proceedings of the Ninth Confer-
ence of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation,
pp. 669–674. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2019.
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1.13, arguments from fairness
are based on a combination of filling gaps (elleimma)
in the law and an extensive or restrictive interpretation
of the rule, with the latter being performed through the
former. This paper examines how the concepts of ‘legal
gaps’ and ‘open texture’ can contribute to our under-
standing of Aristotelian fairness (epieikeia).
[329] Ben Kotzee. Poisoning the well and epistemic privilege. Argu-
mentation, 24(3):265–281, 2010.
In this paper, a challenge is outlined for Walton’s recent
analysis of the fallacy of poisoning the well. An example
of the fallacy in action during a debate on affirmative
action on a South African campus is taken to raise the
question of how Walton’s analysis squares with the idea
that disadvantaged parties in debates about race may
be “epistemically privileged”. It is asked when the back-
ground of a participant is relevant to a debate and it
is proposed that a proper analysis of the poisoning the
well will outline conditions under which making one
participant’s background an issue in a debate would be
legitimate and illegitimate. Expanding Walton’s anal-
ysis to deal with the challenge, it is concluded that
calling into question a participant’s suitability to take
part in a debate is never legitimate when it is based
simply on a broad fact about their background (like
their race or gender).
[330] Ben Kotzee, J. Adam Carter, & Harvey Siegel. Educating
for intellectual virtue: A critique from action guidance. Episteme,
2020. Forthcoming.
Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences
in mainstream epistemology today. An important com-
mitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – respon-
sibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993;
Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it
must provide regulative normative guidance for good
thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists
(most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epis-
temology not only can provide regulative normative
guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the
primary epistemic aim of all education as the incul-
cation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture con-
trasts with another well-known position – that the pri-
mary aim of education is the promotion of critical
thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In
this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both
philosophy of education and epistemology and, a for-
tiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this pic-
ture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of
education must meet and hold that it is the aim of crit-
ical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellec-
tual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis,
we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epis-
temology, next to the well-known empirically- driven
‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical
challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues ap-
proach does not have available a suitably effective ped-
agogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue
as the primary aim of education. This is because the
pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach
(borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not
properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, with-
out much further development in virtue-based theory,
logic and critical thinking must still play the primary
role in the epistemology of education.
[331] Kristján Kristjánsson. Ten myths about character, virtue and
virtue education – plus three well-founded misgivings. British
Journal of Educational Studies, 61(3):269–287, 2013.
Initiatives to cultivate character and virtue in moral
education at school continue to provoke sceptical re-
sponses. Most of those echo familiar misgivings about
the notions of character, virtue and education in virtue
– as unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, pater-
nalistic, anti-democratic, conservative, individualistic,
relative and situation-dependent. I expose those mis-
givings as ‘myths’, while at the same time acknowledg-
ing three better-founded historical, methodological and
practical concerns about the notions in question.
[332] Tone Kvernbekk. Johnson, MacIntyre, and the practice of argu-
mentation. Informal Logic, 28(3):262–278, 2008.
This article is a discussion of Ralph Johnson’s concept
of practice of argumentation. Such practice is charac-
terized by three properties: (1) It is teleological, (2) it
is dialectical, and (3) it is manifestly rational. I argue
that Johnson’s preferred definition of practice—which
is Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of practice as a human
activity with internal goods accessible through partci-
pation in that same activity—does not fit these prop-
erties or features. I also suggest that this failure should
not require Johnson to adjust the properties to make
them fit the practice concept. While MacIntyre’s con-
cept of practice clearly has some attractive features, it
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does not provide what Johnson wants from a concept
of practice.
[333] Tone Kvernbekk. Commentary on Daniel H. Cohen and Katha-
rina Stevens, “Virtuous vices: On objectivity and bias in argumen-
tation”. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista, eds., Argu-
mentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th Interna-
tional Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argu-
mentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
I have contented myself to comment on just a small bit
of Cohen and Stevens’ paper. I have left out all the stuff
about virtues and vices, and have concentrated on bias
and objectivity. If I apply Mackenzie’s understanding
of bias to my own commentary, I am forced to conclude
that it is far from unbiased as I have left lots of pos-
sible considerations untreated. But then again I might
be off the hook – I was after all allowed by the authors
to adopt a bias.
[334] Jack M. C. Kwong. Epistemic injustice and open-mindedness.
Hypatia, 30(2):337–351, 2015.
In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit-
based epistemic injustices can be framed around the in-
tellectual character virtue of open-mindedness. In par-
ticular, these injustices occur because the people who
commit them are closed-minded in some respect; the
injustices can therefore be remedied through the cul-
tivation of the virtue of open-mindedness. Describing
epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory ben-
efits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phe-
nomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the un-
derpinning of a virtue-theoretical structure by which to
explain what it is that perpetrators are culpable for and
how virtues can have normative explanatory power.
[335] Jack M. C. Kwong. Open-mindedness as a critical virtue. Topoi,
35(2):403–411, 2016.
This paper proposes to examine Daniel Cohen’s recent
attempt to apply virtues to argumentation theory, with
special attention given to his explication of how open-
mindedness can be regarded as an argumentational or
critical virtue. It is argued that his analysis involves a
contentious claim about open-mindedness as an epis-
temic virtue, which generates a tension for agents who
are simultaneously both an arguer and a knower (or
who strive to be both). I contend that this tension
can be eased or resolved by clarifying the nature of
open-mindedness and by construing open-mindedness
in terms of its function. Specifically, a willingness to
take a novel viewpoint seriously is sufficient for mak-
ing open-mindedness both an epistemic and a critical
virtue.
[336] Jack M. C. Kwong. Open-mindedness as engagement. The
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 54(1):70–86, 2016.
Open-mindedness is an under-explored topic in virtue
epistemology, despite its assumed importance for the
field. Questions about it abound and need to be an-
swered. For example, what sort of intellectual activi-
ties are central to it? Can one be open-minded about
one’s firmly held beliefs? Why should we strive to be
open-minded? This paper aims to shed light on these
and other pertinent issues. In particular, it proposes a
view that construes open-mindedness as engagement,
that is, a willingness to entertain novel ideas in one’s
cognitive space and to accord them serious considera-
tion.
[337] Jack M. C. Kwong. Is open-mindedness conducive to truth?
Synthese, 194(5):1613–1626, 2017.
Open-mindedness is generally regarded as an intel-
lectual virtue because its exercise reliably leads to
truth. However, some theorists have argued that open-
mindedness’s truth-conduciveness is highly contingent,
pointing out that it is either not truth-conducive at all
under certain scenarios or no better than dogmatism
or credulity in others. Given such shaky ties to truth,
it would appear that the status of open-mindedness as
an intellectual virtue is in jeopardy. In this paper, I
propose to defend open-mindedness against these chal-
lenges. In particular, I show that the challenges are ill-
founded because they misconstrue the nature of open-
mindedness and fail to consider the requisite condi-
tions of its application. With a proper understanding
of open-mindedness and of its requirements, it is clear
that recourse to it is indeed truth-conducive.
[338] Daniel Lapsley & Dominic Chaloner. Post-truth and science
identity: A virtue-based approach to science education. Educa-
tional Psychologist, 55(3):132–143, 2020.
Post-truth trades on the corruption of argument and
evidence to protect ideological commitment and social
identity. We distinguish two kinds of post-truth envi-
ronments, epistemic bubbles and echo chambers, and
argue that facets of post-truth are countered the more
science (and general) education encourages the devel-
opment of intellectual virtues and internalization of sci-
ence identity. After first locating our perspective on in-
tellectual virtues within virtue epistemology and Aris-
totelian virtue theory, we argue that intellectual char-
acter is strongly metacognitive and requires a concept
of science identity to provide a motivational force to the
work of virtues. Our educational response to post-truth
focuses on Aristotelian-inspired pedagogy for teaching
virtues, metacognitive virtue strategies, and the devel-
opment of science identity. The internalization of sci-
ence identity is further developed in terms of moral
education and Self-Determination Theory. We suggest
further lines of theory and research and conclude that
science education is in the business of character educa-
tion.
[339] Michael Leff. Perelman, ad hominem argument, and rhetorical
ethos. Argumentation, 23(3):301–311, 2009.
Perelman’s view of the role of persons in argument is
one of the most distinctive features of his break with
Cartesian assumptions about reasoning. Whereas the
rationalist paradigm sought to minimize or eliminate
personal considerations by dismissing them as distract-
ing and irrelevant, Perelman insists that argumentation
inevitably does and ought to place stress on the spe-
cific persons engaged in an argument and that the rela-
tionship between speaker and what is spoken is always
relevant and important. In taking this position, Perel-
man implicitly revives the classical conception of proof
by character (ethos or “ethotic” argument), but despite
an extended discussion of act and person in argument,
The New Rhetoric does not give much consideration to
the classical concept and confuses differing approaches
to it within the tradition. The result is that Perelman
treats the role of the speaker in argument only by refer-
ence to abstract techniques and does not recognize the
importance of examining particular cases in order to
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thicken understanding of how ethotic argument works
in the complex, situated context of its actual use. Con-
sequently, Perelman’s account of the role of persons in
argument should be supplement by reference to case
studies, and to that end, I consider ethotic argument
in W.E.B. Du Bois’ famous essay “Of Mr. Booker T.
Washington and Others”.
[340] Uri D. Leibowitz. Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies.
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 13(5):507–529, 2016.
Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations
to those in desperate need with our students. Famously,
Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give
a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If
my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common
for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer’s
argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief.
In response it might be tempting to remind students of
the (so called) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the per-
son advancing an argument rather than the argument
itself. In this paper I argue that the “ad hominem re-
ply” to students’ request for information about Singer is
misguided. First I show that biographical facts about
the person advancing an argument can constitute in-
direct evidence for the soundness/unsoundness of the
argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant
because they may reveal that one can discard the ar-
gument without thereby incurring moral responsibility
for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument
is sound.
[341] Patti Lenard. Deliberating sincerely: A reply to Warren. Journal
of Social Philosophy, 39(4):625–638, 2008.
Mark Warren may be right that it is worth consider-
ing relaxing the sincerity norm that underpins much
theorizing in deliberative democracy in favor of a com-
mitment to insincerity in the form of good manners.
However, we should not yet commit ourselves to so do-
ing until a few issues are clarified: (1) We must have
a detailed account of the motivation individuals might
have to take up the attitude of strategic good manners
(given that the adoption of these manners implies a
rejection of the view that the recipients of these good
manners are deserving of equal consideration); (2) we
must carefully distinguish situations in which insincer-
ity is harmful from those in which it is beneficial from
the perspective of achieving genuine resolution to sen-
sitive issues; (3) we need to have a clear account of
whether good manners apply to the content of speech
or merely the demeanor with which speech is presented;
and (4) we need an account of the nature of the trans-
formative effect we can expect from insincerity, as well
as an account of the conditions under which this trans-
formative effect is possible and likely. I worried here
that Warren ignores the possible impact that known
insincerities—deployed as an element of strategic good
manners—will have on the trust relations that neces-
sarily underpin cooperative communication. Until these
details are provided, we ought to be wary of turning
away from our prima facie commitment to sincerity in
deliberation.
[342] Neil Levy. Open-mindedness and the duty to gather evidence.
Public Affairs Quarterly, 20(1):55–66, 2006.
This paper contends that most of us have no duty to
gather evidence on both sides of controversial moral
and political questions. On the contrary, on most of the
controversial questions debated in our newspapers and
on television, we actually ought to refrain from gather-
ing such evidence. ‘Balance’ and open-mindedness will
tend to lead not to rationality and justification, but to
their opposite.
[343] Runcheng Liang. On Aristotle’s maxim argument. In Bart
Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, & Jean H.M.
Wagemans, eds., Proceedings of the Ninth Conference of the In-
ternational Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 732–735.
Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2019.
A maxim is a proposition that tells people how to act.
The use of a maxim is a maxim argument. Such argu-
ments can show the character of the speaker and are
mainly used in deliberative speech. The reasoning mode
that practical wisdom makes people possess is the nor-
mative structure of maxim arguments. Thus, normative
argument has “ends–means” schemes and “rule–case”
schemes.
[344] Maureen Linker. Do squirrels eat hamburgers? Intellectual
empathy as a remedy for residual prejudice. Informal Logic,
31(2):110–138, 2011.
In this essay, I argue the value of integrating aspects of
social identity theory with informal logic generally. In-
terpretation and judgment can break down in rhetorical
contexts where social differences are significant. This is
often the result of “residual prejudice” (Fricker, 2007)
and unconscious bias. Using several examples from a
study on classroom dialogue in an inner city Midwest-
ern elementary school, I show how bias was the result
of unreflective and unconscious social attitudes. I pro-
pose a 4 stage process of “intellectual empathy” as a
route to more socially reflective thinking, drawing on
the strengths of informal logic and social theory.
[345] Maureen Linker. Epistemic privilege and expertise in the con-
text of meta-debate. Argumentation, 28:67–84, 2014.
I argue that Kotzee’s (Argumentation 24:265–281,
2010) model of meta-debate succeeds in identifying
illegitimate or fallacious charges of bias but has the
unintended consequence of classifying some legitimate
and non-fallacious charges as fallacious. This makes the
model, in some important cases, counter-productive. In
particular, cases where the call for a meta-debate is
prompted by the participant with epistemic privilege
and a charge of bias is denied by the participant with
social advantage, the impasse will put the epistemi-
cally advantaged at far greater risk. Therefore, I pro-
pose treating epistemic privilege as a variety of expert
opinion specifically in cases where meta-debate partici-
pants come to an impasse in deliberation. My proposal
exposes the problem of interpreting debate contexts as
both adversarial and free from social power differen-
tials.
[346] James MacAllister. Virtue epistemology and the philosophy
of education. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 46(2):251–270,
2012.
This article initially provides a brief overview of virtue
epistemology; it thereafter considers some possible
ramifications of this branch of the theory of knowl-
edge for the philosophy of education. The main fea-
tures of three different manifestations of virtue epis-
temology are first explained. Importantly, it is then
maintained that developments in virtue epistemology
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may offer the resources to critique aspects of the de-
bate between Hirst and Carr about how the philoso-
phy of education ought to be carried out and by whom.
Wilfred Carr’s position—that educational practitioners
have privileged access to philosophical knowledge about
teaching practice—will in particular be questioned. It
will be argued that Carr’s view rests on a form of epis-
temology, internalism, which places unreasonably nar-
row restrictions upon the range of actors and ways,
in which philosophical knowledge of and/or for edu-
cation might be achieved. In declaring that practical
wisdom regarding teaching is ‘entirely dependent’ on
practitioner reflection, Carr not only radically deviates
from Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom, he also,
in effect, renders redundant all philosophical research
about education that is not initiated by teachers in
this manner. It is concluded that Aristotle’s general ap-
proach to acquiring information and knowledge about
the world might yet still offer a foundation for a more
comprehensive philosophy of education; one that makes
clear that the professional testimony and reflection of
teachers, observation of teaching practice, and already
existing educational philosophy, theory and policy can
all be perceived as potentially valuable sources of philo-
sophical knowledge of and for education.
[347] Chris MacDonald. Commentary on Michael D. Baumtrog, “The
willingness to be persuaded”. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Be-
nacquista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceed-
ings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society
for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2016.
[348] Brian MacPherson. The incompleteness problem for a virtue-
based theory of argumentation. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin
Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON,
2014.
The incompleteness problem for virtue ethics is inher-
ited by a virtue-based theory of argumentation as de-
veloped by Daniel Cohen (2007). A complete norma-
tive theory of argumentation should be able to provide
reasons for why argumentative virtues such as open-
mindedness are worthwhile, along with being able to
resolve conflicts of such virtues. Adumbrating virtue-
based argumentation theory with a pragmatic utilitar-
ian approach constitutes a more complete theory that
can account for why argumentative virtues are worth-
while.
[349] B. J. C. Madison. Is open-mindedness truth-conducive? Syn-
these, 196:2075–2087, 2019.
What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straight-
forward and influential answer to this question has been
given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only in-
sofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall con-
tend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong
in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they
go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clar-
ifying ways in how best to understand the nature of
open-mindedness. But I shall argue that these consid-
erations do not establish the desired conclusions that
open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these
much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate
reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I
argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s
objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I con-
clude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-
conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes
an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-
mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We
either need an adequate reliabilist response to Mont-
marquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts
of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude
by briefly outlining some alternatives.
[350] Michele Mangini. Ethics of virtues and the education of the
reasonable judge. International Journal of Ethics Education,
2(2):175–202, 2017.
In contemporary society, as in classical Greece, we need
citizens that deliberate well both for themselves and for
society overall. Different competitors contend about the
right principles in the theory of education. This paper
holds that ‘character education’, descending from the
ancient ethics of virtues, still represents the best op-
tion available for people who want to deliberate well
for the common good. A special place in deliberation
is taken by legal reasoning because the law is central
in the distribution of goods in our society. Rather than
focusing only on rules and principles I follow the EV ap-
proach and focus on the qualities of the good decision-
maker, the reasonable judge. The intellectual virtues of
phronesis and techné combine those personal and pro-
fessional qualities that we want at work in any judge.
But it is the exercise of the civic art of rhetoric that ex-
presses at best the public dimension of the reasonable
judge.
[351] Tuomas Manninen. Reflections on dealing with epistemically vi-
cious students. Disputatio, 9, 2020.
As a philosophy instructor, I strive to get my students
to think critically about the subject matter. However,
over the years I have encountered many students who
seem to deliberately want to avoid thinking critically. I
am talking particularly about some students in my “Sci-
ence and Religion” course, who subscribe to scientific
creationism and endorse anti–scientific beliefs which
seem to be irrational. In this essay, I will offer reflec-
tions of my experiences from these classes, and argue
that individuals who subscribe to creationism exhibit a
combination of epistemic vices that makes them prone
to holding incorrect views. Employing Quassim Cas-
sam’s framework on the epistemic vices of conspiracy
theorists in his “Vice Epistemology”, I argue that the
creationists’ beliefs can best be understood as result-
ing from similar vices. Subsequently, I move to consider
the reasons why these students subscribe to creation-
ism, using Katherine Dormandy’s analysis in her “Does
Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?” as a
springboard. Following Dormandy, I explore how epis-
temic vices (in particular the lack of epistemic humility)
lead to someone holding false—even irrational—beliefs.
Finally, I will consider strategies in dealing with vice–
charging the epistemically vicious students in a way
that avoids the practical difficulties noted by Ian James
Kidd in his “Charging Others with Epistemic Vice”.
[352] Jeffery Maynes. Critical thinking and cognitive bias. Informal
Logic, 35(2):184–204, 2015.
Teaching critical thinking skill is a central pedagogi-
cal aim in many courses. These skills, it is hoped, will
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be both portable (applicable in a wide range of con-
texts) and durable (not forgotten quickly). Yet, both
of these virtues are challenged by pervasive and po-
tent cognitive biases, such as motivated reasoning, false
consensus bias and hindsight bias. In this paper, I ar-
gue that a focus on the development of metacognitive
skill shows promise as a means to inculcate debiasing
habits in students. Such habits will help students be-
come more critical thinkers. I close with suggestions for
implementing this strategy.
[353] Jeffrey Maynes. Steering into the skid: On the norms of critical
thinking. Informal Logic, 37(2):114–128, 2017.
While cognitive bias is often portrayed as a problem
in need of a solution, some have argued that these bi-
ases arise from adaptive reasoning heuristics which can
be rational modes of reasoning. This presents a chal-
lenge: if these heuristics are rational under the right
conditions, does teaching critical thinking undermine
students’ ability to reason effectively in real life rea-
soning scenarios? I argue that to solve this challenge,
we should focus on how rational ideals are best approx-
imated in human reasoners. Educators should focus on
developing the metacognitive skill to recognize when
different cognitive strategies (including the heuristics)
should be used.
[354] Simona Mazilu. Reason and emotionality in argumentation in the
era of globalization. Interstudia, 15:116–128, 2014.
The paradoxical nature of globalization in between di-
versity and atomization seems to have a great impact
on the way people communicate within a culture and
across cultures, as well. Whether we speak about pol-
itics, science, religion or economy, individuals are en-
couraged to express their views showing tolerance and
flexibility towards the other so as to minimize areas of
disagreement. Nevertheless, the antagonist tendency is
to promote individualism through excessive competi-
tiveness and gradual loss of empathy towards the other
which translates into narrow-mindedness, biases and
unwillingness to revise opinions in interpersonal com-
munication. Using insights from the extended version
of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van
Eemeren and Houtlosser 2006) and from other vari-
ous scholars interested in the role of emotions in ar-
gumentation (Plantin 1997, 1998, 1999, 2004, Gilbert
1994, 1996, 1997, 2005, Walton 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000,
Kwak 2007, Aberdein 2010 and Ciurria 2012) I intend
to investigate the way these opposing tendencies mani-
fest themselves in argumentative practice. In line with
these scholars, I hold that the resolution of a differ-
ence of opinion does not solely depend on the arguers’
sound reasoning but also on how they interact with one
another emotionally.
[355] Deirdre McCloskey. Bourgeois virtue and the history of P and
S. The Journal of Economic History, 58(2):297–317, 1998.
Since the triumph of a business culture a century and
half ago the businessman has been scorned, and so
the phrase “bourgeois virtue" sounds like an oxymoron.
Economists since Bentham have believed that anyway
virtue is beside the point: what matters for explanation
is Prudence. But this is false in many circumstances,
even strictly economic circumstances. An economic his-
tory that insists on Prudence Alone is misspecified, and
will produce biased coefficients. And it will not face
candidly the central task of economic history, an apol-
ogy for or a criticism of a bourgeois society.
[356] Joan McGregor. Free speech, universities, and the development
of civic discourse. In Mark Christopher Navin & Richard
Nunan, eds., Democracy, Populism, and Truth, pp. 77–90.
Springer, Cham, 2020.
This paper will explore the multifaceted nature of the
controversies around campus speech and academic free-
dom and what should be the appropriate university re-
sponse to those issues. Where there is widespread agree-
ment is that there is currently a lack of civil discourse
around political, scientific, social, and religious ideas in
our country. The level of vitriol has grown, and name-
calling is the norm in the public space, whether real or
virtual. College campuses are not immune to the po-
litical climate and tone of the country. Concerns about
free expression and responses to unpopular ideas at uni-
versities point to the larger failure to develop the skills
of civil discourse in our students and citizens. The in-
ability to engage in civil discourse is a dangerous threat
to advancing knowledge and for assuring a robust de-
liberative democracy. Colleges and universities should
be places where controversial ideas, even noxious ideas,
can expressed and challenged, and students need to be
part of that process. I will argue that colleges and uni-
versities should adopt as part of their core mission the
development of the skills of civic discourse, which is the
foundation of the virtue of civility, a necessary virtue
for a deliberative democracy and one that is sorely lack-
ing in current times.
[357] Suzanne McMurphy. Trust, distrust, and trustworthiness in
argumentation: Virtues and fallacies. In Dima Mohammed &
Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
What is trust? How does it function as a primary virtue
for persuasive arguments? How does its presumption
contribute to the effectiveness of an argument’s per-
suasiveness? This presentation will explore these ques-
tions and the controversy among scholars regarding
how trust is generated and under what conditions it is
lost. We will also discuss whether inauthentic trustwor-
thiness is a manipulation used for gaining a fallacious
advantage in argumentation.
[358] Russell Douglas McPhee. A Virtue Epistemic Approach to
Critical Thinking. Ph.D. thesis, Bond University, 2016.
In this thesis I develop a virtue-theoretic conception
of critical thinking. I argue that many conceptions of
critical thinking have conflated “critical thinking” with
“good thinking”. In contrast to other intellectual pur-
suits, I identify critical thinking as its own activity
which aims at the achievement and maintenance of in-
tellectual autonomy. I identify the constitutive virtues
of critical thinking as conscientiousness, self-awareness,
and prudent wariness. I argue that virtues require inter-
nal success, and intellectual autonomy is the achieve-
ment of the external success of the critical thinking
virtues. It is a mistake to consider other virtues or char-
acter traits involving moral or cooperative behaviour
as constitutive of critical thinking, though these may
be ancillary virtues and useful to foster alongside the
virtues of critical thinking. The conception I offer in
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this thesis suggests a solution to concerns regarding
transfer of learning and offers a pedagogically-clear way
of framing a critical thinking curriculum.
[359] Richard Menary. Cognitive practices and cognitive character.
Philosophical Explorations, 15(2):147–164, 2012.
The argument of this paper is that we should think of
the extension of cognitive abilities and cognitive char-
acter in integrationist terms. Cognitive abilities are ex-
tended by acquired practices of creating and manipu-
lating information that is stored in a publicly accessible
environment. I call these cognitive practices (2007). In
contrast to Pritchard (2010) I argue that such processes
are integrated into our cognitive characters rather than
artefacts; such as notebooks. There are two routes to
cognitive extension that I contrast in the paper, the
first I call artefact extension which is the now clas-
sic position of the causal coupling of an agent with an
artefact. This approach needs to overcome the objec-
tion from cognitive outsourcing: that we simply get an
artefact or tool to do the cognitive processing for us
without extending our cognitive abilities. Enculturated
cognition, by contrast, does not claim that artefacts
themselves extend our cognitive abilities, but rather
that the acquired practices for manipulating artefacts
and the information stored in them extend our cogni-
tive abilities (by augmenting and transforming them).
In the rest of the paper I provide a series of arguments
and cases which demonstrate that an enculturated ap-
proach works better for both epistemic and cognitive
cases of the extension of ability and character.
[360] David Merry. The philosopher and the dialectician in Aristotle’s
Topics. History and Philosophy of Logic, 37(1):78–100, 2016.
I claim that, in the Topics, Aristotle advises dialectical
questioners to intentionally argue fallaciously in order
to escape from some dialectically awkward positions,
and I work through the consequences of that claim. It
will turn out that, although there are important excep-
tions, the techniques for finding arguments described
in Topics I–VII are, by and large, locations that Aris-
totle thought of as appropriate for use in philosophi-
cal inquiry. The text that grounds this claim, however,
raises a further problem: it highlights the solitary na-
ture of philosophical inquiry, which puts into question
the philosophical relevance of Topics VIII. I find that
the Topics provides inadequate grounds for thinking
that Aristotle saw Topics VIII as describing standards
or techniques of argument that were appropriate for
philosophy, and so these texts cannot be used by con-
temporary commentators to shed light on Aristotle’s
philosophical practice. Finally, although Aristotle saw
philosophy as a solitary activity, he thought dialectic
played an important part in a typical philosophical life,
both as a means for defending one’s reputation, and as
a way of participating in an intellectual community.
[361] Benjamin De Mesel. How morality can be absent from moral
arguments. Argumentation, 30(4):443–463, 2016.
What is a moral argument? A straightforward answer
is that a moral argument is an argument dealing with
moral issues, such as the permissibility of killing in cer-
tain circumstances. I call this the thin sense of ‘moral
argument’. Arguments that we find in normative and
applied ethics are almost invariably moral in this sense.
However, they often fail to be moral in other respects.
In this article, I discuss four ways in which morality can
be absent from moral arguments in the thin sense. If
these arguments suffer from an absence of morality in at
least one of these ways, they are not moral arguments
in what I will call the thick sense of ‘moral argument’.
Because only moral arguments in the thick sense could
possibly qualify as proper responses to moral problems,
the absence of morality in thin arguments means that
these arguments will fail to give us a reason to do what-
ever they claim that we ought to do, even if we see no in-
dependent reason to question the truth of the premises
or the logical validity of the argument.
[362] Chienkuo Mi & Shane Ryan. Skilful reflection as a master virtue.
Synthese, 197:2295–2308, 2020.
This paper advances the claim that skilful reflection
is a master virtue in that skilful reflection shapes and
corrects the other epistemic and intellectual virtues.
We make the case that skilful reflection does this
with both competence-based epistemic virtues and
character-based intellectual virtues. In making the case
that skilful reflection is a master virtue, we identify the
roots of ideas central to our thesis in Confucian phi-
losophy. In particular, we discuss the Confucian con-
ception of reflection, as well as different levels of epis-
temic virtue. Next we set out the Dual Process Hy-
pothesis of Reflection, which provides an explanation
of the workings of reflection in relation to Type 1 and
Type 2 cognitive processes. In particular, we flag how
repetition of Type 2 processes may eventually shape
Type 1 processes and produce what we call downstream
reflection. We distinguish competence-based epistemic
virtues from character-based intellectual virtues. We
also explain how our metacognition account of reflec-
tion, drawing on a Confucian conception of reflection
and the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection, explains
skilful reflection as a master virtue. Finally we outline
an application of our metacognition account of reflec-
tion to a current debate in epistemology.
[363] William R. Minto. Commentary on: Philip Rose’s “Compro-
mise as deep virtue: Evolution and some limits of argumentation”.
In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Ar-
gumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of
the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May
22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
[364] William R. Minto. Commentary on José Ángel Gascón, “Pursu-
ing objectivity: How virtuous can you get?”. In Patrick Bondy
& Laura Benacquista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and
Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21,
2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2016.
The virtue of objectivity starts with the recognition
that there is a vantage point from which our capac-
ity to acquire knowledge of the world, including us as
parts of that world, is optimized. Gascón’s position, as
I see it, invites an Aristotelian-style gloss: objectivity
is state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a
mean relative to us, a mean between extremes of bias
blindness on the one hand, and total detachment on
the other.
[365] Connie Missimer. Perhaps by skill alone. Informal Logic,
12(3):145–153, 1990.
This article questions a view dominant among theo-
reticians of critical thinking: that the critical thinker
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has certain character traits, dispositions, or virtues.
Versions of this theory (hereafter called the Charac-
ter View) have been advanced without much analysis.
The impression is that these traits or virtues are ob-
vious accompaniments to critical thinking, yet such is
not the case. Versions of the Character View are in-
consistent; even within one version unlikely scenarios
arise. Furthermore, historical evidence can be brought
against this view. Most people assume that the greatest
contributors to intellectual progress would be critical
thinkers. Yet a number of intellectual giants, including
Marx, Rousseau, Bacon, Freud, Russell, Newton, and
Feynman lacked many of the traits which the Character
View holds to be necessary for critical thinking. This
discrepancy calls into question the connection between
having certain dispositions or virtues and the ability to
think critically. Rather than concluding that these and
other great thinkers cannot have been critical thinkers,
one can subscribe to an alternative view which makes
no claims about character, namely that critical think-
ing is a skill or set of skills (hereafter, the Skill View).
According to this view, a critical thinker is someone
who practices the skills of critical thinking frequently,
just as a mathematician is a person who does math-
ematics frequently. Critical thinking is here defined as
the consideration of alternative theories in light of their
evidence, a definition which I believe encompasses the
skill criteria of Ennis and Paul. The Skill View has for
the most part been disparaged, yet the evidence in its
favor would appear to be stronger; it has the advan-
tage of theoretical simplicity; and it does not smug-
gle in moral prescriptions, leaving ethics instead to the
scrutiny of critical thought. Finally, it is arguable that
an historical version of the Skill View can show critical
thinking to be more exciting than any version which
the Character View has offered thus far.
[366] Connie Missimer. Where’s the evidence? Inquiry: Critical
Thinking Across the Disciplines, 14(4):1–18, 1995.
Two types of theories about critical thinking offer a
choice. The Character View seems intuitively right to
many theorists. But, at the moment, its proponents
have offered no evidence beyond the obviousness of
their many principles, and, in fact, I have shown ev-
idence against several of Siegel’s traits claimed for the
process of critical thinking. This evidence forces the
anomaly of accepting Newton’s Theory of Motion as a
great piece of critical thinking, while concluding that
Newton was not (much of) a critical thinker. And sim-
ilar results obtain for Darwin. Finally, the Character
View is complicated. The Alternative Argument The-
ory (AAT) is by comparison quite clear because it is
simple, it has supporting evidence, but it runs counter
to some deep-seated beliefs. I would recommend for the
time being against the Character View until it can build
a better evidentiary case for itself, and recommend pro-
visional acceptance of the Alternative Argument The-
ory. Whatever you decide, by the AAT you have done
critical thinking; by the Character View, that’s any-
body’s guess.
[367] Moti Mizrahi. Why be an intellectually humble philosopher? Ax-
iomathes, 26(2):205–218, 2016.
In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why
be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that,
as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned,
the historical record of Western Philosophy provides
a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the
historical record of philosophical argumentation, which
is a track record that is marked by an abundance of
alternative theories and serious problems for those the-
ories, can teach us important lessons about the limits
of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in turn,
show why philosophers should argue with humility.
[368] José Juan Moreso. Reconciling virtues and action-guidance in
legal adjudication. Jurisprudence, 9(1):88–96, 2018.
In this paper, I intend to articulate an answer to the
powerful particularist objection against the notion of
moral and legal reasoning based on universal princi-
ples. I defend a particular way of specifying and con-
textualising universal principles. I claim that this ac-
count preserves legal and moral justification conceived
as subsumption to legal and moral principles. I also
try to show how virtues can be reconciled with this
account, i.e. what is the right place for virtues in le-
gal adjudication. To carry this out, I draw on a virtue
epistemology.
[369] Olivier Morin. The virtues of ingenuity: Reasoning and arguing
without bias. Topoi, 33(2):499–512, 2014.
This paper describes and defends the “virtues of in-
genuity”: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philoso-
phers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in
the practice of using reasoning to solve problems and
gather information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less
important uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent re-
vival of rhetoric and argumentative approaches to rea-
soning (in psychology, philosophy and science studies)
has highlighted the virtues of persuasiveness and cast
a new light on some of its apparent vices—bad faith,
deluded confidence, confirmation and myside biases.
Those traits, it is often argued, will no longer look so
detrimental once we grasp their proper function: argu-
ing in order to persuade, rather than thinking in order
to solve problems. Some of these biases may even have
a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen in this light,
the virtues of ingenuity may well seem redundant. De-
fending them, I argue that the vices of conviction are
not innocuous. If generalized, they would destabilize
argumentative practices. Argumentation is a common
good that is threatened when every arguer pursues con-
viction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside
biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for
nor explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a
collapse of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect,
humility or honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues
that specifically attach to the practice of making con-
scious inferences.
[370] Ana M. Nieto & Carlos Saiz. Critical thinking: A question
of aptitude and attitude? Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the
Disciplines, 25(2):19–26, 2010.
Traditionally, it has been held that critical thinking
requires a set of cognitive skills and dispositions. The
present work supports the opinion of some theorists
who have proposed that these might not be the only
two ingredients necessary for improving critical think-
ing. More specifically, new factors could be necessary
if critical thinking is to be achieved, such as gaining
an epistemological understanding of critical thinking;
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reaching a given level of epistemological development,
or the beliefs that are held about thinking. These new
components are analysed conceptually and instruction-
ally. Special attention is also devoted to dispositions.
[371] Ana M. Nieto & Jorge Valenzuela. A study of the internal
structure of critical thinking dispositions. Inquiry: Critical Think-
ing Across the Disciplines, 27(1):31–38, 2012.
The execution of critical thinking depends on a set of
skills and dispositions. It is unanimously accepted that
skills represent the cognitive component, but consensus
varies with regard to dispositions. Although most the-
oreticians admit that this is a complex construct inte-
grated by motivations and mental habits, they don’t ex-
plain further. We have performed a study attempting to
explore the internal structure of dispositions. We sug-
gest a possible hypothesis of “Motivational Genesis of
Dispositions,” according to which disposition would be
formed by motivation and by mental habits, although
the contribution of each of these factors would change
depending on the practice gained in critical thinking.
Thus, when a person is not practised in critical think-
ing, motivation makes a greater contribution than men-
tal habits. Nevertheless, with practice and motivated
exercise of the skills of critical thinking, the influence
of these mental habits increases. The regression analy-
ses carried out support such a hypothesis.
[372] Douglas Niño & Danny Marrero. The agentive approach to
argumentation: A proposal. In Frans van Eemeren & Bart
Garssen, eds., Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumenta-
tion Theory, pp. 53–67. Springer, Cham, 2015.
The main goal of this paper is to outline an agent-
centered theory of argumentation. Our working hy-
pothesis is that the aim of argumentation depends upon
the agenda agents are disposed to close or advance. The
novelty of this idea is that our theory, unlike the main
accounts of argumentation (i.e., rhetorical, dialogical
and epistemological theories of argumentation), does
not establish an a priori function that agents are ex-
pected to achieve when arguing. Instead, we believe
that the aims of argumentation depend upon the pur-
poses agents are disposed to achieve (i.e., their agen-
das).
[373] Douglas Niño & Danny Marrero. An agentive response to the
incompleteness problem for the virtue argumentation theory. In
Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Argumentation and
Reasoned Action: Proceedings of the First European Conference
on Argumentation, Lisbon, 9–12 June 2015, vol. 2, pp. 723–731.
College Publications, London, 2016.
This paper outlines an agent-centered theory of argu-
mentation. Our working hypothesis is that the aim of
argumentation depends upon the agenda agents are dis-
posed to close or advance. The novelty of this idea is
that our theory, unlike the main accounts of argumen-
tation, does not establish a fixed function that agents
have to achieve when arguing. Instead, we believe that
the aims of argumentation depend upon the purposes
agents are disposed to achieve (agendas).
[374] Jeff Noonan. Commentary on: Satoru Aonuma’s “Dialectic of/or
agitation? Rethinking argumentative virtues in Proletarian Elocu-
tion”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of
Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA),
May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
Satoru Aonuma breaks new ground in a field largely ne-
glected by argumentation theorists and Marxists alike:
the argumentative virtues of revolutionary political
speech. I emphasize “revolutionary” in order to raise
certain questions concerning the author’s conclusion
that Marxist speech be evaluated under the generic
rubric of “civic virtues.” I will contend that “civic
virtues” are virtues that contribute to the health of a
given polity. The aim of revolutionary speech, in con-
trast, is to incite the overthrow of the established order.
Good revolutionary speech would thus have the oppo-
site effect of civically virtuous speech.
[375] Kathryn J. Norlock. Receptivity as a virtue of (practitioners of)
argumentation. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds.,
Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
I rely on Nel Noddings’ analysis of receptivity as “an
essential component of intellectual work," to argue that
receptivity is a virtue of argumentation (1984:34), prac-
ticing the principle of charity excellently for the sake of
an author and their philosophical community. The de-
ficiency of receptivity is epitomized by the philosopher
who listens to attack. The excess of receptivity is the
vice of insufficiently critical acceptance of an author
regardless of the merits of an argument.
[376] Susana Nuccetelli. Latin American philosophers: Some re-
cent challenges to their intellectual character. Informal Logic,
36(2):121–135, 2016.
Why hasn’t Latin American philosophy produced any
internationally recognized figure, tradition, or move-
ment? Why is it mostly unknown inside and outside
Latin America? Some skeptical answers to these ques-
tions have recently focused on critical-thinking compe-
tences and dispositions. Latin American philosophers
are said to lack, for example, originality in problem-
solving, problem-making, argumentation, and to some
extent, interpretation. Or does the problem arise from
their vices of “arrogant reasoning?” On my view, all
of these answers are incomplete, and some even self-
defeating. Yet they cast some light on complex, critical-
thinking virtues and vices that play a significant role
in philosophical thinking.
[377] Anthony O’Hear. Morality, reasoning and upbringing. Ratio,
33(2):106–116, 2020.
This paper examines the relationship between morality
and reasoning in a general sense. Following a broadly
Aristotelian framework, it is shown that reasoning well
about morality requires good character and a ground-
ing in virtue and experience. Topic neutral ‘critical
thinking’ on its own is not enough and may even be
detrimental to morality. This has important conse-
quences both for philosophy and for education. While
morality is objective and universal, it should not be
seen purely in terms of the intellectual grasp of true
propositions. As Simone Weil shows, it emerges from
very basic aspects of our nature. As well as reasoning
in an abstract sense we need what Pascal calls esprit de
finesse based in our humanity as a whole, in sens, raison
et coeur. The paper concludes with some reflections on
our propensity to fail morally and on the relationship
between virtue and happiness.
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[378] Felipe Oliveira de Sousa. Other-regarding virtues and their
place in virtue argumentation theory. Informal Logic, 40(3):317–
357, 2020.
In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made
in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks
a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding
virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only en-
riches the field of research of virtue argumentation the-
ory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and
more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully vir-
tuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both
self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should
be concerned both with his own development as an ar-
guer and with helping other arguers in that regard.
[379] Paula Olmos. Commentary on Khameiel Al Tamimi’s “Evaluat-
ing narrative arguments”. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benac-
quista, eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings
of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2016.
Khameiel Al Tamimi’s paper addresses and tries to
connect two topics that have recently become rather
significant within contemporary argumentation studies:
namely the exploration of the potential argumentative
qualities of narrative discourse and the so called virtue
theory of (or virtue approach to) argumentation.
[380] Steve Oswald. Commentary on: Frank Zenker’s “Know thy bi-
ases! Bringing argumentative virtues to the classroom”. In Dima
Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumenta-
tion: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
The reasons behind the success of the type of practical
exercise envisaged to overcome the power of biases re-
main underexplored in Zenker’s contribution. I will try
to show here that the success of the type of practical
proposal defended in this paper constitutes evidence of
the social function of reasoning.
[381] Fabio Paglieri. Argumentation, decision and rationality, 2013.
Presented at ArgLab/European Conference on Argumentation
Workshop: Argumentation and Rational Decisions (IFL, FCSH,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa).
This paper opposes the view that studying argumen-
tation from a decision theoretic perspective is a purely
descriptive project. On the contrary, I argue that such
approach is naturally suited to tackle normative issues,
shedding new light on how strategic rationality inter-
acts with other virtues of argumentation – namely, in-
ferential validity and dialectical appropriateness. My
views on this issue will be developed against the back-
drop of virtue argumentation theory (Cohen 2009; Ab-
erdein 2010; Battaly 2010).
[382] Fabio Paglieri. Bogency and goodacies: On argument quality in
virtue argumentation theory. Informal Logic, 35(1):65–87, 2015.
Virtue argumentation theory (VAT) has been charged
of being incomplete, given its alleged inability to ac-
count for argument validity in virtue-theoretical terms.
Instead of defending VAT against that challenge, I sug-
gest it is misplaced, since it is based on a premise VAT
does not endorse, and raises an issue that most ver-
sions of VAT need not consider problematic. This in
turn allows distinguishing several varieties of VAT, and
clarifying what really matters for them.
[383] Fabio Paglieri. On what matters for virtue argumentation the-
ory. In Bart J. Garssen, David Godden, Gordon Mitchell,
& A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, eds., Proceedings of ISSA
2014: Eighth Conference of the International Society for the Study
of Argumentation, pp. 1070–1079. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2015.
Virtue argumentation theory (VAT) has been charged
of being incomplete, given its alleged inability to ac-
count for argument validity in virtue-theoretical terms.
Instead of defending VAT against that challenge, I sug-
gest it is misplaced, since it is based on a premise VAT
does not endorse, and raises an issue that most ver-
sions of VAT need not consider problematic. This in
turn allows distinguishing several varieties of VAT, and
clarifying what really matters for them.
[384] Fabio Paglieri. On the rationality of argumentative decisions.
In Floris Bex, Floriana Grasso, Nancy Green, Fabio
Paglieri, & Chris Reed, eds., Argument Technologies: Theory,
Analysis, and Applications, pp. 39–54. College Publications, Lon-
don, 2017.
This paper summarizes the basic assumptions of a de-
cision theoretic approach to argumentation, as well as
some preliminary empirical findings based on that view.
The relative neglect for decision making in argumenta-
tion theory is discussed, and the approach is defended
against the charge of being merely descriptive. In con-
trast, it is shown that considering arguments as the
product of decisions brings into play various normative
models of rational choice. This presents argumentation
theory with a novel challenge: how to reconcile strate-
gic rationality with other normative constraints, such
as inferential validity and dialectical appropriateness?
It is suggested that strategic considerations should be
included, rather than excluded, from the evaluation of
argument quality, and this position is put in contact
with the growing interest for virtue theory in argumen-
tation studies.
[385] Rudi Palmieri. Regaining trust through argumentation in the
context of the current financial-economic crisis. Studies in Com-
munication Sciences, 9(2):59–78, 2009.
This paper considers argumentation in the context of
the current economic-financial crisis by focusing on the
attempt made by UBS Bank to retain stakeholders’
confidence. As a case in point, I analyze a press release
through which the bank announces important changes
in the Board of Directors. The text includes a clearly
argumentative aim: convince stakeholders, in particu-
lar clients, to retain their confidence in the bank. The
message exploits and emphasizes the positive qualities
of the would-be chairman and indirectly levers on the
interests and emotions of the concerned audience, to
bring to the inferential structure of the argument those
shared values (endoxa) that make it “trustworthy,” i.e.
persuasive.
[386] Cedric Paternotte & Milena Ivanova. Virtues and vices in
scientific practice. Synthese, 194:1787–1807, 2017.
The role intellectual virtues play in scientific inquiry
has raised significant discussions in the recent litera-
ture. A number of authors have recently explored the
link between virtue epistemology and philosophy of sci-
ence with the aim to show whether epistemic virtues
can contribute to the resolution of the problem of the-
ory choice. This paper analyses how intellectual virtues
can be beneficial for successful resolution of theory
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choice. We explore the role of virtues as well as vices
in scientific inquiry and their beneficial effects in the
context of theory choice. We argue that vices can play
a role in widening the set of potential candidate theo-
ries and support our claim with historical examples and
normative arguments from formal social epistemology.
We argue that even though virtues appear to be neither
necessary nor sufficient for scientific success, they have
a positive effect because they accelerate successful con-
vergence amongst scientists in theory choice situations.
[387] Steven W. Patterson. Dancing, dueling, and argumentation:
On the normative shape of the practice of argumentation. In
Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, David Godden, &
Gordon Mitchell, eds., Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the
International Society for the Study of Argumentation, pp. 1476–
1485. Rozenberg/Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2011.
Do we have an obligation to argue? If so, where does
that obligation come from and how does it bind us? Is
the obligation to argue a moral obligation, or a pru-
dential one, or is it perhaps an obligation of some
other sort? These questions all fall within a more gen-
eral sphere of concerns that I believe would be aptly
labeled the sphere of normativity in argumentation.
These questions are not the whole of this sphere of con-
cerns, but they are important members of it—perhaps
even essential starting points. In this paper I will ad-
dress this sphere by arguing: 1) that we do have an obli-
gation to argue, and 2) that the obligation to argue ap-
plies to us by virtue of our standing as co-participants
in a convention of argumentation. My account has its
basis in social philosophy, and so is somewhat unlike
other contemporary views on offer regarding the obli-
gation to argue. It will be worthwhile to begin with a
brief review of these accounts before proceeding to my
own.
[388] Richard Paul. Critical thinking and the critical person. In Crit-
ical Thinking: What Every Person Needs in a Rapidly Changing
World, pp. 182–205. Sonoma State University, Sonoma, CA, 1990.
Written for Thinking: The Second International Con-
ference (1987), this paper explores a series of themes
familiar to Richard Paul’s readers: that most school
learning is irrational rather than rational, that there
are two different modes of critical thinking and hence
two different kinds of critical persons, that strong sense
critical thinking is embedded in the ancient Socratic
ideal of living an examined life, and that social stud-
ies instruction today is, in the main, sociocentric. Paul
illustrates this last point with items from a state de-
partment of education critical thinking test and illus-
trations from a popular university-level introductory
political science text. Paul closes with an argument
in favor of a new emphasis on developing the critical
thinking abilities of teachers: “If, in our haste to bring
critical thinking into the schools, we ignore the need to
develop long-term strategies for nurturing the develop-
ment of teachers’ own critical powers and passions, we
shall surely make the new emphasis on critical thinking
into nothing more than a passing fad, or worse, into a
new, more sophisticated form of social indoctrination
and scholastic closedmindedness.”
[389] Richard Paul. Critical thinking, moral integrity and citizenship:
Teaching for the intellectual virtues. In Guy Axtell, ed., Knowl-
edge, Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, pp.
163–175. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2000.
Educators and theorists tend to approach the affective
and moral dimensions of education as they approach
all other dimensions of learning, as compartmentalized
domains, and as a collection of learnings more or less
separate from other learnings. As a result, they view
moral development as more or less independent of cog-
nitive development. “And why not!” one might imag-
ine the reply. “Clearly there are highly educated, very
intelligent people who habitually do evil and very sim-
ple, poorly educated people who consistently do good.
If moral development were so intimately connected to
cognitive development, how could this be so?” In this
paper, I provide the outlines of an answer to that objec-
tion by suggesting an intimate connection between crit-
ical thinking, moral integrity, and citizenship. Specifi-
cally, I distinguish a weak and a strong sense of each
and hold that the strong sense ought to guide, not only
our understanding of the nature of the educated person,
but also our redesigning the curriculum.
[390] Luigi Pellizzoni. The myth of the best argument: Power, de-
liberation and reason. British Journal of Sociology, 52(1):59–86,
2001.
Power in communication takes two main forms. As ‘ex-
ternal’ power, it consists in the ability to acknowl-
edge or disregard a speaker or a discourse. As ‘inter-
nal’ power, it is the ability of an argument to elim-
inate other arguments by demonstrating its superior-
ity. A positive or negative value may be ascribed to
these forms of power. Four ideal-typical positions are
discussed – strategy, technocracy, constructionism, and
deliberation. Public deliberation has three virtues –
civic virtue, governance virtue and cognitive virtue.
Deliberation lowers the propensity to, and the ben-
efit of, strategic behaviour. It also increases knowl-
edge, enhancing the quality of decisions. For Haber-
mas, the unity of reason is expressed in the possibil-
ity of agreement on the most convincing argument.
However, sometimes conflicts are deep-lying, principles
and factual descriptions are profoundly different, and
uncertainty is radical. The best argument cannot be
found. There is no universal reason. The question is
whether non-strategic agreement may spring from the
incommensurability of languages. In search of an an-
swer, Rawls’s concept of overlapping consensus, the
feminist theory of the public sphere, and the idea of de-
liberation as co-operation are discussed. The argument
developed is that the approach to deliberative democ-
racy may be renewed by rethinking its motivational and
cognitive elements. Public deliberation is grounded on
a pre-political level of co-operation. Intractable contro-
versies may be faced at the level of practices, looking
for local, contextual answers.
[391] Kathryn Phillips. Character, dog whistles, and the limits of
charity. In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan
Albert Van Laar, & Bart Verheij, eds., Reason to Dissent:
Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Argumentation,
Groningen 2019, vol. 3, pp. 239–250. College Publications, Lon-
don, 2020.
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Both the principle of charity and responsibility condi-
tion are thought to be central elements of argument
reconstruction and productive discourse. These condi-
tions are problematic in arguments that contain vari-
ous forms of deception. In this paper, I will focus on
multivocal appeals (popularly known as dog whistles,)
which are meant to be heard by only certain audience
members. I will argue that arguments containing dog
whistles require more nuanced tools to reconstruct the
argument.
[392] Kathryn Phillips. Deep disagreement and patience as an argu-
mentative virtue, 2020. Presented at Evidence, Persuasion and Di-
versity: 12th International Conference of the Ontario Society for
the Study of Argumentation, University of Windsor, ON.
A popular approach to analyzing the concept of evi-
dence is to identify a unique set of normative criteria
delineating the concept. However, disagreements about
evidence seem deep, and using this approach raises con-
cerns about the imposition of dominant norms, which
might exclude important sources of knowledge. Pa-
tience is an argumentative virtue necessary to continue
to engage in disagreements rather than lose hope in
the face of seemingly intractable disputes such as the
nature of evidence.
[393] Massimo Pigliucci. How to behave virtuously in an irrational
world. Disputatio, 9, 2020.
It is no secret that we inhabit an increasingly irrational
world, plagued by rampant pseudoscience, science de-
nialism, post–truths and fake news. Or perhaps, human
nature being what it is, we have always lived in such
a world and we are now simply more keenly aware of
it because of easy and widespread access to social me-
dia. Moreover, the stakes are higher, as pseudoscience
in the form of the anti–vax movement imperils the lives
of many, while climate change denialism literally risks
a collapse of the human ecosystem. So how do we deal
with the problem? How do we talk to otherwise per-
fectly reasonable and functional people who neverthe-
less espouse all sorts of nonsense — and vote accord-
ingly? In this paper I will explore a couple of real life
conversations among many that I have had with be-
lievers in pseudoscience, and then present and discuss
virtue epistemology as one approach to ameliorate the
problem. No silver bullets are available, unfortunately,
but it is our intellectual and moral duty to keep, as
Carl Sagan famously put it, the candle of reason lit
even when surrounded by the darkness of unreason.
[394] Josué Piñeiro & Justin Simpson. Eventful conversations and the
positive virtues of a listener. Acta Analytica, 35:373–388, 2020.
Political solutions to problems like global warming and
social justice are often stymied by an inability to pro-
ductively communicate in everyday conversations. Mo-
tivated by these communication problems, the paper
considers the role of the virtuous listener in conver-
sations. Rather than the scripted exchanges of infor-
mation between individuals, we focus on lively, intra-
active conversations that are mediating events. In such
conversations, the listener plays a participatory role
by contributing to the content and form of the con-
versation. Unlike Miranda Fricker’s negative virtue
of testimonial justice, which neutralizes the listener’s
identity-prejudices in their credibility judgments of the
speaker’s testimony, we consider the positive virtues
of a good listener. These positive virtues enable lis-
teners to productively contribute to the conversation
by helping create the fertile epistemic space of a non-
adversarial, caring relationship that facilitates critical
and creative thinking.
[395] Robert C. Pinto. Evaluating inferences: The nature and role of
warrants. Informal Logic, 26(3):287–317, 2006.
Following David Hitchcock and Stephen Toulmin, this
paper takes warrants to be material inference rules. It
offers an account of the form such rules should take
that is designed (a) to implement the idea that an ar-
gument/inference is valid only if it is entitlement pre-
serving and (b) to support a qualitative version of ev-
idence proportionalism. It attempts to capture what
gives warrants their normative force by elaborating a
concept of reliability tailored to its account of the form
such rules should take.
[396] Robert C. Pinto. Commentary on: Harvey Siegel’s “Argumenta-
tion and the epistemology of disagreement”. In Dima Mohammed
& Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceed-
ings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario Society
for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA,
Windsor, ON, 2014.
The long version of Siegel’s paper is an extremely useful
overview of the literature on two aspects of the episte-
mology of disagreement, and I’m in complete agreement
with what I take to be his main conclusions, namely (1)
that because of ambiguities in the treatment of peer-
hood and the variety of different cases which require
different sorts of treatment, there do not seem to be
any general epistemic principles concerning peer dis-
agreement, other than what has come to be called the
Total Evidence View, and (2) that Fogelin is wrong in
supposing or concluding that that there are disagree-
ments “which by their nature are not subject to ratio-
nal resolution.” I would however call brief attention to
two aspects of Siegel’s presentation about which I have
reservations.
[397] Robert C. Pinto. Truth and the virtue of arguments. In Dima
Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumenta-
tion: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
In a 2006 paper I claimed that the virtue arguments
or inferences must have is not that they be truth-
preserving, but that they be entitlement-preserving (in
Brandom’s sense of that phrase). I offered two rea-
sons there why such a conception of argument virtue
is needed for a satisfactory treatment of defeasible ar-
guments and inferences. This paper revisits that claim,
and assesses the prospects for a more thorough defence
than was offered in that paper.
[398] Nancy Nyquist Potter. Mad, bad, or virtuous? The moral, cul-
tural, and pathologizing features of defiance. Theory & Psychology,
22(1):23–45, 2011.
Defiance is sometimes treated as behavior that needs
to be punished or even diagnosed, especially when it is
expressed by the subjugated. In contrast to that view,
I argue that the readiness to be defiant is a virtue.
Drawing upon an Aristotelian framework, updated by
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an uncompromising challenge to hegemonic power dif-
ferences, I indicate a way for the subjugated and disen-
franchised to recoup self-worth and moral agency. Defi-
ance even may help correct for burdened virtues, as Lisa
Tessman analyzes them. Thus, this article falls within
the domains of moral psychology and social change.
Difficulties in conceptualizing and operationalizing de-
fiance as a virtue, especially since defiance tends to be
divisive within society, are discussed in terms of cases.
Special attention is paid to medicalizing discourses that
take defiance to be a sign of pathology, especially with
members of oppressed groups.
[399] Duncan Pritchard. Educating for intellectual humility and con-
viction. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 54(2):398–409, 2020.
It is argued that two plausible goals of the educational
enterprise are (i) to develop the intellectual character,
and thus the intellectual virtues, of the student, and
(ii) to develop the student’s intellectual self-confidence,
such that they are able to have conviction in what they
believe. On the face of it, however, these two educa-
tional goals seem to be in tension with one another,
at least insofar as intellectual humility is a genuine
intellectual virtue. This is because intellectual humil-
ity seems to require that one does not have conviction
in one’s beliefs. It is argued that this tension can be
avoided so long as we have the right account of intel-
lectual humility in play. This enables us to understand
what educating for intellectual humility might involve,
and how it might co-exist with the educational devel-
opment of a student’s intellectual self-confidence.
[400] Chris Provis. Virtuous decision making for business ethics. Jour-
nal of Business Ethics, 91:3–16, 2010.
In recent years, increasing attention has been given to
virtue ethics in business. Aristotle’s thought is often
seen as the basis of the virtue ethics tradition. For Aris-
totle, the idea of phronēsis, or ‘practical wisdom’, lies
at the foundation of ethics. Confucian ethics has no-
table similarities to Aristotelian virtue ethics, and may
embody some similar ideas of practical wisdom. This
article considers how ideas of moral judgment in these
traditions are consistent with modern ideas about in-
tuition in management decision making. A hypothet-
ical case is considered where the complexity of ethi-
cal decision making in a group context illustrates the
importance of intuitive, phronēsis-like judgment. It is
then noted that both Aristotelian and Confucian virtue
ethics include suggestions about support for moral de-
cision making that are also consistent with modern the-
ory.
[401] Tage Rai & Keith Holyoak. The rational hypocrite: Informal
argumentation and moral hypocrisy. In Proceedings of the Annual
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, vol. 33, pp. 2475–2479.
2011.
We suggest that in some instances the apparent logical
inconsistency of moral hypocrisy stems from different
evaluations of a weak argument, rather than dishon-
esty per se. Extending Corner, Hahn, and Oaksford’s
(2006) analysis of slippery slope arguments, we pro-
pose that inferences of hypocrisy depend on perceived
similarity of actions to previous standards. In Experi-
ment 1, dissimilar actions were rated as less hypocrit-
ical than their similar counterparts. If observers are
choosing between competing theories (i.e., hypocrisy
or legitimate dissimilarity), evidence of self-serving mo-
tives will positively support inferences of hypocrisy in-
dependent of changes in similarity. In Experiment 2,
we manipulated potential self-serving interests that an
action would produce while keeping similarity between
cases identical. Actions that would result in a beneficial
outcome for the actor were seen as more hypocritical
than their non-self-serving counterparts. These results
support the possibility that Bayesian analyses of weak
arguments have implications for assessing moral rea-
soning.
[402] Tommi Ralli. Intellectual excellences of the judge. In Liesbeth
Huppes-Cluysenaer & Nuno M.M.S. Coelho, eds., Aristotle
and the Philosophy of Law: Theory, Practice and Justice, pp. 135–
147. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013.
Aspects of legal cases hinge on understanding the situa-
tion of the disputants. While categories such as feeling,
empathy, law and politics have limited discriminating
capacity here, I propose to draw upon the Aristotelian
scheme of intellectual virtues. Specifically, I look at how
the judge exercises discernment (gnômê) and the com-
prehension of what others say (synesis). In the context
of practical wisdom, Hursthouse has argued that dis-
cernment requires experience of exceptions. I add that
the judge exercises her discernment by suspending the
application of principles to an individual, while listen-
ing. Furthermore, I add that the exceptions include ex-
periences lived through, which Hursthouse’s technical
view neglects. When using her comprehension to ab-
sorb the details of the situation based upon testimony,
the judge will have to be open to different perspectives,
able to move between them, and yet courageous enough
to stand by what she deems right. I conclude with a hy-
pothetical about the judge’s involvement in the process
contributing to a better understanding of the other in
a global environment.
[403] Alejandro Ramírez Figueroa. La virtud abductiva y la regla
de introducción de hipótesis en deducción natural. Revista de
Filosofia Aurora, 26:487–513, 2014. In Spanish.
Since its creation by Peirce, the nature of abductive
inference has been construed in many ways. Three con-
struings are analyzed, and some of their derivatives, to
then examine the possibility for considering abduction
as an argumentative virtue of cognitive character, in
line with current theories on epistemological virtues re-
sulting from E. Sosa’s works and argumentative virtues
according to A. Aberdein. Based on the said constru-
ing, it is proposed that abduction could play the role of
justification of natural deduction rules that introduce
hypothetical clauses.
[404] Alejandro Ramírez Figueroa. Abducción y virtudes epistémi-
cas. In VI Jornadas “Peirce en Argentina” 20-21 de agosto del
2015. 2015. In Spanish.
[405] William Rehg. Assessing the cogency of arguments: Three kinds
of merits. Informal Logic, 25(2):95–115, 2005.
This article proposes a way of connecting two lev-
els at which scholars have studied discursive practices
from a normative perspective: on the one hand, lo-
cal transactions—face-to-face arguments or dialogues—
and broadly dispersed public debates on the other. To
help focus my analysis, I select two representatives of
work at these two levels: the pragma-dialectical model
of critical discussion and Habermas’s discourse theory
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of political-legal deliberation. The two models confront
complementary challenges that arise from gaps between
their prescriptions and contexts of actual discourse. In
response, I propose a theory of argument cogency that
distinguishes three kinds of merit: content, transac-
tional, and public. Normative links between the two
levels arise through the ways argument contents spread
across multiple transactions in a social space whose
structure and composition favor collective reasonable-
ness.
[406] Magne Reitan. Ethos and pathos: Philosophical analysis. In
Bart Garssen, David Godden, Gordon R. Mitchell, &
Jean H.M. Wagemans, eds., Proceedings of the Ninth Confer-
ence of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation,
pp. 953–962. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, 2019.
It is argued in this paper that ethos and pathos
have dual natures, with both being argumentative
and causal. This dual nature is based on both trust
and emotions having a complex nature, that they are
composed of both a cognitive component and a non-
cognitive component. One can argue with respect to
the first, but not the second. The second has a causal
role, and this makes ethos and pathos forceful means
of persuasion.
[407] Suzanne Rice. Toward an Aristotelian conception of good listen-
ing. Educational Theory, 61(2):141–153, 2011.
In this essay Suzanne Rice examines Aristotle’s ideas
about virtue, character, and education as elements in
an Aristotelian conception of good listening. Rice be-
gins by surveying of several different contexts in which
listening typically occurs, using this information to
introduce the argument that what should count as
“good listening” must be determined in relation to the
situation in which listening actually occurs. On this
view, Rice concludes, there are no “essential” listening
virtues, but rather ways of listening that may be re-
garded as virtuous in the context of particular concrete
circumstances.
[408] Wayne Riggs. Open-mindedness. Metaphilosophy, 41(1-2):172–
188, 2010.
Open-mindedness is typically at the top of any list
of the intellectual or “epistemic” virtues. Yet, provid-
ing an account that simultaneously explains why open-
mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have
and how such a trait is compatible with full-blooded
belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work
of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view
of open-mindedness that meets this challenge. On this
view, open-mindedness is primarily an attitude toward
oneself as a believer, rather than toward any particu-
lar belief. To be open-minded is to be aware of one’s
fallibility as a believer, and to acknowledge the possi-
bility that anytime one believes something, one could
be wrong. In order to see that such an attitude is epis-
temically valuable even to an already virtuous agent,
some details of the skills and habits of the open-minded
agent are elucidated.
[409] Phyllis Rooney. Commentary on: Kathryn Norlock’s “Recep-
tivity as a virtue of (practitioners of) argumentation”. In Dima
Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumenta-
tion: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the On-
tario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25,
2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
While significant work in argumentation theory (and
philosophy of argument) has been devoted to the pre-
sentation of arguments, many now argue for renewed
attention to responses to arguments, and, in particu-
lar, to the epistemic responsibilities of responders who
clearly also play a central role in the successes or fail-
ures of argumentation. As Kathryn Norlock notes, this
renewed attention is motivated, among other things, by
concerns about the ancillary adversarial “blood sport”
practices of argumentation that are not unknown in
philosophy and in other contexts of debate. Since prac-
tices of argumentation are significantly communal and
relational, Norlock adds, we need to assess these prac-
tices as also ethical ones. More particularly, she argues
that we can usefully mine insights from an ethic of car-
ing (as advanced by Nell Noddings especially), and she
endorses Noddings’s account of receptivity (“the pre-
condition for ethical interaction”) as a virtue that prac-
titioners of argumentation might usefully exhibit. My
comments will focus on two central topics: the am-
bivalent use of “caring” as central to the ethical picture
Norlock sets out, and the relationship between the epis-
temic and the ethical in argumentation as suggested by
her account.
[410] Amélie Rorty. Aristotle on the virtues of rhetoric. The Review
of Metaphysics, 64(4):715–733, 2011.
While agreeing with Plato’s concerns about the skills of
brilliant Persuaders, Aristotle proceeds to differentiate
types of intellectual virtues or excellences, distinguish-
ing those that are capable of successfully but uncrit-
ically achieving their aims from those whose exercise
intrinsically incorporate good and admirable ends. He
then analyzes the constituents of the virtues of practi-
cal wisdom, distinguishing those that—like wit, clever-
ness, and perspicuity—can be exercised independently
of the moral virtues. A Persuader can successfully craft
an astute and even insightful legal defense for an unjust
cause, but he does not qualify as a person of practical
wisdom unless his desires and ends are genuinely good.
His audience can understand his argument and accept
his judgment without being directed or committed to
acting well. On the other hand, to qualify as a phron-
imos, a person of practical wisdom, a Persuader must
not only be capable of shrewdly sizing up a jury or an
Assembly, saying the right words at the right time and
in the right way, he must also do so for the right rea-
son, for the right aims, as an expression of the unity of
his intellectual and character virtues. In short, a bril-
liant, successful Persuader need not be a phronimos,
but a phronimos must—among other things—rightly
as well as successfully exercise the skills of a talented
Persuader.
[411] Philip Rose. Compromise as deep virtue: Evolution and
some limits of argumentation. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin
Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON,
2014.
If argument forms evolve then the possible existence
of localized argument forms may create an interpretive
impasse between locally distinct argument communi-
ties. Appeal to evolutionarily ‘deep’ argument forms
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may help, but might be strained in cases where emer-
gent argument forms are not reducible to their base
conditions. Overcoming such limits presupposes the
virtue of compromise, suggesting that compromise may
stand as ‘deep virtue’ within argumentative forms of
life.
[412] Robert C. Rowland. Commentary on: David Zarefsky’s “The
‘comeback’ second Obama–Romney debate and virtues of argu-
mentation”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds.,
Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
Zarefsky’s overall argument draws an important dis-
tinction about commentary on the debate, arguing that
Obama won the second debate not only because of an
aggressive style, but also because of his argumentative
skill. Rather than comment on Zarefsky’s insightful de-
scription of crucial argument exchanges in the debate
or his analysis of Romney’s use of ethotic argument or
how both candidates relied on association and disso-
ciation, I want to focus on underlying implications of
his argument. My approach is to use Zarefsky’s anal-
ysis as a jumping off point to draw distinctions about
what argumentative analysis reveals about American
presidential debates.
[413] Robert C. Rowland & Deanna F. Womack. Aristotle’s view of
ethical rhetoric. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 15(1-2):13–31, 1985.
We believe that a consistent Aristotelian view of the
relation between rhetoric, ethics, and politics can be
developed and that Aristotelian ethical theory places
substantially different requirements on the rhetor than
those imposed by competing theories of rhetoric. In ad-
dition, we shall argue that Aristotle’s ethical system is
valuable because it commands attention to both the
emotional and rational faculties and is well adapted to
the needs of a democratic society. We shall develop this
position by arguing that rhetoric is both an art of dis-
covering all of the available means of persuasion, and
an object which the rhetor produces. As an art, rhetoric
is amoral; as a product, rhetoric is either moral or im-
moral. After clarifying the dual nature of rhetoric as
art (techne) and product, we shall systematically ana-
lyze the assumptions of Aristotelian ethics. In the final
section of this essay, we shall sketch the relevance of
Aristotle’s rhetorical ethic for the rhetor in a democ-
racy.
[414] Bruce Russell. Commentary on: Patrick Bondy’s “The epistemic
approach to argument evaluation: Virtues, beliefs, commitments”.
In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Ar-
gumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of
the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May
22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
A responsible argument provides justification for be-
lieving its conclusion. Bondy and I may disagree on
some of the details, but we are essentially in agreement
about the nature of responsible argumentation and on
the nature of a virtuous arguer, namely, someone dis-
posed to give and to recognize responsible arguments.
[415] Karim Sadek. Disagreement, public reasoning, and (non-
)authoritarian argumentation. In Catarina Dutilh Novaes,
Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar, & Bart Verheij,
eds., Reason to Dissent: Proceedings of the 3rd European Con-
ference on Argumentation, Groningen 2019, vol. 1, pp. 463–480.
College Publications, London, 2020.
Which kind of disagreement should we promote? I
tackle this question via a reflection on the standard for
determining which arguments and reasons are allowed
into public debates. Drawing on the works of Maeve
Cooke and Michael Gilbert I propose non-authoritarian
argumentation as a model for the analysis and evalu-
ation of public argumentation in democracies. I argue
for, and explicate, the promotion of disagreement that
square a dual-commitment to pluralism and solidarity.
[416] Peter L Samuelson & Ian M Church. When cognition turns
vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology. Philo-
sophical Psychology, 28(8):1095–1113, 2015.
In this paper we explore the literature on cogni-
tive heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemol-
ogy, specifically highlighting the two major positions—
agent-reliabilism and agent-responsibilism (or neo-
Aristotelianism)—as they apply to dual systems the-
ories of cognition and the role of motivation in biases.
We investigate under which conditions heuristics and
biases might be characterized as vicious and conclude
that a certain kind of intellectual arrogance can be at-
tributed to an over- or inappropriate reliance on Sys-
tem 1 cognition. By the same token, the proper employ-
ment of System 2 cognition results in the virtuous func-
tioning of our cognitive systems (agent-reliabilism).
Moreover, the role of motivation in attenuating cog-
nitive biases and the cultivation of certain epistemic
habits (a search for accuracy, being accountable for
one’s judgments, the use of rules of analysis, and ex-
posure to differing perspectives) points to the tenets
of agent-responsibilism in epistemic virtue. We identify
the proper use of System 2 cognition and the habits
of mind that attenuate biases as demonstrations of the
virtue of intellectual humility. We briefly explore the
nature of these habits and the contribution of person-
ality traits, situational pressures, and training in their
cultivation.
[417] Maria Sanders. Preserving character in the classroom: A virtue-
based approach to teaching informal logic and critical thinking,
2013. Presented at the AILACT Group Session at the Central Di-
vision APA Meeting, February 20–23, Riverside Hilton, New Or-
leans, LA.
[418] Harikumar Sankaran & Marija Dimitrijevic. Implications
for critical thinking dispositions: Evidence from freshmen in
New Mexico. Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines,
25(2):27–35, 2010.
In this study, we compare the overall level of disposi-
tion towards critical thinking among college freshmen
in New Mexico with that of other undergraduates from
around the world. We ascertain whether there are dom-
inant dispositional attributes among students who pre-
fer a certain discipline as their major, between genders
and ethnicity.
[419] Kunimasa Sato. Motivating children’s critical thinking: Teaching
through exemplars. Informal Logic, 35(2):205–221, 2015.
This study focuses on fostering the motivation to think
critically through teaching with exemplars. First, I ar-
gue that teachers and parents can be seen as exemplars
who exhibit thought processes and attitudes relevant to
critical thinking, as can fictional characters in media
VIRTUES AND ARGUMENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 59
such as novels and films. Second, I demonstrate that,
through learning from exemplars, children may begin
to develop their own way of critical thinking. Third, I
conclude that admiration for exemplars may motivate
children to think critically, even small children who
have not yet developed a sensitivity toward evidence
and reasons.
[420] Brett G. Scharffs. The role of humility in exercising practical
wisdom. University of California Davis Law Review, 32:127–199,
1998.
Practical wisdom provides a powerful paradigm for un-
derstanding legal reasoning and adjudication. One of
the primary insights of practical wisdom is that it rec-
ognizes a role for character as well as intellect in delib-
eration. Intellect alone may suffice to make one clever,
enabling one to figure out how to achieve one’s ends. As
Aristotle notes, however, if the ends are wrong, clever-
ness may facilitate mere villainy. Virtue of character,
together with experience, transforms cleverness into
practical wisdom. Kronman’s account of the virtues
of character necessary for exercising practical wisdom
– sympathy (or mercy) and detachment (or justice) –
is helpful but incomplete. The (or at least a) missing
ingredient is humility. Humility helps one to become
more just and more merciful. It also aids deliberation
and choice by one who is just and merciful, one who is
trying to determine the appropriate course of action in
a particular situation. For these reasons, humility is a
virtue of character that we should especially seek and
value in judges.
[421] Brett G. Scharffs. The character of legal reasoning. Washing-
ton & Lee Law Review, 61(2):733–786, 2004.
Legal, and especially judicial, reasoning is a com-
plex combination of practical wisdom (phronesis), craft
(techne), and rhetoric (rhetorica). These three concepts
have unique concerns, components, distinctive charac-
teristics, andmeasuresofsuccess. Each of the concepts
is also accompanied by risks, or what I have termed
the dark sides of practical wisdom, craft, and rhetoric.
While these concepts, when taken individually, pro-
vide an incomplete and even dangerous account of legal
reasoning, these dangers are overcome when they are
united to form the bedrock characteristics of the good
lawyer and judge. The virtues of intellect and character
inherent to practical wisdom temper the risks associ-
ated with craft and rhetoric. Practical wisdom imbues
craft with a moral dimension that it otherwise lacks
and elevates rhetoric above mere sophistry. Craft’s con-
nection with the past tempers the troubling tendencies
associated with practical wisdom and rhetoric. Craft
balances the elitist and arrogant tendencies of practical
wisdom by adding an aspect of humility and grounds
rhetoric in a tradition that helps limit rhetorical ex-
cesses. Rhetoric’s commitment to giving reasons makes
practical wisdom more articulate and craft less secre-
tive, cunning, and tricky. Only in combination do prac-
tical wisdom, craft, and rhetoric create a balanced,
complete, and compelling account of legal reasoning.
[422] Brett G. Scharffs. Abraham Lincoln and the cardinal virtue of
practical reason. Pepperdine Law Review, 47(2):341–359, 2020.
Practical wisdom is an elusive concept. This Article fo-
cuses on a case in which Abraham Lincoln, prior to his
election as President, participated (or more accurately
did not participate) to frame a discussion of what prac-
tical wisdom means and how it makes a difference for
lawyers.
[423] Francis Schrag. Thinking in School and Society. Routledge, New
York, NY, 1988. ISBN 9780415001748.
In saying of someone that he or she is a good thinker
we may mean one of two things: that the person is
intelligent or that the person is thoughtful. A person
may be clever without being thoughtful and vice versa.
In the first sense, we commend something skill-like. In
the second we commend something more like a virtue
or trait of character. The educator’s focus, I shall ar-
gue in this book, ought to be on the development of the
virtue or character trait of thoughtfulness.
[424] Margrit Schreier & Norbert Groeben. Ethical guidelines for
the conduct in argumentative discussions: An exploratory study.
Human Relations, 49(1):123–132, 1996.
An exploratory study is aimed at systematically devel-
oping ethical criteria for evaluating contributions to ar-
gumentative discussions by bringing together strategies
from popular rhetoric with the normative theoretical
concept of argumentational integrity. Argumentational
integrity constitutes the focus of research in a project of
the same name which aims at reconstructing the ethical
criteria participants use in evaluating contributions to
argumentative discussions. The study rests on the as-
sumption that the diversity of strategy lists in popular
theoretical texts can be reduced by asking competent
subjects to sort the strategies according to similarity.
The similarities themselves can be taken to constitute
ways of acting to be avoided in a fair discussion; as
a consequence, they can be used to formulate ethical
rules or standards of fair argumentation. The construct
of argumentational integrity services as a theoretical
framework for this systematization.
[425] Margrit Schreier, Norbert Groeben, & Ursula Christ-
mann. “That’s not fair!” Argumentational integrity as an ethics
of argumentative communication. Argumentation, 9(2):267–289,
1995.
The article introduces the concept of ‘argumentational
integrity’ as the basis for developing ethical criteria by
which contributions to argumentative discussions can
be evaluated; the focus is on the derivation, definition,
and specification of the concept. The derivation of the
concept starts out from a prescriptive use of ‘argumen-
tation’, entailing in particular the goal of a rational as
well as a cooperative solution. In order to make this
goal attainable, contributions to argumentative discus-
sions must meet certain conditions. It is assumed that
participants are not only intuitively aware of these con-
ditions, but in fact expect of themselves and others that
they will not consciously violate the conditions. This
assumption leads to the most general definition of the
norm of argumentational integrity: Speakers must not
knowingly violate the argumentative conditions. On the
basis of an empirical study drawing upon classifications
of unethical strategies in popular rhetorical texts, the
general norm is then specified in the form of 11 ‘stan-
dards of fair argumentation’.
[426] Lydia Schumacher. Rationality as Virtue: Towards a Theologi-
cal Philosophy. Routledge, London, 2016.
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For much of the modern period, theologians and
philosophers of religion have struggled with the prob-
lem of proving that it is rational to believe in God.
Drawing on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, this book
lays the foundation for an innovative effort to overturn
the longstanding problem of proving faith’s rational-
ity, and to establish instead that rationality requires
to be explained by appeals to faith. To this end, Schu-
macher advances the constructive argument that ra-
tionality is not only an epistemological question con-
cerning the soundness of human thoughts, which she
defines in terms of ‘intellectual virtue’. Ultimately, it is
an ethical question whether knowledge is used in ways
that promote an individual’s own flourishing and that
of others. That is to say, rationality in its paradigmatic
form is a matter of moral virtue, which should nonethe-
less entail intellectual virtue.
[427] Kyle Scott. The political value of humility. Acta Politica,
49(2):217–233, 2014.
This article takes up the issue of deliberation and the
importance of internal constraints for the proper func-
tioning of a deliberative environment. Those who seek
to engage in deliberation must possess certain char-
acteristics, or virtues, that will facilitate deliberation.
This article discusses humility within this context. Hu-
mility serves as a principle deliberative virtue. Theo-
rists should focus on the characteristics of individuals
who make deliberation possible before looking for the
proper institutional arrangements. I provide a defini-
tion and illustration of humility through a reading of
Fyodor Dostoevsky’s ‘Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ and
‘Legend of the Grand Inquisitor’.
[428] Alan Sears & Jim Parsons. Towards critical thinking as an ethic.
Theory and Research in Social Education, 19(1):45–68, 1991.
For a long time, there has been a disparity between
social studies as it is conceived by theorists at univer-
sities and as it is practiced by teachers. The funda-
mental difference between the two groups is that the
theorists focus on developing critical thinking abilities,
while teachers have focused on content acquisition as
central. Many reasons for this dichotomy have been ad-
vanced. These reasons mainly focus on problems with
the educational system itself. This paper proposes an
alternative view of the fundamental reason for the lack
of consistency between theory and practice. Our view is
that, while teachers have been exposed to critical think-
ing as a teaching strategy, they have not, by and large,
adopted it as an ethic. When faced with the difficulties
of implementing a critical thinking based program in
their classrooms, teachers who have no ethical commit-
ment to the process choose alternative teaching strate-
gies. These strategies are “safer” and usually involve
more traditional content. Critical thinking as an ethic
is built on several fundamental principles that cannot
be learned, but must be experienced. It is incumbent
then for university professors to embody the ethic of
critical thinking in their own teaching if they hope to
influence prospective teachers to adopt and teach a crit-
ical social studies.
[429] Lois S. Self. Rhetoric and phronesis: The Aristotelian ideal. Phi-
losophy and Rhetoric, 12(2):130–145, 1979.
This essay seeks to establish the claim that there is
an “association of persuasion and virtue” in Aristo-
tle’s theory of rhetoric which derives from the nature
of the art of rhetoric itself; more specifically, that
the ideal practitioner of Aristotle’s Rhetoric employs
the skills and qualities of Aristotle’s model of human
virtue, the Phronimos or “man of practical wisdom,”
who is described in the Nicomachean Ethics. Three
arguments support this contention. First, Aristotle’s
view of rhetoric should be understood in relation to
the concept of practical wisdom since the definitions
and provinces of concern assigned by Aristotle to the
two concepts are strikingly similar. Secondly, excellent
performance of the art of rhetoric Aristotle describes re-
quires the characteristics associated with practical wis-
dom (phronesis). Finally, the desirable relationship of
the man of practical wisdom to the public closely paral-
lels the relationship Aristotle posits between the rhetor
and the audience in the Rhetoric.
[430] Harvey Siegel. Not by skill alone: The centrality of character to
critical thinking. Informal Logic, 15(3):163–177, 1993.
Connie Missimer (1990) challenges what she calls the
Character View, according to which critical thinking
involves both skill and character, and argues for a rival
conception—the Skill View—according to which criti-
cal thinking is a matter of skill alone. In this paper I
criticize the Skill View and defend the Character View
from Missimer’s critical arguments.
[431] Harvey Siegel. What (good) are thinking dispositions? Educa-
tional Theory, 49(2):207–221, 1999.
Genuine thinking dispositions are real tendencies,
propensities, or inclinations people have to think in
particular ways in particular contexts. As such, they
are not the same as, or reducible to, either formal rules
of good thinking or specific behaviors or patterns of
behavior. They can, moreover, contribute to genuine
explanations of episodes of thinking, and of long-term
patterns of thinking. If this is so, my title questions are
answered. The preceding paragraph summarizes what
thinking dispositions are. To the question “What good
are they?” at least one answer is clear: Thinking dispo-
sitions are good to the extent that they cause or bring
about good thinking. They do their job when they con-
stitute the “animating force” that causes thinkers to
think well.
[432] Harvey Siegel. Open-mindedness, critical thinking, and indoc-
trination: Homage to William Hare. Paideusis, 18(1):26–34, 2009.
William Hare has made fundamental contributions to
philosophy of education. Among the most important
of these contributions is his hugely important work on
open-mindedness. In this paper I explore the several
relationships that exist between Hare’s favored educa-
tional ideal (open-mindedness) and my own (critical
thinking). I argue that while both are of central impor-
tance, it is the latter that is the more fundamental of
the two.
[433] Harvey Siegel. Argumentation and the epistemology of disagree-
ment. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of
Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA),
May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtu-
ous arguer do? Several options have been defended in
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the recent literature on the epistemology of disagree-
ment, which connects interestingly to the controversy
launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagree-
ment.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed
by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen
in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagree-
ment is much less problematic for argumentation the-
ory than it once seemed.
[434] Harvey Siegel. Critical thinking and the intellectual virtues. In
Jason Baehr, ed., Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in
Applied Virtue Epistemology, pp. 95–112. Routledge, New York,
NY, 2016.
What is the relation between critical thinking (hence-
forth CT) and intellectual virtue? Is CT an intellectual
virtue or a cluster of such virtues? Is there anything
more to CT than the intellectual virtues it involves?
In what follows I hope to answer these questions by
addressing three clusters of issues: (1) Are the disposi-
tions, habits of mind and character traits constitutive
of the “critical spirit” rightly considered as intellectual
virtues? What is gained or lost by so conceiving them?
(2) Do the intellectual virtues include abilities as well
as dispositions, or are abilities something separate? (3)
Should we be “reliabilists” or “responsibilists” with re-
spect to the intellectual virtues? That is, must the
intellectual virtues, in order to be virtues, reliably se-
cure the truth? Or might they rather be “excellences”
or “perfections” that needn’t secure the truth, or be re-
liable generators of it, in order rightly to be considered
virtues? Finally, I will address a more specific question:
(4) What is the connection between virtue and reason?
More specifically still: Is a virtuous intellect eo ipso a
rational one?
[435] Harvey Siegel. Education’s Epistemology: Rationality, Diver-
sity, and Critical Thinking. Oxford University Press, New York,
NY, 2017.
Education’s Epistemology extends and further defends
Harvey Siegel’s “reasons conception” of critical think-
ing. It analyzes and emphasizes both the epistemic
quality, and the dispositions and character traits that
constitute the “critical spirit,” that are central to a
proper account of critical thinking; argues that that
epistemic quality must be understood ultimately in
terms of epistemic rationality; defends a conception
of rationality that involves both rules and judgment;
and argues that critical thinking has normative value
over and above its instrumental tie to truth. Siegel also
argues, contrary to currently popular multiculturalist
thought, for both transcultural and universal philo-
sophical ideals, including those of multiculturalism and
critical thinking themselves.
[436] Lawrence B. Solum. Virtue jurisprudence: A virtue-centered
theory of judging. Metaphilosophy, 34(1–2):178–213, 2003.
“Virtue jurisprudence” is a normative and explanatory
theory of law that utilizes the resources of virtue ethics
to answer the central questions of legal theory. The
main focus of this essay is the development of a virtue-
centered theory of judging. The exposition of the the-
ory begins with exploration of defects in judicial char-
acter, such as corruption and incompetence. Next, an
account of judicial virtue is introduced. This includes
judicial wisdom, a form of phronesis, or sound prac-
tical judgment. A virtue-centered account of justice is
defended against the argument that theories of fair-
ness are prior to theories of justice. The centrality of
virtue as a character trait can be drawn out by ana-
lyzing the virtue of justice into constituent elements.
These include judicial impartiality (even-handed sym-
pathy for those affected by adjudication) and judicial
integrity (respect for the law and concern for its coher-
ence). The essay argues that a virtue-centered theory
accounts for the role that virtuous practical judgment
plays in the application of rules to particular fact situa-
tions. Moreover, it contends that a virtue-centered the-
ory of judging can best account for the phenomenon of
lawful judicial disagreement. Finally, a virtue-centered
approach best accounts for the practice of equity, de-
parture from the rules based on the judge’s apprecia-
tion of the particular characteristics of individual fact
situations.
[437] Yujia Song. The moral virtue of open-mindedness. Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 48(1):65–84, 2018.
This paper gives a new and richer account of open-
mindedness as a moral virtue. I argue that the main
problem with existing accounts is that they derive the
moral value of open-mindedness entirely from the epis-
temic role it plays in moral thought. This view is overly
intellectualist. I argue that open-mindedness as a moral
virtue promotes our flourishing alongside others in ways
that are quite independent of its role in correcting our
beliefs. I close my discussion by distinguishing open-
mindedness from what some might consider its equiva-
lent: empathy and tolerance.
[438] Michael W. Spicer. Justice, conflict, and adversary argument:
An examination of Stuart Hampshire’s ideas and their implica-
tions for American public administration. Public Administration
Quarterly, 38(4):445–465, 2014.
This article draws on the ideas of Stuart Hampshire
to examine political practices of our culture as a ba-
sis for deriving a shared understanding of justice. It
is argued here that such practices intimate a notion
of procedural justice or “hearing the other side:” the
idea that there is virtue in settling the various disputes
that arise among us concerning our different interests
and conceptions of the good, including our different
conceptions of substantive justice, by processes of ad-
versarial argument rather than force. The article also
argues that, if public administration scholars and prac-
titioners wish to foster procedural justice, then, they
need to have an understanding of an appreciation for
our constitutional practices of adversarial argument, as
well as seeking other ways of promoting such adversar-
ial argument within their own particular agencies and
organizations.
[439] Michael W. Spicer. The virtues of politics in fearful times. Inter-
national Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, 17(1):65–
88, 2014.
While many warn about the failures of politics, this ar-
ticle argues that politics serves to resolve conflicts of
interests and values among us in a manner that limits
the use of violence and also protects and fosters value
pluralism and freedom. Public administration scholars
often look to science to improve governance but sci-
ence cannot resolve our many conflicting ends and val-
ues, nor can it take proper account of the freedom and
resulting sheer unpredictability that we have come to
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experience within our own tradition of politics. It is ar-
gued that the practice of politics requires not a science
of governance, but simply a certain kind of toleration,
namely a willingness to hear the other side and to en-
gage in practices of adversary argument. Implications
for the “politics of fear” are also discussed.
[440] Michael W. Spicer. Neutrality, adversary argument, and con-
stitutionalism in public administration. Administrative Theory &
Praxis, 37(3):188–202, 2015.
Since there can be no language that is free of our moral
and political values, it is difficult, if not impossible, for
public administrators and those of us who study and
teach them to be “ethically neutral.” However, the idea
of neutrality, thought of in terms of “fairness,” or a
willingness to “hear the other side,” remains a value
that is worthwhile for public administrators to pursue.
The implications of this argument for American con-
stitutionalism and public administration practice and
education are examined.
[441] James S. Spiegel. Open-mindedness and intellectual humility.
Theory and Research in Education, 10(1):27–38, 2012.
Among those who regard open-mindedness as a virtue,
there is dispute over whether the trait is essentially
an attitude toward particular beliefs or toward oneself
as a believer. I defend William Hare’s account of open-
mindedness as a first-order attitude toward one’s beliefs
and critique Peter Gardner’s view of open-mindedness
as a non-commital posture and Jonathan Adler’s claim
that open-mindedness is a second-order recognition of
one’s fallibility as a knower. While I reject Adler’s ac-
count of open-mindedness as a meta-attitude, I affirm
his intuition that there is a closely related second-order
intellectual virtue pertaining to the attitude we take
toward ourselves as knowers. However, this trait is in-
tellectual humility not open-mindedness. I explain why
both of these traits are intellectual virtues and how
they properly build off one another in the virtuous
mind.
[442] James S. Spiegel. Contest and indifference: Two models of open-
minded inquiry. Philosophia, 45:789–810, 2017.
While open-mindedness as an intellectual trait has been
recognized for centuries, Western philosophers have not
explicitly endorsed it as a virtue until recently. This
acknowledgment has been roughly coincident with the
rise of virtue epistemology. As with any virtue, it is
important to inform contemporary discussion of open-
mindedness with reflection on sources from the history
of philosophy. Here I do just this. After reviewing two
major accounts of open-mindedness, which I dub “Con-
test” and “Indifference,” I explore some ideas pertinent
to the subject in four philosophers spanning eighteen
centuries: Sextus Empiricus, John Locke, John Stuart
Mill, and Paul Feyerabend. Despite their varying con-
cerns and terminology, their contributions may valu-
ably inform current reflection on the virtue of open-
mindedness, whether construed in terms of the Contest
or Indifference account.
[443] James S. Spiegel. Open-mindedness and disagreement. Metaphi-
losophy, 50(1–2):175–189, 2019.
The current debate about disagreement has as rivals
those who take the steadfast view and those who af-
firm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side main-
tain that resolute commitment to a belief is reason-
able despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say
that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant
for one’s belief. This article discusses the relevance of
open-mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It
shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory per-
spective are consistent with a robust and substantive
display of open-mindedness. However, it also turns out
that there are more ways to display open-mindedness
on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view.
[444] Matthew L. Stanley, Alyssa H. Sinclair, & Paul Seli. In-
tellectual humility and perceptions of political opponents. Journal
of Personality, 2021. Forthcoming.
Objective: Intellectual humility (IH) refers to the
recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. We
investigate possible interpersonal implications of IH for
how people perceive the intellectual capabilities and
moral character of their sociopolitical opponents and
for their willingness to associate with those opponents.
Method: In four initial studies (N = 1, 926,Mage = 38,
880 females, 1,035 males), we measured IH, intellec-
tual and moral derogation of opponents, and willing-
ness to befriend opponents. In two additional studies
(N = 568,Mage = 40, 252 females, 314 males), we pre-
sented participants with a specific opponent on certain
sociopolitical issues and several social media posts from
that opponent in which he expressed his views on the
issue. We then measured IH, intellectual, and moral
derogation of the opponent, participants’ willingness
to befriend the opponent, participants’ willingness to
“friend” the opponent on social media, and participants’
willingness to “follow” the opponent on social media.
Results: Low-IH relative to high-IH participants were
more likely to derogate the intellectual capabilities and
moral character of their opponents, less willing to be-
friend their opponents, and less willing to “friend” and
“follow” an opponent on social media. Conclusions: IH
may have important interpersonal implications for per-
son perception, and for understanding social extremism
and polarization.
[445] Jan Steutel & Ben Spiecker. Rational passions and intellectual
virtues: A conceptual analysis. Studies in Philosophy and Educa-
tion, 16:59–71, 1997.
Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intel-
lectual honesty and the willingness to participate in ra-
tional discussions, are conceived as important aims of
education. In this paper an attempt is made to clarify
the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the
intellectual virtues are systematically compared with
moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of
character to be an intellectual virtue implies assuming
that such a trait can be derived from, or is a speci-
fication of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect
for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions of
intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required
distinctions. For example, it is argued that our concept
of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a
normative conception of intellectual virtuousness.
[446] Katharina Stevens. The virtuous arguer: One person, four roles.
Topoi, 35(2):375–383, 2016.
VIRTUES AND ARGUMENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 63
When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument,
we soon find ourselves confronted with a puzzling situ-
ation: what seems to be a virtue in one argumentative
situation could very well be called a vice in another.
This paper will present the idea that there are in fact
two sets of virtues an arguer has to master—and with
them four sometimes very different roles.
[447] Katharina Stevens. The roles we make others take: Thoughts
on the ethics of arguing. Topoi, 38(4):693–709, 2019.
Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the
Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, ac-
cording to which arguers should take proponent and op-
ponent roles and argue against one another. The model
is deficient because it creates disadvantages for femi-
nine gendered persons in a way that causes significant
epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue
that the problem that these critics have pointed out can
be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the
argument the associated tasks and norms of which she
cannot fulfill, she is liable to suffer morally significant
harms. One way to react to this problem is by requir-
ing arguers to set up argument structures and allocate
roles so that the argument will be reasons-reflective in
as balanced a way as possible. However, I argue that
this would create to heavy a burden. Arguers would
then habitually have to take on roles that require them
to divert time and energy away from the goals that
they started arguing for and instead serve the goal of
ideal reasons-reflectiveness. At least prima facie arguers
should be able to legitimately devote their time and en-
ergy towards their own goals. This creates a problem:
On the one hand, structures that create morally signifi-
cant harms for some arguers should be avoided—on the
other hand, arguers should be able to take argument-
roles that allow them to devote themselves to their own
argumentative goals. Fulfilling the second requirement
for some arguers will often create the morally signifi-
cant harms for their interlocutors. There are two pos-
sible solutions for this problem: first, arguers might be
required to reach free, consensual agreements on the
structure they will adopt for their argument and the
way they will distribute argumentative roles. I reject
this option as both fundamentally unfeasible and prac-
tically unrealistic, based on arguments developed by
theorists like Krabbe and Jacobs. I argue that instead,
we should take a liberal view on argument ethics. Ar-
guers should abide by moral side constraints to their
role taking. They should feel free to take roles that
will allow them to concentrate on their argumentative
goals, but only if this does not create a situation in
which their interlocutors are pushed into a role that
that they cannot effectively play.
[448] Katharina Stevens & Daniel Cohen. The attraction of the
ideal has no traction on the real: On adversariality and roles in
argument. Argumentation and Advocacy, 55(1):1–23, 2019.
If circumstances were always simple and all arguers
were always exclusively concerned with cognitive im-
provement, arguments would probably always be co-
operative. However, we have other goals and there are
other arguers, so in practice the default seems to be
adversarial argumentation. We naturally inhabit the
heuristically helpful but cooperation-inhibiting roles of
proponents and opponents. We can, however, opt for
more cooperative roles. The resources of virtue argu-
mentation theory are used to explain when proactive
cooperation is permissible, advisable, and even manda-
tory – and also when it is not.
[449] Katharina Stevens & Daniel H. Cohen. The attraction of the
ideal has no traction on the real: On choices and roles in argu-
ments. In Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat, eds., Argumenta-
tion and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference
on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017, vol. 2, pp. 785–801. College
Publications, London, 2018.
If arguers were exclusively concerned with cognitive
improvement, arguments would be cooperative. How-
ever, we have other goals and there are other arguers,
so the default is adversarial argumentation. We natu-
rally inhabit the heuristically helpful but cooperation-
inhibiting roles of proponents and opponents. We can,
however, opt for more cooperative roles. The resources
of virtue argumentation theory are used to explain
when proactive cooperation is permissible, advisable,
even mandatory – and also when it is not.
[450] Katharina Stevens & Daniel H. Cohen. Devil’s advocates are
the angels of argumentation. In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Hen-
rike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar, & Bart Verheij, eds.,
Reason to Dissent: Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference
on Argumentation, Groningen 2019, vol. 2, pp. 161–174. College
Publications, London, 2020.
Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The con-
cept of a devil’s advocate—a cooperative arguer who
assumes the role of an opponent for the sake of the
argument—serves as a lens to bring into clearer focus
the ways that adversarial arguers can be virtuous and
adversariality itself can contribute to argumentation’s
goals. It also shows the different ways arguments can be
adversarial and the different ways that argumentation
can be said to be “essentially” adversarial.
[451] Katharina Stevens & Daniel H. Cohen. Angelic devil’s advo-
cates and the forms of adversariality. Topoi, 2021. Forthcoming.
Is argumentation essentially adversarial? The con-
cept of a devil’s advocate—a cooperative arguer who
assumes the role of an opponent for the sake of the
argument—serves as a lens to bring into clearer focus
the ways that adversarial arguers can be virtuous and
adversariality itself can contribute to argumentation’s
goals. It also shows the different ways arguments can be
adversarial and the different ways that argumentation
can be said to be “essentially” adversarial.
[452] L. Paul Strait & Brett Wallace. Academic debate as a
decision-making game: Inculcating the virtue of practical wisdom.
Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, 29:1–37, 2008.
This essay argues for a pedagogical renewal in the
academic debate community, which currently lacks a
clear telos. Practical wisdom, as defined by Aristotle
in the Nicomachean Ethics, is proposed as the final
cause of academic debating. Practical wisdom is iden-
tified with the process of good decision-making. Con-
troversies in the theory of disadvantages, counterplans,
and critiques are evaluated. In order to realize the fi-
nal cause of practical wisdom, debate theory needs to
be restructured according to a common-sense under-
standing of decision-making. The authors advocate a
more rigorous and systematic approach for debating
and evaluating theoretical arguments.
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[453] Wan Shahrazad Wan Sulaiman, Wan Rafaei Abdul Rah-
man, & Mariam Adawiah Dzulkifli. Examining the construct
validity of the adapted California Critical Thinking Dispositions
(CCTDI) among university students in Malaysia. Procedia: Social
and Behavioral Sciences, 7(C):282–288, 2010.
This research aims at evaluating the psychometric
properties of the adapted California Critical Think-
ing Dispositions (CCTDI) particularly the construct
validity. CCTDI consists of 75 Likert-type items mea-
suring seven dispositions, namely truth-seeking, open-
mindedness, analyticity, systematicity, inquisitiveness,
self-confidence and maturity. The participants of this
study involved 425 undergraduate and graduate stu-
dents. Results showed that the CCTDI has satisfac-
tory construct validity with seven subscales extracted
and confirmed by exploratory and confirmatory factor
analyses. These evidences of construct validity were fur-
ther supported with the results of high Cronbach alpha
indicating that it is a valid and reliable instrument to
measure critical thinking dispositions.
[454] John Symons. Formal Reasoning: A Guide to Critical Thinking.
Kendall Hunt Publishing Company, Dubuque, IA, 2017.
Critical thinking does not provide a path to cozy and
reassuring beliefs. It will not necessarily support your
favorite ideology, it is potentially disruptive to some
aspects of your current way of life, and it may even
irritate some of your friends and family. Nevertheless,
a critical thinker should favor truth over comfort. We
ought to favor truths even though we sometimes de-
rive some pleasure from believing falsehoods. Typi-
cally, careful students of critical thinking find they
must abandon at least some of their cherished opin-
ions or comfortable habits of thought. Doing so requires
courage, intellectual maturity, and humility. Not all of
us can be courageous and mature all of the time. How-
ever, an education in critical thinking requires that, at
a minimum, you aspire to these virtues. Some people
claim that they would rather be wrong and feel good
than be right and not feel good. This book is not for
them.
[455] Alessandra Tanesini. Arrogance, anger and debate. Symposion,
5(2):213–227, 2018.
Arrogance has widespread negative consequences for
epistemic practices. Arrogant people tend to intimidate
and humiliate other agents, and to ignore or dismiss
their views. They have a propensity to mansplain. They
are also angry. In this paper I explain why anger is a
common manifestation of arrogance in order to under-
stand the effects of arrogance on debate. I argue that
superbia (which is the kind of arrogance that is my con-
cern here) is a vice of superiority characterised by an
overwhelming desire to diminish other people in order
to excel and by a tendency to arrogate special entitle-
ments for oneself, including the privilege of not having
to justify one’s claims.
[456] Alessandra Tanesini. Reducing arrogance in public debate. In
James Arthur, ed., Virtues in the Public Sphere: Citizenship,
Civic Friendship, and Duty, pp. 28–38. Routledge, London, 2019.
Self-affirmation techniques can help reduce arrogant
behaviour in public debates. This chapter consists of
three sections. The first offers an account of what
speakers owe to their audiences, and of what hearers
owe to speakers. It also illustrates some of the ways in
which arrogance leads to violations of conversational
norms. The second argues that arrogance can be un-
derstood as an attitude toward the self which is posi-
tive but defensive. The final section offers empirical ev-
idence why we should expect self-affirmation to reduce
defensiveness and thus the manifestation of arrogance
in debate.
[457] Alessandra Tanesini. Arrogance, polarisation and arguing to
win. In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch, eds., Polar-
isation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives,
pp. 158–174. Routledge, London, 2020.
A number of philosophers have defended the view that
seemingly intellectually arrogant behaviours are epis-
temically beneficial. In this chapter I take issue with
most of their conclusions. I argue, for example, that
we should not expect steadfastness in one’s belief in
the face of contrary evidence nor overconfidence in
one’s own abilities to promote better evaluation of
the available evidence resulting in good-quality group-
judgement. These features of individual thinkers are, on
the contrary, likely to lead groups to end up in stale-
mates and to polarise over issues. It is true that groups
benefit from including members that, prior to discus-
sion, hold diverse views. But disagreement benefits
group judgement only when it is transient, rather than
entrenched. That is, groups reach better quality con-
clusions when a number of diverse opinions are dissem-
inated and evaluated fairly before reaching a consensus.
If this is right, it would seem that individual qualities,
such as open-mindedness and even-handedness about
the epistemic value of opinions other than one’s own,
rather than steadfastness or overconfidence are con-
ducive to better quality group judgement
[458] Deborah Tannen. Agonism in academic discourse. Journal of
Pragmatics, 34(10-11):1651–1669, 2002.
The pervasiveness of agonism, that is, ritualized ad-
versativeness, in contemporary western academic dis-
course is the source of both obfuscation of knowledge
and personal suffering in academia. Framing academic
discourse as a metaphorical battle leads to a variety of
negative consequences, many of which have ethical as
well as personal dimensions. Among these consequences
is a widespread assumption that critical dialogue is syn-
onymous with negative critique, at the expense of other
types of ‘critical thinking’. Another is the requirement
that scholars search for weaknesses in others’ work at
the expense of seeking strengths, understanding the
roots of theoretical differences, or integrating disparate
but related ideas. Agonism also encourages the concep-
tualization of complex and subtle work as falling into
two simplified warring camps. Finally, it leads to the ex-
clusion or marginalization of those who lack a taste for
agonistic interchange. Alternative approaches to intel-
lectual interchange need not entirely replace agonistic
ones but should be accommodated alongside them.
[459] Edward Donald Taylor. The Importance of Humility for the
Teaching of Critical Thinking. Master’s thesis, Concordia Univer-
sity, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2016.
Teaching critical thinking is widely regarded as a vital
task, both for educators in general and philosophers in
particular. It is simultaneously acknowledged as being
notoriously difficult to instill in students. In part, this
seems to be the result of critical thinking skills being
VIRTUES AND ARGUMENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 65
to some extent domain-specific. For example, teaching
can help students learn to avoid certain logical falla-
cies in a particular domain such as political science,
and yet the same students fall into logically identical
fallacies in another area of their lives without noticing
and without any apparent conflict. This is a problem
noted both by philosophers interested in the theoreti-
cal implications and educators attempting to address it
in practice. My MRP will explore a virtue-based strat-
egy for addressing this problem. Virtue ethics litera-
ture focuses on both character virtues and intellectual
virtues, while the virtue epistemology literature has fo-
cused primarily just on intellectual virtues. These in-
clude open-mindedness and intellectual courage. I be-
lieve this makes for a gap in the virtue epistemology
literature. It is a gap because some epistemic prob-
lems, including the domain-specificity challenge to crit-
ical thinking, have underappreciated bases in general
character traits, in addition to the already recognized
bases in general intellectual traits. To help address epis-
temic problems such as overcoming domain-specificity
of critical thinking, virtue epistemology ought to fo-
cus on character virtues, not just intellectual virtues.
To help show this, I use humility as a case study. My
main thesis is that having the general character trait of
humility is an essential prerequisite for routinely good
critical thinking across multiple domains. Without this
and other general character traits, an agent will too
often be unwilling and/or unable to apply theoretical
knowledge of critical thinking that is necessary for rou-
tinely succeeding at critical thinking.
[460] Barbara J. Thayer-Bacon. Caring reasoning. Inquiry: Critical
Thinking Across the Disciplines, 19(4):22–34, 2000.
I want to examine here the ontological and epistemo-
logical assumptions of caring as a form of moral ori-
entation. By doing so, I will be able to make the case
that caring is as vital for epistemological theories as it is
for moral theories. Caring does not just inform ethics,
it informs reasoning as weIl. I will argue that caring
reasoning helps ensure we understand each other’s dif-
ferent, shifting views fairly and generously while at the
same time avoiding too narrowly defining caring and
risking essentializing it. Caring reasoning can help an-
swer concems feminists have expressed about caring, as
a moral orientation, in terms of supplying justification
and drawing awareness to historical context and social
systems.
[461] Juli K. Thorson. Thick, thin, and becoming a virtuous arguer.
Topoi, 35(2):359–366, 2016.
A virtue account is focused on the character of those
who argue. It is frequently assumed, however, that
virtues are not action guiding, since they describe how
to be and so fail to give us specific actions to take
in a sticky situation. In terms of argumentation, we
might say that being a charitable arguer is virtuous,
but knowing so provides no details about how to argue
successfully. To close this gap, I develop a parallel with
the thick-thin distinction from ethics and use Hurst-
house’s notion of “v-rules.” I also draw heavily from
the work in argumentation by Daniel Cohen to develop
Wayne Brockriede’s notion of arguing lovingly. But “ar-
gue lovingly” has a delicious ambiguity. For Brockriede
it describes how we engage with others arguers. It can
also mean, however, a loving attachment to knowledge,
understanding, and truth. Applying the thick-thin dis-
tinction to argumentation in general and loving argu-
mentation in particular shows that a virtue theoretic
approach to argumentation is valuable for two reasons:
it can provide one articulation of what it means to be
a virtuous arguer and provide some insights into how
to become one.
[462] Valerie Tiberius. Virtue and practical deliberation. Philosophi-
cal Studies, 111:147–172, 2002.
The question of how to reason well is an important nor-
mative question, one which ultimately motivates some
of our interest in the more abstract topic of the prin-
ciples of practical reason. It is this normative question
that I propose to address by arguing that given the
goal of an important kind of deliberation, we will de-
liberate better if we develop certain virtues. I give an
account of the virtue of stability and I argue that sta-
bility makes reasoners (of a certain sort) reason better.
Further, I suggest at the end of the paper that an ac-
count of virtues that conduce to good reasoning might
go a long way toward answering some of the traditional
questions about the principles of practical reason.
[463] Valerie Tiberius. Open-mindedness and normative contingency.
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 7:182–204, 2012.
Open-mindedness seems to be a virtue because an open
mind is more receptive to the truth. But if value judg-
ments are best understood as a human projection, ex-
pression, or construction, then it is unclear why open-
mindedness is a virtue when it comes to normative
judgments. If moral truths are not “out there”, what
is the point of an open mind? What are we being
open to? Further, if oughts and values are, in some
way, contingent on us, open-mindedness may put us at
greater risk of losing important convictions than in the
case of belief about the world. In this paper I defend
open-mindedness for normative judgment in the con-
text of meta-ethical theories that makes values mind-
dependent.
[464] Thomas T. Tominaga. Toward a Confucian approach to culti-
vating the reasoning mind for the social order. Inquiry: Critical
Thinking Across the Disciplines, 12:20–23, 1993.
Implicit in Confucius’ emphasis on self-cultivation is
the need not only to cultivate our jen (benevolence,
humanity, kindheartedness), but also to develop and
apply our reasoning mind—as an enlightened and dis-
ciplined way of bringing about and maintaining social
order. In this paper, I would like to investigate how this
is understood and pursued from the Confucian perspec-
tive. The ideas I express are developed from those of
Confucius and his influential followers—Mencius, Chu
Hsi, and Wang Yang-ming.
[465] Brian Treanor. Environmentalism and public virtue. Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23:9–28, 2010.
Much of the literature addressing environmental virtue
tends to focus on what might be called “personal
virtue”—individual actions, characteristics, or dis-
positions that benefit the individual actor. There
has, in contrast, been relatively little interest in ei-
ther “virtue politics”—collective actions, characteris-
tics, or dispositions—or in what might be called “pub-
lic virtues,” actions, characteristics, or dispositions that
benefit the community rather than the individual. This
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focus, however, is problematic, especially in a society
that valorizes individuality. This paper examines public
virtue and its role in environmental virtue ethics. First,
I outline different types of virtue in order to frame the
discussion of public virtues and, in particular, a sub-
class of virtues I will refer to as political virtue. Second,
I focus on practical problems and address the inade-
quacy of personal virtue for effecting social change and,
therefore, for addressing most environmental crises. Fi-
nally, I argue that public and political virtues are neces-
sary, if under emphasized, conditions for the flourishing
of the individual, and that they are important comple-
ments to more traditional environmental virtues.
[466] Cheng-hung Tsai. A virtue semantics. South African Journal of
Philosophy, 27(1):27–39, 2008.
In this paper, I propose a virtue-theoretic approach to
semantics, according to which the study of linguistic
competence in particular, and the study of meaning
and language in general, should focus on a speaker’s
interpretative virtues, such as charity and interpretabil-
ity, rather than the speaker’s knowledge of rules. The
first part of the paper proffers an argument for shifting
to virtue semantics, and the second part outlines the
nature of such virtue semantics.
[467] George Tsai. Rational persuasion as paternalism. Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 42(1):78–112, 2014.
Rational persuasion is paternalistic, I argue, when it
is motivated by distrust in the other’s capacity to ad-
equately recognize or weigh reasons that bear on her
good, when it conveys that she is insufficiently capable
of engaging with those reasons, as a competent person
is expected to be able to do, and when it occludes an
opportunity for her to engage independently with those
reasons herself.
[468] Olli-Pekka Vainio. Disagreeing Virtuously: Religious Conflict
in Interdisciplinary Perspective. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing,
Grand Rapids, MI, 2017.
Disagreement is inevitable, particularly in our current
context, marked by the close coexistence of conflicting
values and perspectives in politics, religion, and ethics.
How can we deal with disagreement ethically and con-
structively in our pluralistic world? In Disagreeing Vir-
tuously Olli-Pekka Vainio presents a valuable interdisci-
plinary approach to that question, drawing on insights
from intellectual history, the cognitive sciences, phi-
losophy of religion, and virtue theory. After mapping
the current discussion on disagreement among various
disciplines, Vainio offers fresh ways to understand the
complicated nature of human disagreement and recom-
mends ways to manage our interpersonal and intercom-
munal conflicts in ethically sustainable ways.
[469] Jorge Valenzuela, Ana Ma Nieto, & Carlos Saiz. Critical
thinking motivational scale: A contribution to the study of rela-
tionship between critical thinking and motivation. Electronic Jour-
nal of Research in Educational Psychology, 9(2):823–848, 2011.
The present work reports the characteristics of an in-
strument measuring the degree of motivation that peo-
ple possess to think critically. The Critical Thinking
Motivation Scales (CTMS) is based on a theoretical op-
tion that affords precedence to the perspective of mo-
tivation for over the perspective of dispositions. Mo-
tivation is understood as the expectancy/value. This
sound theoretical frame offers further possibilities for
researching factors that affect the activation of cogni-
tive resources for the acquisition and deployment of
critical thinking.
[470] Jean Paul Van Bendegem. Argumentation and pseudoscience:
The case for an ethics of argumentation. In Massimo Pigliucci
& Maarten Boudry, eds., Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Re-
considering the Demarcation Problem, pp. 287–304. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2013.
As someone who has participated in real life as a de-
bater and a lecturer, I have heard (and unfortunately
continue to hear) many silly and few sound arguments.
This huge difference between theory and practice cre-
ates a rather strong tension, and, in general terms, that
tension is what I want to discuss here. More specifically,
if we take into account all the real-life aspects of a de-
bate, a discussion, or an argumentation, what does it
mean to defend a thesis, a position, or a claim in an ef-
ficient way? In section two, I am more explicit, though
rather brief, about the above mentioned ideal reasoner
or debater. Then I sketch the picture that comes closer
to real-life situations. In section four, I outline what this
new look entails for argumentation, discussion, and de-
bate. Next, I present some concrete cases, and in the
final section, I raise the ethical issues posed by all this.
[471] Paul van den Hoven. Commentary on: Anne-Maren Andersen’s
“Pistis—the common Ethos?”. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin
Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON,
2014.
Anne-Maren Andersen starts her contribution devel-
oping the term pistis into an analytical tool that she
summarizes in table 1. She then applies the tool on
Danish parliamentary debate. Forced to make a choice
I limit myself to some sketchy remarks about the first
part, the way Andersen develops the term pistis. In my
opinion it is useful to elaborate on the history of this
term pistis to decide whether we should adopt this term
to denote the analytical tool presented in table 1. My
conclusion will be not to adopt it this way. However,
that does not mean that the analytical tool pretended
by Andersen is not useful to analyze parliamentary de-
bate. The theoretical foundation however can be found
in existing theories about the principle of charity and
cooperation principle.
[472] Jan Albert van Laar & Erik C. W. Krabbe. Splitting a differ-
ence of opinion: The shift to negotiation. Argumentation, 32:329–
350, 2018.
Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of in-
terest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discus-
sants who are unable to resolve their difference about
the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may
be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the
other and search instead for a compromise that would,
for each of them, though only a second choice yet be
preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First,
when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when
would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second,
what is the nature of a compromise? What does it
mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opin-
ion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of
mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution?
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Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argu-
mentation within the context of negotiation and com-
promise formation and to show how arguing disputants
can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way.
[473] Serena Villata, Elena Cabrio, Imène Jraidi, Sahbi Ben-
lamine, Maher Chaouachi, Claude Frasson, & Fabien Gan-
don. Emotions and personality traits in argumentation: An em-
pirical evaluation. Argument & Computation, 8:61–87, 2017.
Argumentation is a mechanism to support different
forms of reasoning such as decision making and persua-
sion and always cast under the light of critical thinking.
In the latest years, several computational approaches to
argumentation have been proposed to detect conflict-
ing information, take the best decision with respect to
the available knowledge, and update our own beliefs
when new information arrives. The common point of
all these approaches is that they assume a purely ra-
tional behavior of the involved actors, be them humans
or artificial agents. However, this is not the case as
humans are proved to behave differently, mixing ra-
tional and emotional attitudes to guide their actions.
Some works have claimed that there exists a strong
connection between the argumentation process and the
emotions felt by people involved in such process. We
advocate a complementary, descriptive and experimen-
tal method, based on the collection of emotional data
about the way human reasoners handle emotions dur-
ing debate interactions. Across different debates, peo-
ple’s argumentation in plain English is correlated with
the emotions automatically detected from the partici-
pants, their engagement in the debate, and the men-
tal workload required to debate. Results show several
correlations among emotions, engagement and men-
tal workload with respect to the argumentation ele-
ments. For instance, when two opposite opinions are
conflicting, this is reflected in a negative way on the
debaters’ emotions. Beside their theoretical value for
validating and inspiring computational argumentation
theory, these results have applied value for developing
artificial agents meant to argue with human users or to
assist users in the management of debates.
[474] Katharina von Radziewsky. The virtuous arguer: One person,
four characters. In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds.,
Virtues of Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation
(OSSA), May 22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument,
we soon find ourselves confronted with a puzzling situ-
ation: What seems to be a virtue in one argumentative
situation could very well be called a vice in another.
This talk will present the idea that there are in fact
four roles an arguer has to master – and with them
four sometimes very different sets of virtues.
[475] Ronald J Waicukauski, JoAnne Epps, & Paul Mark San-
dler. Ethos and the art of argument. Litigation, 26(1):31–34, 75,
1999.
In preparing an argument, there are always strategic
and tactical decisions that will influence your ethos
with the listener. Think about those decisions—and
their potential effect on your ethos—the next time you
try a case or argue a motion or an appeal. Consider how
a certain argument might affect the listener’s percep-
tion of your integrity, of your knowledge, of your sincer-
ity. Ponder whether your clever allusions will make the
jury like you or identify with you. What Aristotle ob-
served long ago, contemporary research has confirmed:
Ethos could make the difference between whether your
argument succeeds or fails.
[476] Douglas N. Walton. Ethotic arguments and fallacies: The cred-
ibility function in multi-agent dialogue systems. Pragmatics and
Cognition, 7(1):177–203, 1999.
In this paper, it is shown how formal dialectic can be
extended to model multi-agent argumentation in which
each participant is an agent. An agent is viewed as
a participant in a dialogue who not only has goals,
and the capability for actions, but who also has sta-
ble characteristics of types that can be relevant to an
assessment of some of her arguments used in that di-
alogue. When agents engage in argumentation in dia-
logues, each agent has a credibility function that can
be adjusted upwards or downwards by certain types of
arguments brought forward by the other agent in the
dialogue. One type is the argument against the person
or argumentum ad hominem, in which personal attack
on one party’s character is used to attack his argument.
Another is the appeal to expert opinion, traditionally
associated with the informal fallacy called the argu-
mentum ad verecundiam. In any particular case, an
agent will begin a dialogue with a given degree of cred-
ibility, and what is here called the credibility function
will affect the plausibility of the arguments put for-
ward by that agent. In this paper, an agent is shown to
have specific character traits that are vital to properly
judging how this credibility function should affect the
plausibility of her arguments, including veracity, pru-
dence, sincerity and openness to opposed arguments.
When one of these traits is a relevant basis for an ad-
justment in a credibility function, there is a shift to a
subdialogue in which the argumentation in the case is
re-evaluated. In such a case, it is shown how the out-
come can legitimately be a reduction in the credibility
rating of the arguer who was attacked. Then it is shown
how the credibility function should be brought into an
argument evaluation in the case, yielding the outcome
that the argument is assigned a lower plausibility value.
[477] Douglas N. Walton & Fabrizio Macagno. The fallaciousness
of threats: Character and ad baculum. Argumentation, 21:63–81,
2007.
Robert Kimball, in “What’s Wrong with Argumen-
tum Ad Baculum?” (Argumentation, 2006) argues that
dialogue-based models of rational argumentation do
not satisfactorily account for what is objectionable
about more malicious uses of threats encountered in
some ad baculum arguments. We review the dialogue-
based approach to argumentum ad baculum, and show
how it can offer more than Kimball thinks for analyzing
such threat arguments and ad baculum fallacies.
[478] Jianfeng Wang. Place, image and argument: The physical
and nonphysical dimensions of a collective ethos. Argumentation,
34:83–99, 2020.
“Place” as an argumentative domain, which has been
taken for granted and treated by theorists of argumen-
tation simply as a physical notion designating the oc-
casion where an argumentation takes place, carries far
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more complex meanings beyond its traditionally as-
sumed domain in the following three dimensions: as
a geographical locale; as a concept, an idea, a history
or a notion with its own disputable narratives and pre-
sumptions; and as an imaginative geography. Similarly,
an image or a character projected through argumenta-
tive discourse should be among the central concerns
for argumentation studies, however, limited attention
has nevertheless been paid to this traditional face of
argument in general and the collective face in particu-
lar. We argue that image is a site of discursive produc-
tion, a symbolic field or a discursively disputable space.
The discursive interplay among “place,” “image,” “ar-
gument” and “time” offer a new way of thinking about
ethotic argument and its key role in the establishment
of discursive credibility.
[479] Mark E. Warren. What should and should not be said: Deliber-
ating sensitive issues. Journal of Social Philosophy, 37(2):163–181,
2006.
I conclude that sensitive issues pose strategic challenges
for deliberative democrats: the criteria that govern the
validity of assertions—in particular, truthfulness and
sometimes even truth—often trade off against those
features of communication that endow individuals with
the status of participants. Deliberative diplomacy—
which may require expressive insincerities—is to be pre-
ferred when issues are at their most sensitive and con-
ditions of discourse less than ideal.
[480] Mark E. Warren. Deliberation under nonideal conditions: A re-
ply to Lenard and Adler. Journal of Social Philosophy, 39(4):656–
665, 2008.
Good manners “interfere with expression for the sake
of responsiveness to others, and such interferences are
both more noticeable and more important under condi-
tions of conflict”. Insincerity of this kind, and within the
context of sensitive issues, may sometimes have a role
to play in enabling deliberation—a position I call “de-
liberative diplomacy.” It is this claim to which Lenard
and Adler take exception, since they view my position
as endangering the ethic of truthfulness upon which
reasoned discourse depends. I respond by developing
eleven interrelated elements of the argument which, al-
though stated in the article, were either not sufficiently
developed or remained implicit.
[481] Thomas H. Warren. Critical thinking beyond reasoning: Restor-
ing virtue to thought. In Kerry S. Walters, ed., Re-Thinking
Reason: New Perspectives in Critical Thinking, pp. 221–232. State
University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1994.
There is something fundamentally wrong with the “crit-
ical thinking" (CT) movement that has gained so much
momentum in American education over the last decade.
In this essay I shall argue (1) that the general content of
CT pedagogy is not truly centered on human thinking
at all, but on some other vital, but radicaly different,
mental faculty that might better be called “reasoning”;
and (2) that the development of the capacity for true
thinking, and not merely reasoning, is profoundly im-
portant and may even be the crucial condition for the
development of individual moral consciousness. Thus,
the so-called CT movement, while intending in part to
develop moral insight or knowledge, may actually be
self-restricting in this regard. In distinguishing thinking
from reasoning, this essay endeavors to restore virtue to
the activity of thinking, virtue in the sense of essential
nature, as well as in the sense of moral worth.
[482] Lani Watson. What is inquisitiveness? American Philosophical
Quarterly, 52(3):273–287, 2015.
Despite some recent extensive work on the characteri-
sation of the character-based virtues (e.g. Roberts and
Wood, 2007; Baehr 2011) no detailed treatment of the
intellectual virtue of inquisitiveness has yet been forth-
coming. Inquisitiveness, however, is often cited as an
example of intellectual virtue in the contemporary lit-
erature (e.g. Baehr 2011; Zagzebski 1996). An in-depth
examination of the virtue of inquisitiveness is therefore
apt in the context of this emerging discourse. Part I of
this paper will review three approaches to characteris-
ing the intellectual virtues taken by Zagzebski (1996),
Roberts and Wood (2007) and Baehr (2011) and sub-
sequently develop a characterisation of inquisitiveness.
Part II will extend this examination by investigating
the unique role that inquisitiveness plays in the intel-
lectually virtuous life thus highlighting its place at the
heart of the autonomous virtue epistemological frame-
work.
[483] Lani Watson. Educating for good questioning: A tool for intel-
lectual virtues education. Acta Analytica, 33(3):353–370, 2018.
Questioning is a familiar, everyday practice which we
use, often unreflectively, in order to gather informa-
tion, communicate with each other, and advance our
inquiries. Yet, not all questions are equally effective
and not all questioners are equally adept. Being a good
questioner requires a degree of proficiency and judg-
ment, both in determining what to ask and in deciding
who, where, when, and how to ask. Good questioning is
an intellectual skill. Given its ubiquity and significance,
it is an intellectual skill that, I believe, we should ed-
ucate for. In this paper, I present a central line of ar-
gument in support of educating for good questioning,
namely, that it plays an important role in the forma-
tion of an individual’s intellectual character and can
thereby serve as a valuable pedagogical tool for intel-
lectual character education. I argue that good ques-
tioning plays two important roles in the cultivation of
intellectual character: good questioning (1) stimulates
intellectually virtuous inquiry and (2) contributes to
the development of several of the individual intellec-
tual virtues. Insofar as the cultivation of intellectually
virtuous character is a desirable educational objective,
we should educate for good questioning.
[484] Ralph Wedgwood. Rationality as a virtue. Analytic Philosophy,
55(4):319–338, 2014.
Interpreting the concept of “rationality” as referring to
a kind of virtue helps us to solve some of the problems
that arise when we theorize with this concept. For ex-
ample, this interpretation helps us to understand the
relations between “rationality” and “rational require-
ments”, and the distinction that epistemologists often
signal by the terms “propositional” and “doxastic justifi-
cation”. Finally, interpreting rationality in this way will
help us to answer some of the objections that have been
raised against the thesis that the term ‘rational’, as it
is used in these contexts in epistemology and decision
theory, expresses a normative concept of any kind. In
particular, I shall argue that this interpretation helps us
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to answer the following objection. It has seemed plau-
sible to many formal epistemologists and decision theo-
rists that rationality involves having mental states with
certain formal features—such as consistency or prob-
abilistic coherence in one’s beliefs, or preferences that
meet certain so-called “axioms” like transitivity, mono-
tonicity, stochastic dominance, and the like. However,
it is not obviously even possible for ordinary agents to
have mental states with these formal features. If “ra-
tionality” is a normative concept, would not the claim
that rationality requires these formal features conflict
with the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’? As I shall
argue, understanding rationality as a kind of virtue will
help us to find a solution to this problem.
[485] Sheldon Wein. Commentary on: Brian MacPherson’s “The in-
completeness problem for a virtue-based theory of argumentation”.
In Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Ar-
gumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of
the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May
22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
Brian MacPherson has, it seems to me, offered us an
excellent account showing that and why virtue-based
argumentation theories need supplementation, and he
has, in my view, directed us to the right sort of sup-
plementation to overcome this problem. But some may
see problems with the supplementation he offers, and so
his next task should be to clarify the nature and role of
the pragmatic-utilitarian supplementation he gestures
towards.
[486] Sheldon Wein. Commentary on “DAMed if you do; DAMed if
you don’t”: DAMMIT—Dominant Adversarial Model: Minded In-
stead of Terminated. In Patrick Bondy & Laura Benacquista,
eds., Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016. OSSA, Windsor, ON,
2016.
The Dominant Adversarial Model (DAM) has arguers
in a metaphorical battle, each arguer seeking to de-
stroy the other’s argument. In this commentary on
“DAMmed If You Do, DAMmed If You Don’t” by
Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby (which is itself a
commentary on a paper by Dan Cohen on the Dom-
inant Adversarial Model) I raise one issue about the
metaphor and suggest an alternative metaphor. Cohen
thinks we should reject or replace or supplement the
DAM. Bailin and Battersby agree but think Cohen does
not go far enough.
[487] David J. Weiss & James Shanteau. The vice of consensus and
the virtue of consistency. In Kip Smith, James Shanteau, &
Paul Johnson, eds., Psychological explorations of competent de-
cision making, pp. 226–240. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2003.
Agreement among professionals is often considered as
evidence that a decision is correct. The reasoning be-
hind this principle is that it is unlikely that independent
experts would all choose a wrong alternative. Concur-
ring opinions in medicine, consensus on faculty commit-
tees, and unanimous appeals court decisions exemplify
how the principle makes us confident. The expertise of
someone who disagrees with the consensual answer is
deemed questionable. We challenge this view, arguing
that agreement with other experts is neither necessary
nor sufficient for expertise.
[488] David Carl Wilson. A Guide to Good Reasoning: Cultivating
Intellectual Virtues. University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing,
Minneapolis, MN, 2nd edn., 2020.
A Guide to Good Reasoning has been described by re-
viewers as “far superior to any other critical reasoning
text.” It shows with both wit and philosophical care
how students can become good at everyday reason-
ing. It starts with attitude—with alertness to judgmen-
tal heuristics and with the cultivation of intellectual
virtues. From there it develops a system for skillfully
clarifying and evaluating arguments, according to four
standards—whether the premises fit the world, whether
the conclusion fits the premises, whether the argument
fits the conversation, and whether it is possible to tell.
[489] Michael Wreen. Arguing with a good man. Philosophy &
Rhetoric, 29(1):65–74, 1996.
Never having been trained in rhetorical theory or, to
any appreciable extent, classical philosophy, and not
having done nearly enough reading in either, I’m more
than a little afraid to be doing what I’m doing here,
presuming to be able to write a professional paper on
my topic, ethos and argument. But being of good char-
acter (or ethos), and, in particular, being truthful, I’d
like you all to blame Alan Brinton if this paper is the
dismal failure that it may well be. It was Brinton who
first introduced me to rhetorical theory and encouraged
me to write on the topic.
[490] Minghui Xiong. Confucian philosophical argumentation skills. In
Dima Mohammed & Marcin Lewiński, eds., Virtues of Argu-
mentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of
the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May
22–25, 2013. OSSA, Windsor, ON, 2014.
Becker argued Confucianism lacked of argumentation,
dialogue and debate. However, Becker is wrong. First,
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We present empirical evidence that methods employed
to teach critical thinking are likelier to facilitate the
discernment and correction of biases in others’ reason-
ing than to have a similar effect in the self-monitoring
case. Therefore, standard CT instruction likely fails to
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Despite its long tradition the research of classical
rhetoric can provide many interesting perspectives even
today, since through renewed readings of ancient works
possible reinterpretations of certain concepts that be-
long to the ancient system of classical rhetoric are en-
abled. At the same time a detailed research of the classi-
cal rhetorical system offers one of the most useful start-
ing points to refine our perception of its concepts and
recognize the value of their application to the contem-
porary models of rhetorical and argumentative analy-
sis. In this sense, one of the most interesting classical
concepts appears to be rhetorical ethos, a strategy of
(favorable) character presentation. Known and studied
mostly either solely from Aristotle’s conceptualizations
of pisteis entekhnoi or from the perspective of a moral
character that comes from Isocrates and Plato, ancient
rhetorical ethos in fact reveals a multifaceted nature
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